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Abstract. 
 
Soviet policy-makers, in order to aid and abet industrialisation, seem to have chosen science 
as an agent for development.  Soviet science, mainly through the Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR, was driving the Soviet industrial development and a key element of the 
preparation of human capital through social programmes and politechnisation of the society. 
This provided a broad set of the skills, including management and governance, 
multidisciplinary synthesis, and analytical ability which were required to ensure sustainable 
technical and industrial development.  
 
This process of human capital development in the USSR could not take place without a 
particular Soviet social policy which was designed by the Party and Government and 
included the development of science, education, healthcare in synchronisation. The success 
was achieved due to the implementation of the large programme for human capital 
development in whose preparation both basic research and education played the critical role. 
 
Science was regarded in the USSR as an indispensable tool for modernising the country, 
and, for the first time in world history, was recognised as a natural resource beyond the 
doctrine of Marxism which helped cope with the challenges, including industrialisation, 
WWII and the import substitution programme.  
  
The investments in the development of fundamental science eventually paid off both 
nationally and later - at the global level.  Many of the Soviet scientific discoveries started to 
appear as products in global households only decades after the Soviet collapse. Without 
many Soviet discoveries and developments, the current digital and industrial development 
would be hardly possible as they are integral parts of the global technology chains which 
constitute the modern hi-tech industry, economy, and most various markets. 
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Chapter 1          Introduction 
 
In modern research, the development of the Soviet Union (the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, or the USSR) has been the subject of significant debate since the first years of the 
Bolsheviks’ coming to power and continued after the end of the USSR. To various extents, 
many scholars have agreed on the following. 
 
Although in the Russian Empire factory industry was quite developed in St. Petersburg 
(Petrograd) and Moscow, the country was mostly backward and unindustrialised,1 occupying 
‘a semi-colonial position relatively to the West,’ especially to France and Germany in terms 
of the capital and heavy industry import.2 Meanwhile, these two cities ‘were no more than 
industrial “islands” in a vast agricultural sea,’ according to Maurice Dobb.3 
 
In Alexander Gerschenkron’s account, ‘Russia before the First World War was still a 
relatively backward country by any quantitative criterion,’ 4  although the Russian 
industrialisation which began in the 1880s provided a record, in terms of the other European 
counterparts, economic growth of the annual 8 per cent throughout the 1890s that with ups 
and downs continued until 1914.5 In its traditional race against time, Russia as a European 
country was a late-comer in the nexus of industrialisation whose pattern in many ways 
resembled that of Germany three decades earlier.6 However, in the Russian case, it faced with 
many insurmountable institutional obstacles of the historical, political, economic and social 
character whose contradictions became evident and much more acute during WWI and the 
Russian Civil War.7 In terms of the country’s educated and innovative human capital, as well 
as labour, the backwardness was particularly apparent, which was worded by Gerschenkron in 
1962 as follows: 
 
Russia on the eve of its great industrial spurt suffered from many disabilities. 
Its entrepreneurs were far too few; their time horizon was often limited, their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Dobb, Maurice, 1953, Soviet Economic Development Since 1917, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, first 
   - As well, as confirmed by Nove, Alec, 1992, An Economic History of the USSR. 1917-1991, Third Edition, 
Penguin Books. 
2 Dobb, 37-8 (Kindle edition). 
3 Ibid., 35. 
4 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 1962, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, A Book of Essays, The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 138; hereafter referred to as 
Gerschenkron. 
5 Ibid., 129. 
6 Ibid., 19. 
7 The Essay 6, Russia: Patterns and Problems of Economic Development, 1861-1958, Ibid., 119-51. 
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commercial customs backward, and their standards of honesty none too high. 
The influx of labor to industry was inadequate because of the institutional 
framework that had been imposed upon agriculture. Such labor as was 
available was uneducated, in Russia that tendency was particularly strong.8 
 
Meanwhile and speaking of the scientific human capital development, the Tsarist Academy of 
Sciences was one of the notable institutions of this kind in Europe with high academic 
standards and a culture of creativity which was characterised by a very high level of 
development in theoretical science. However, as worded by Loren R. Graham, ‘[T]he 
opposition to the development of science offered by these three great inertial forces in the last 
150 years of Russian history – government, church, and aristocracy – was immense.’9 In pre-
revolutionary Russia, applied science was less developed which can be explained by a low 
level of the Russian industry mostly controlled by foreigners.10  
 
As Graham wrote about that period, ‘[I]ndustrial laboratories were practically non-existent. 
The faculty members of the universities often received their educations in Germany, where 
the prestige of pure science was also preeminent; in the manner of disciples everywhere, the 
Russian students often carried their teachers’ views to extremes.’11 Although Russia had a few 
prominent engineering schools established in the XIX Century, the Academy ‘was still largely 
absorbed in the spirit of pure science’12 with research in mathematics, chemistry, biology, 
geology, topography, and geography particularly developed. 
 
The overall backwardness and contradictions in development led Russia to its defeat in WWI 
and the 1917 October Revolution. The industrial change which occurred to the Soviet Union 
within a quarter of a century transformed the country ‘beyond recognition,’ as worded by 
Dobb.13 For instance, the output of electrical power, steel, and coal production increased 
dramatically from the negligible numbers of three or four per cent to from ten to fifty per cent 
of the output of such industrialised powers as the USA, Germany, and Britain in 1937, 
making the Soviet numbers comparable.14 Similar results were achieved in agriculture.15 As 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 122-3. 
9 Graham, Loren R., 1967, The Soviet Academy of Sciences and the Communist Party, 1927 – 1932, Princeton 
University Press. 7; hereafter referred to as Graham. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 10. 
12 Ibid., 11. 
13 Dobb, 290. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., 284-9. 
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researched by Eugene Zaleski,16 from 1920 to 1940 the total industrial production in the 
Soviet Union grew by almost 6.5 times, according to the Soviet Central Statistical 
Administration,17 whereas the various Western sources estimated the growth from 2.63 
times (Kaplan and Moorsteen)18 to 3.5 times (Jasny).19 The growth in the production of all 
civilian products, according to Nutter, was at a rate of 2.69 times.20 Meanwhile, estimates of 
the growth in large-scale industry varied from 430 per cent by Hodgman21 to 771 per cent in 
the Soviet statistics.22  
 
Nonetheless, one can conclude, according to Gerschenkron of Harvard University, ‘that the 
average annual rate of industrial growth in [the USSR] throughout the first ten years after 
the initiation of the First Five Year Plan was somewhere between 12 and 14 percent; the 
rate fell in the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War but rose 
again after 1945. Its high level was maintained far beyond the period of reconstruction from 
war damages. In the first half of the fifties, industrial output still kept increasing at some 13 
percent a year.’23  
 
As a result of its industrialisation, along with the Allies, in 1945 the Soviet Union defeated 
the Third Reich and Imperial Japan in WWII. As French historian of WWII Henri Michel 
outlined in 1975, ‘Magnitogorsk has defeated the Ruhr,’24 defining the role of Soviet 
industrialisation in the war. 
 
After WWII, the Soviet Union established itself as a powerful economy and a prominent 
global actor. In particular, it provided significant cultural and economic aid and expanded 
trade with Third World countries including India and China. China was a primary recipient. In 
what can be considered as one of the most massive technology transfers in modern history, in 
the period from 1950 to the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union invested 7.7 per cent of its annual 
national income in the People’s Republic of China, i.e. ‘Soviet exports to assisted enterprises 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Zaleski, Eugene, 1971, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth 1918-1932, Chapel Hill, The University of 
North Carolina Press. 
17 Ibid., 259-60, citing from Promyshlennost SSSR (Industry of the USSR), Moscow, 1957, 31-32. 
18 Ibid., citing from Kaplan, Norman M., and Moorsteen, Richard H., 1960, Indexes of Soviet Industrial Output, 
RAND Research Memorandum 2495, Santa Monica, Calif., 235. 
19 Ibid., citing from Jasny, Naum, 1951, Soviet Economy During the Plan Era, Stanford University, 22. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., citing from Hodgman, Donald, 1954, Soviet Industrial Production, 1928-1951, Cambridge, Mass., 89.  
22 Ibid., citing from Promyshlennost SSSR. 
23 Gerschenkron, 149. 
24 Michel, Henri, 1975, The Second World War, Andre Deutsch, 463. 
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totaled 9,409 hundred million rubles, of which equipment accounted for 8,394 hundred 
million rubles.’25 
 
Overall, according to Roger E. Kanet, ‘The decade from 1955 to 1965 witnessed a five-fold 
expansion of Soviet trade with the non-Communist states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
from 304 m. rubles (5.2 per cent of total trade turnover) to 1,743.6 m. rubles (11.9 per cent of 
total trade).’26 In 1960 Soviet foreign trade was 10.072 billion rubles, and 5.0059 billion 
rubles was export.27 The overall global export volume of trade in 1960 was USD130.09 
billion28 (the 1961 exchange rate of SUR0.929 per USD1 can be applied30). 
 
Meanwhile, during the preceding period from the 1920s to 1940s, in the extremely restricted 
economic conditions the Soviet Union experienced enormous losses of human capital in wars, 
famines, emigration, and political repressions. For instance, the direct human losses of the 
Soviet population in WWII constituted 26,613 million people31 which were accompanied by 
a temporary reduction of the birth rate and an increase in mortality.32 However, in terms of 
such quantitative indicators as the size of the population and life expectancy, the increase 
shown below was achieved.  
 
The population of the USSR was persistently growing except for WWII33 and was more than 
doubled within 71 years of Soviet history from 137.727 million people at the beginning of 
192034 to 291.1 million people in January 1991.35 Within 70 years, urbanisation of the Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Zhang, B., Zhang, J., Yao, 2006, Technology Transfer from the Soviet Union to the People’s Republic of 
China: 1949-1966, Comparative Technology Transfer and Society, 4 (2), 117; retrieved on 11 May 2019, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/201913; hereafter refereed to as Zhang.  
26 Kanet, Roger E., 1975, The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies, Vol. 31, No. 8, 
Aug., The World Today, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 338. 
27 Vneshnya torgovlia SSSR za 1960 god, Statisticheskii obzor (The USSR Foreign Trade in 1960, The Statistical 
Annual Directory), 1961, VNESHTORGIZDAT, Moskva, 7.    
28 Trends in global export volume of trade in goods from 1950 to 2016 (in billion US dollars), The Statistical 
Portal; retrieved on 05.04.2018 from the Web, https://www.statista.com/statistics/264682/worldwide-export-
volume-in-the-trade-since-1950/.  The 1960 numbers are given in the denominated after 1961 SUR. 
29 SUR is the currency code of Soviet ruble as defined by The International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), ISO 4217. 
30 Historical Official Exchange Rates, Soviet Ruble, Wikipedia, referring to a saved copy of the archive of the 
Bank of Russia; retrieved on 05.06.2018 from the Web, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_ruble#cite_note-7. 
31 Andreev, E.M., et al., 1993, Naselenie Sovietskogo Soyuza, 1922-1991 (The Population of the Soviet Union, 
1922-1991), Moscow, Nauka, 78; retrieved on 25.04.2017 from the Web: 
http://demoscope.ru/weekly/knigi/naselenie/naselenie_1922-1991.pdf; hereafter referred to as Andreev. 
32 Ibid., 75-7. 
33 It was 196.617 million people in mid-1941 (Ibid., 56) and 179.217 million people at the beginning of 1950 
(Ibid., 70).  
34 Ibid., 14. Soviet Russia lost the territories of Poland and the Baltic States. At the beginning of 1914, the 
population of the Russian Empire (excluding Finland but including Poland and the Baltic states was 165.7 
million people; Rossiya, 1913, Statistiko-dokumental'nyi spravochnik (Russia, 1913, Statistical Documentary 
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population from about 17 per cent in 1917 reached a balance between the urban and rural 
population in 1961; ‘and by 1987 two of every three Soviet citizens were urban dwellers,’36 
marking ‘a transition from a largely rural agricultural society to an urban industrial society.’37 
According to the Soviet/Russian economists Valentin Katasonov and Grigory Khanin, during 
Soviet industrialisation of the 1930s, the inflow of labour ensured less than a half of the 
Soviet GDP growth. Meanwhile, in the 1950s, in the conditions of the renewed immense 
growth mentioned above, an additional labour force constituted only 20 per cent of the 
growth, and the other 80 per cent were achieved through labour productivity.38 
 
The average life expectancy in the USSR rose from 44 years in 1926-739 to a peak of 69.5 
(64.5 for men and 73.6 for women) in 1971-2, according to the 1988 data,40 or to 69.95 (66.1 
for men and 73.8 for women) in 1965-6, according to the 1993 data,41 made after some 
adjustments in the light of the new data available. Thus, by the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union 
eventually came close to the most developed nations of the world in terms of this social 
indicator.42 
 
In terms of the other indicators of human capital and social development, education is critical. 
Throughout the 1930s and 1950s the following quantitative data became evident in the Soviet 
Union. As indicated in 1957 by Alexander Korol of MIT, in contrast to the figure of 8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Directory), 1995, the Russian History Institute, The Russian Academy of Sciences, Blitz, Saint Petersburg, 16; 
retrieved on 04.06.2018 from the Web, http://istmat.info/files/uploads/166/rossiya_1913_original.pdf. 
35 Naselenie, Chast 1 (The Population, Part 1), Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1990 g., (Statisticheskii 
ezhegodnik) (People's Economy of the USSR in 1990 [Statistical Yearbook]) 1991, Moscow, Finansy I Statistika; 
retrieved on 05.06.2018 from the Web, http://istmat.info/node/443. 
36 Soviet Union, Urbanization, Country Data; retrieved on 06.05.2019 from the Web, http://www.country-
data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-12479.html. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Katasonov, Valentin, 2019, Sovietskaya industrlializatsiya – nekotorye itogi (Soviet Industrialisation, Some 
Results), Fond Strategicheskoi Kultury (The Fund of Strategic Culture), 14 May; retrieved on 17.05.2019 from 
the Web, https://www.fondsk.ru/news/2019/05/14/sovetskaja-industrializacija-nekotorye-itogi-48181.html.   
39 Ed. Petrovsky, B. V., 1974-89, Prodolzhitel'nost zhizni (Life Expectancy), Bol'shaya Meditsinskaya 
Encyclopaedia (Large Medical Encyclopaedia), Vol. 21, 3d Edition, Moscow, Sovetskaya Encyclopaedia; 
retrieved on 23.03.2018 from the Web, http://xn--90aw5c.xn--
c1avg/index.php/%D0%9F%D0%A0%D0%9E%D0%94%D0%9E%D0%9B%D0%96%D0%98%D0%A2%D0
%95%D0%9B%D0%AC%D0%9D%D0%9E%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%AC_%D0%96%D0%98%D0%97%D0
%9D%D0%98; hereafter referred to as Petrovsky.  
40 Ryan, Michael, 1988, Life Expectancy and Mortality Data from the Soviet Union, British Medical Journal 
(Clinical Research Division), Volume 296, 28 May, 1513; retrieved on 25.04.2017 from the Web: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/29530876?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents; hereafter referred to as Ryan. 
41 Andreev, 95. 
42 Ibid., 94. 
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million pupils in primary schools in the Russian Empire,43 the total enrolment in Soviet 
schools reached its pre-war peak in 1940-1 with 34.5 million pupils.44 
 
In higher education, in 1956 in the Soviet Union there were 34 universities and 730 institutes 
established mostly during the Soviet period and dedicated to research in the major fields and 
for the industrial needs or specialisations respectively.45 The data showed that in 1955, 
enrolment in higher education institutions in the Soviet Union was 14 times higher in 
comparison with that of Russia in 1913-4, i.e. 1,865,000 students in 762 institutions (90-93 
persons per 10,000 of the total population) vs. 117,000 students in the total enrolment in 95 
institutions (83 persons per 10,000 of the total population) respectively.46  
 
In particular, ‘the budget allocations for education grew from 5.7 billion rubles in 1950 to 
10.3 billion rubles in 1960, and for the healthcare and physical culture from 2.1 billion 
rubles in 1950 to 4.8 billion rubles, i.e. in 2-2.5 time for both assignments,’ according to 
Khanin.47  
 
The data of the development of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (The Soviet Academy 
of Sciences, or the SAS) indicated that throughout the 1930s and 40s the SAS, according to 
Graham, ‘was converted from a society of scientists [in Tsarist Russia] into an enormous 
governmental institution, endowed with both research and pedagogical functions, and spread 
throughout the Soviet Union.’48 The SAS and its branches, consequently launched in 14 
republics and other regions of the Soviet Union, interacted with multiple S&T and R&D 
units, design bureaus, enterprises and associations, various educational institutions in the 
coordination with Gosplan (the Central State Planning Committee) and some of the 
ministries,49 and altogether represented ‘one giant public sector,’ as outlined in Paul M. 
Cocks’ report.50 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Korol, Alexander, 1957, Soviet Education for Science and Technology, The Technology Press of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, Chapman & Hall, Ltd, London, 2; 
hereafter referred to as Korol. 
44 Ibid., 22. 
45 Ibid., 137-8. 
46 Ibid., 131-2. 
47 Khanin, Grigory Isaakovich, 2002, 50-e – desyatiletie triumfa sovietskoi ekonomiki (The 50s is the Decade of 
the Triumph of the Soviet Economy), Svobodnaya Mysl' – XXI, #5, 72-94; retrieved on 01.05.2018 from the 
Web, http://istmat.info/node/57531; hereafter referred to as Khanin I. 
48 Graham, 191. 
49 Cocks, Paul M., 1980, Science Policy. USA/USSR. Volume II: Science Policy in the Soviet Union, Report by 
research working group under the USA/USSR Joint Commission of Scientific and Technical Cooperation, 47-
60; hereafter referred to as Cocks. 
50 Ibid., 4. 
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According to Soviet statistics, the funding for science in the USSR constituted SUR0.3 
billion in 1940,51 SUR0.505 billion in 1950, SUR2,172 billion in 1960,52 SUR6.9 billion 
in1965, SUR11.7 billion in 1970, SUR17.4 billion in 1975 to reach SUR21.3 billion in 
1980.53 In Cocks’ account, the Soviet funding for science reached 5 per cent of the Soviet 
GNP in 1980.54  It is important to stress out that the expenditures for the development of 
science were integrated into the overall social package.  27 per cent of the national income 
was allocated for the provision of the social policies in the USSR in 1980.55 
 
Throughout the 1930s and 1950s, Soviet scientists like Pyotr Kapitsa (Piotr, or Peter Kapitza), 
Lev Landau, Nikolay Basov, Aleksandr Prokhorov, Nikolay Semyonov and some others made 
notable discoveries which, starting from 1956, were awarded with Nobel Prizes.56 In October 
1957 the USSR launched Sputnik into space, and in April 1961 it began the programme of the 
human space flights.  
 
Considering that the nation became the pioneer in space exploration and that this sector 
required input from many other fields to be successful as the apex of a value chain, the Soviet 
space programme, as a part of the overall Soviet development, as evident from above, 
showcased a tangible and rapid progress in the social and health care system, education, 
industry, science, and technology. As acknowledged by James Peck, due to Soviet 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR v 1980 godu (Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik) (The People's Economy of the USSR in 
1980 [The Statistical Yearbook]), 1981, Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 524.	  
52 Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR v 1967 godu (Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik) (The People's Economy of the USSR in 
1967 [The Statistical Yearbook]), 1968, Statistika, Moscow, 818. 
53 Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR v 1980 godu (Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik) (The People's Economy of the USSR in 
1980 [The Statistical Yearbook]), 1981, Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 524. 
54 Cocks, 3. 
55 Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR v 1980 godu, Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik (The People's Economy of the USSR in 
1980, 1981, [The Statistical Yearbook]), Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 524. 
56 Nobel Prizes and Laureates, Pyotr Kapitsa – Biographical, The Nobel Prize in Physics 1978, Pyotr Kapitsa, 
Arno Penzias, Robert Woodrow Wilson, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 24.04.2017 from the Official Web Site of 
the Nobel Prize, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1978/kapitsa-bio.html; hereafter 
referred to as Kapitsa; 
- The Nobel Prize in Physics 1962, Lev Landau, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 04.06.2017 from the Web 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1962/; hereafter referred to as Landau. 
- The Nobel Prize in Physics, 1964, Nikolay G. Basov – Biographical, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 04.05.2017 
from the Web, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1964/basov-bio.html; hereafter referred 
to as Basov; 
- The Nobel Prize in Physics, 1964, Aleksandr M. Prokhorov – Biographical, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 
04.05.2017 from the Web, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1964/prokhorov-bio.html; 
hereafter referred to as Prokhorov. 
- The Nobel Prize in Chemistry, 1956, Nikolay Semyonov – Biographical, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 
12.03.2018 from the Web, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1956/semenov-bio.html; 
hereafter referred to as Semyonov. 
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development, in the discourse of global development from the 1950s, the word 
‘westernization’ was replaced with ‘modernization.’57  
  
Nonetheless, most of the existing work evaluating Soviet development largely falls under the 
category of Cold War literature. As described by Sheila Fitzpatrick, a leading historian of the 
Soviet Union, in 2010:  
 
There was a deadening predictability about both American and Soviet writing 
on Soviet history, the one seemingly a mirror image of the other. On any 
given topic, the Soviet historians would say that the Communist Party, free of 
internal doubts or dissent, had planned every detail of the ‘progressive’ 
policy, which turned out to be a smashing success. American scholars, 
agreeing that the Party planned every detail, would call the policy misguided 
and ideological, and judge it a disaster. I always thought there must be some 
more interesting way of interpreting the Soviet Union than simply reversing 
the value signs in its propaganda.58  
 
Both the perspective and language of the Cold War became clearly dominant in the literature 
on Soviet development, ignoring that in the first 25 years after the establishment of the USSR 
the international situation was pretty different to that after WWII, and making the perspective 
and language of the Cold War not directly compatible with those 25 years of development. 
Meanwhile, that period was crucial for the future Soviet success described above in 
establishing the base which defined and underpinned this progress. 
 
Set against this background, the research question is formulated as follows: How, in a quarter 
of a century, could such a backward country as the Soviet Union advance in its human capital 
and industrial development to an approximate level of the major powers of the era? 
 
In evaluating various sets and interconnections of the Soviet policies towards the development 
of the social and health care system, education, industry, science and technology as 
highlighted before, to address this unanswered question, the role of the Soviet science policy 
appeared particularly important. As outlined by Joseph S. Berliner, ‘Given the economic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Peck, James, 2006, Washington's China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of 
Globalism, University of Massachusetts Press, 46-47; hereafter referred to as Peck. 
58 Fitzpatrick, Sheila, 2010, Spy in the Archives, Meeting the Devil, A Book of Memoirs from London Review of 
Books, London, William Heinemann, 292-3. 
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structure, a society with a long and honoured tradition in science, technology, and enterprise 
may be expected to generate a higher rate of innovation.’59 Rather than being deeply rooted in 
this kind of the tradition, the Soviet case of innovation and, hence, development might have 
proven the importance of social, cultural and historical factors in which science and its 
possible connections to the other spheres of development including technology occupied a 
focal point.  
 
Science remained nonetheless unidentified in the literature in relation to Soviet development 
in general and its social and industrial policies in particular. It would also seem important to 
draw an extent to which science and technology are interconnected.  Meanwhile, ‘the rate of 
technological innovation depends in part on the nature of the social arrangements by which 
economic decisions are made.’60 Thus, science in the USSR is chosen as the key indicator 
around which construction of this research is built, to presumably shed light on the possible 
integrity of the Soviet science and social policies as well as their role in the Soviet human 
capital and industrial development.  
 
To tackle the research question, the following strategy is to be deployed. The thesis is divided 
into three major parts – a theoretical one, a data chapter and an analysis which are combined 
into 6 chapters including the conclusion. Altogether with the introduction, the first part 
includes chapter 2 which consists of the literature review and methodology.  
 
In the literature review, ten key voices on the subject are chosen. They can be divided into 
two camps, one of which takes the position that the Soviet Union stole or borrowed the know-
how for development, while the other one argues for the indigenous development as a result 
of Marxist and non-market drivers of progress.  The sharp difference of the views shows that 
this is not a settled question and there is a gap in what literature can inform the reader. 
 
The methodology section explains why a qualitative analytical method is chosen. The 
interviewees are divided into those from within the Soviet system and successor systems, and 
those from the West who interacted with the system. The list of the insiders includes an 
assistant to Soviet leader Josef Stalin, an ex-deputy head of the MIG aviation design bureau, 
scientists and social researchers from Russia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. In the second group 
of interviewees who are outsiders to the Soviet system, there are notable scientists such as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Berliner, Joseph S., 1976, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry, First MIT Press Paperback Edition, 
1978, 5; hereafter referred to as Berliner. 
60 Ibid., 8. 
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former head of the Argonne National Laboratory in the US, which is a home of nuclear 
technology  (he also used to be head of the Cavendish Laboratory/Department of Physics at 
the University of Cambridge), a former head of the Quantum Matter Group of the Cavendish 
Laboratory, CEO of the University of Cambridge Enterprise and other international physicists 
and engineers from the UK, the US, Canada, Greece and India.  
 
In this section, the questionnaire is described, as well as explaining why the particular 
questions are formulated in relation to the thesis. The other main sources of information are 
identified as well, e.g. the reports, various policy documents, legal acts, personal and official 
letters, memoirs, and other papers. In addition, the structure of the access to information and 
the data limitations are explained, and the specific interpretive challenges are described. 
 
The second part of the dissertation presents the data, and it consists of two parts in chapter 3. 
In the first one, the main data from the interviews are disclosed, starting with those who were 
inside the Soviet system and ranging to those who have only secondary knowledge of it. The 
second part of chapter 3 provides the information from various primary sources, e.g. Soviet 
official decrees, archives, and statistics used in the research. Due to the words length limit, 
some data obtained through interviews are also given in conjunction with the analysis in the 
further chapters. The data on the development of science in the Soviet Union are given with 
an emphasis on the role of Pyotr Kapitsa, a Soviet and Cambridge physicist and engineer, in 
the process of the policy development and deployment. His biographical details are provided 
in Appendix L.  
 
The third part of the thesis presents an analysis in the following three chapters. Chapter 4 
analyses the primary information obtained through the interviews and other sources in order 
to highlight the most prominent ideas related to the assumption that the fast-paced progress of 
Soviet development as indicated in the introduction could have resulted from a proper 
deployment of science and related social policy choices. Throughout this chapter, a particular 
example of the Soviet policies analysed through the respective data is Kazakhstan as an 
agricultural and nomadic society whose social, cultural and industrial transformation during 
Soviet industrialisation and afterwards is especially informative.  
 
In this chapter, science, its driving forces and its role in development are discussed as well, 
and the delineation between the two notions of science and technology is emphasised. This is 
done in order to shed light on a presumably universal connection of fundamental science with 
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modern industry through engineering and technology in the innovation chain, on the one 
hand, and in order to understand and explain that important role which the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR played in Soviet development as indicated above, on the other. This, in 
turn, is followed by an analysis of the policy-making and implementation due to which the 
production of science and scientific personnel became enabled in the Soviet Union.  
 
As mentioned above, Kapitsa contributed to this process. In order to highlight his ideas 
expressed in his correspondence with the Soviet policy-makers (including Stalin, Molotov, 
Khrushchev, Brezhnev and some others) and with some colleagues, as well as articles and 
speeches, Kapitsa’s legacy is presented in comparison with the views of Vannevar Bush, a 
founder of NASA and other US technological institutions, written in a report to the American 
leadership in 1945. This complementary analysis can be found in Appendix M. 
 
Chapter 5 concludes with a summary of the role of science and fundamental research in 
Soviet development and highlight some lasting Soviet contributions to global technological 
chains as well as discusses what happened in the post-war era.  
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion. The thesis aims to understand how Soviet policies were 
developed and how they brought specific results identified in the development of the USSR. 
Many countries, including some of the post-Soviet ones, are still searching for models of 
development which can accommodate local realities and global demands. Even those of the 
developing countries, like Russia or Kazakhstan, which are rich in natural resources, become 
highly dependent on global fluctuations which limit their progress and constrain their overall 
development. The example of the rapid industrialisation and human capital development of 
the Soviet Union in restricted conditions can presumably offer another model which could 
prove useful for them in constructing their social and industrial policy for the production of 
human capital and industry in some of the development models.  
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Chapter 2        Literature Review and Methodology  
 
Chapter 2 looks at the literature on Soviet development policies in section 2.1 and explains 
the methodology used in this thesis in section 2.2. 
 
2.1                            Literature Review   
 
The literature review aims at showing the gap mentioned in the introduction. Among many 
scholars writing on Soviet economic development, there is a significant debate which can be 
displayed on a continuum. The continuum can be divided into two groups conventionally 
designated as negative and positive ones towards the evaluation of the Soviet development as 
resultant from different sets of policies. The first group is a traditional economic approach 
evaluating Soviet technological development from the positions of the free market economy 
and pluralist politics. The second group is the scholars whose positive attitude towards the 
role of the science, as driven by the policies and non-economic factors, in Soviet industrial 
development can be displayed in a pretty broad range.   
 
One end of the continuum could be represented by Anthony Sutton denying almost any 
indigenous Soviet innovation on the grounds of the inherent inability of the central planning 
system to produce innovation and explaining the Soviet technological development by 
exogenous reasons, i.e. technology transfer in this case.61 The 1983 US Congress Report62 is 
shifted much closer to the centre of this continuum, to be nonetheless more on the negative 
side. These papers form the first group of the sources in the literature review.  
 
Julian Cooper on the state of Soviet technology,63 Paul M. Cocks in the 1980 Science Policy 
in the Soviet Union report64 prepared through the US-USSR Working Group on Science 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Sutton, Anthony, 1968, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1917 to 1930, Hoover 
Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, California, 348; hereafter referred to as Sutton I; 
   - Sutton, Anthony, 1971, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1930 to 1945, Hoover 
Institution Press; hereafter referred to as Sutton II;  
   - Sutton, Anthony, 1971, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development. 1945 to 1965, Hoover 
Institution   Press; hereafter referred to as Sutton III. 
62 V. Science and Technology, Soviet Economy in the 1980's: Problems and Prospects. Part 1, December 31, 
1982, Selected Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, 1983, US 
Government Printing Office, Washington, 509-541; hereafter referred to as The 1983 US Congress Report. The 
three specific papers chosen for the consideration from this report are designated by their authors’ names as well 
below. 
63 Cooper, Julian M., 1986, Technology in the Soviet Union, Current History, October 1, 85 (513); hereafter 
referred to as Cooper I; 
    - Cooper, Julian, 1979, Scientific And Technical Change in the USSR, The Futures, December, 471-81; 
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Policy, and Loren Graham on the relationship between the Academy of Sciences of the USSR 
and the Communist Party in 1927-3265 would rather be positively-neutrally placed on the 
continuum mentioned above in regard to the development of science and technology in the 
Soviet Union. Dzhermen Gvishiani of the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia, who aspired to bring 
his view on the development of Soviet science and its importance for global development, is 
to be placed on a more positive side.66 Alexander Korol of MIT, in his study of the Soviet 
education in science and technology,67 provided plenty of the data for the Soviet social policy 
which would place him towards the positive zone. Both the representatives of the two space 
programmes, Morris Leroy Spearman of NASA68 and Mstislav Keldysh, President of the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR,69 connected the Soviet scientific, technological and 
economic development to science and social policy, i.e. non-economic factors, and represent 
the other, very positive end of the continuum described. In addition, Soviet theoretical 
approach for its S&T policy is detailed in I.G. Kurakov’s Science, Technology and 
Communism, Some Questions of Development.70 All of them mentioned in this paragraph 
constitute the second group of the authors in the literature review.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
     - Amann, Ronald; Cooper Julian M.; Davies R.W., eds., 1977, The Most Comprehensive Study of Soviet 
Technology, The Technological Level of Soviet Industry, New Haven, Yale University Press; 
     - Amann, Ronald; Cooper, Julian M., 1986, Technical Progress and Soviet Economic Development, Oxford, 
Basil Blackwell; 
    - Amann, Ronald; Cooper, Julian M., eds., 1982, Industrial Innovation in the Soviet Union, New Haven, Yale 
University Press; 
    - Cooper, Julian, 1979, Western Technology in the Soviet Union, Technology and East West Trade, Library of 
Congress Catalogue Card Number 79-600203 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, US Government 
Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 Stock No. 052-003 -00723-1, November, 205-42; hereafter referred to 
as Cooper II; 
     - Cooper, Julian, 1985, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Power, in Shaffler Mark E., Technology 
Transfer and East-West Relations, London, Croom Helm; hereafter referred to as Cooper III. 
64 Cocks. 
65 Graham. It should be mentioned here that in his other following books dedicated to other aspects of science in 
the Soviet Union, Graham’s position was much more negative: Graham, Loren R., 1989, Science, Philosophy, 
and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union, Columbia University Press; 
Graham, Loren R., Ed., 1990, Science and the Soviet Social Order, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; 
Graham, Loren R., 1993, Science in Russia and the Soviet Union: A Short History, Cambridge University Press. 
66 Gvishiani, D. M., 1976, Nauka, Nauchno-technicheskyi potentsial SSSR (Science, Scientific-Technical 
Potential of the USSR), Bol’shaya Sovetskaya Encyclopedia (The Large Soviet Encyclopaedia); retrieved on 
26.06.2017 from the Web, http://bse.sci-lib.com/article107001.html; hereafter referred to as Gvishiani. 
67 Korol. 
68 Spearman was ‘head of Langley’s supersonic wind tunnels and […] a legendary person within the 
accomplishments of the NASA Langley facilities’; Morris Leroy Spearman, Langley Research Center, NASA; 
retrieved on 02.07.2017 from the Web, https://crgis.ndc.nasa.gov/historic/Morris_Leroy_Spearman. 
69 Keldysh, Mstislav, 1970, Lenin and Development of Science, The UNESCO Courier, 6-11; retrieved on 
02.07.2017 from the Web, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001844/184442eo.pdf; hereafter referred to as 
Keldysh. 
70 Kurakov I.G., 1966, Science, Technology and Communism, Some Questions of Development, Pergamon Press; 
hereafter referred to as Kurakov.    
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Another body of research which is positively-neutral towards Soviet social policies such as 
Mervyn Matthews’ one on Soviet education,71 Alastair McAuley’s one on socio-economic 
welfare and women’s education,72 and Grigory Khanin’s one on socio-economic aspects of 
Soviet development73 is incorporated into chapter 4. 
 
2.1.1                               Sutton and the 1983 US Congress Report 
 
In Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, Sutton argued for the overall 
backwardness of the Soviet Union and for its near total dependence on foreign technology in 
almost all industries, attributing Soviet technological and industrial achievements to the 
exogenous impact: ‘[T]he basic Soviet development strategy was to learn from that country 
considered to have the most advanced processes within a given field of technology and to 
leave no industrial sector without the benefits of this transfer process.’74 From his point of 
view, ‘No fundamental industrial innovation of Soviet origin has been identified in the Soviet 
Union between 1917 and 1965.’75 The Soviet model was flawed from the origin because 
‘central planning [did] not foster […] an engineering capability to develop modem 
technologies from scratch, nor [did] it generate […] inputs (educational, motivational, and 
material) to achieve this objective’76 which made the Soviet system intrinsically incapable of 
producing innovation and technology.  
 
According to Sutton, in Soviet technological development, the role of foreign technological 
transfer in Soviet industrial development was evaluated as crucial and dominant. Sutton 
attributed Soviet technological progress to the Western system which in his historical 
references included Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the US, Great Britain or any other country 
where technology transfer to the USSR originated from77 in different periods from 1917 to 
1965. While considering Soviet development, he did not include historical, cultural and social 
factors, including education and healthcare.78 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Matthews, Marvey, 1982, Education in the Soviet Union, Policies and Institutions since Stalin, George Allen 
& Unwin Ltd; hereafter referred to as Matthews. 
72 McAuley, Alastair, 1979, Economic Welfare in the Soviet Union, Poverty, Living Standards, and Inequality, 
The University of Wisconsin Press, George Allen & Unwin; hereafter referred to as McAuley I; 
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75 Sutton III, xxv. 
76 Ibid., 423 
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The rise to power, according to the scholar, was driven by substantial transfers of technology 
from outside, which were either legal, or illegal, or in the form of the post-war reparations, or 
acquired in espionage.  
 
He argued that the scientific achievements of the USSR were linked solely to a few names 
like Pyotr Kapitsa who, in turn, built his international reputation working in the University of 
Cambridge, a Western institution. To support his argument, Sutton connected the 
development of science across the innovation chain with the political concept of 
totalitarianism and complemented his theoretical assumption with the example of Vladimir 
Ipatieff,79 a Russian chemist who emigrated to the US to become a notable worldwide 
contributor in the field of petroleum chemistry as follows: 
 
It is not that Russian talent is lacking […] The heart of the problem is the 
great weakness of totalitarian systems in the application of scientific advance 
to the industrial structure in any rational manner. No chemist, nor indeed any 
scientist, of Ipatieff's stature has emerged during the 50 years after the 
Bolshevik Revolution, despite the enormous funds poured into science and 
the comparatively comfortable conditions in which scientists live and work.80   
 
Meanwhile, in the next volume, Sutton stated that ‘there [was] no question that Soviet 
scientists were at least on par with Western scientists in 1940, and in some areas of theory 
they could have been slightly ahead’81 without getting into any more detail. 
 
According to Sutton, ‘[u]sually there are many inventions available for selection in any 
industrial system; but in practice only a few are applied to become innovations.’82 In this 
view, science and technology represented changeable and replaceable variables to be 
assembled by the pieces into an innovation: 
 
The reader should bear in mind the distinctions made in this analysis between 
science and technology and between invention and innovation. Science is 
here defined as theory and laboratory development of theory, while 	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technology is the selective application of scientific findings to industrial 
production. Similarly, invention is the process of discovery and the prototype 
development of discovery, while innovation is the selective application of 
invention to industrial production.83 
 
As mentioned above, Sutton considered that the moderate technological advance the Soviet 
Union attained was due to exogenous ideas and imported know-how. However, he agreed that 
the Soviets ‘[…] invariably chose a more successful, low cost process. In the light of the 
history of technical transfers, the Soviet choice of Western techniques [had] been superb.’84 
Also the choice was executed rapidly and successfully ‘at a low cost and in a relatively 
efficient manner.’85 Sutton envisaged the following elements of Soviet industrialisation. 
Firstly, it was driven by ‘simple, clear cut objectives […] to build new, gigantic, mass-
production units to manufacture large quantities of simplified standard models based on 
proven Western designs.’ 86  Secondly, ‘technology, simplifications, standardization and 
duplication became the operational aspects of Soviet industrial strategy.’87 Thirdly, this 
copying saved significant reserves in time and investment.88 Fourthly, the resources from 
agriculture and consumer sectors were ‘diverted into industrial and military construction.’89 
He concluded that the external technical assistance was ‘the major causal factor in Soviet 
economic growth for the period 1928-45.’90  
 
Soviet industrialisation, according to Sutton, was successful, and primarily driven by the fact 
that ‘[t]he Communist Party correctly recognized technology as the heart of economic 
development’ and that ‘[t]he analysis made by the Party [was] correct.’91 Meanwhile, the 
broad economic process of the speedy post-war recovery of the Soviet economy was 
attributed in this study mainly to the Lend-Lease injections of 1943-4592 and reparations 
received as a result of WWII. Sutton assigned the post-war Soviet technological development 
to access received by the Soviet Union as a result of WWII to the resources of the fallen Third 
Reich not only in Germany but also in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, which became parts of the Soviet bloc after the war. The success of atomic 	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technology was driven by the military contributions received from Germany (in both rocket-
construction and nuclear technology) 93  as well as by a very successful Soviet global 
espionage network.94 Sutton identified a couple of successful Soviet indigenous innovations, 
e.g. synthetic rubber and the blast furnaces, marked only three other successful Soviet 
industries, and placed them in the following table:  
 
Table 1             Indigenous Soviet Innovation 1917-65 (as seen by Sutton)95  
 
         1917 to 1930                                 1930 to 1945                              1945 to 1965 
   Primitive tractors                                  Turbodrill                                  Electro-drill 
                                                 Alumina from nepheline                              Aircraft 
                                                    Synthetic rubber; SK-B                             Sputnik 
                                                     Once-through boiler                           Medical sutures 
                                                          Machine guns                          Electro-slag welding 
                                                                                                                   “Scaling up” 
 
 
In Sutton’s quantitative methodological approach electro-drill was counted in the same 
singular category as aircraft and Sputnik. The success of these industries was linked by Sutton 
to the personal preferences of the country’s leaders:  
 
Soviet indigenous technical progress is concentrated in three industrial 
sectors: iron- and steelmaking (but not the steel rolling), electricity generation 
and high-voltage transmission, and rocket technology. It may be noteworthy 
that each of these three technologies was at one time pushed by dominant 
party personalities: Stalin, as his name implies, favored the iron and steel 
industry; Lenin of course was the force for the electrification of Russia; and 
Khrushchev was a force behind the development of rocket and space 
technology.96  
 
The success in the sectors described was ascribed by Sutton to accidental factors of the 
personal involvement of the key political leadership. According to Sutton, in many sectors of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Sutton III, 234-7. 
94 Ibid., 233. 
95 Ibid., 423. 
96 Ibid., 362. 
	   26	  
Soviet industry, Soviet technological development took place due to imported know-how and 
technology to become assembled ‘scaled up’ Soviet innovations. In his view, ‘The Soviet 
problem is not that the nation lacks theoretical or research capability or inventive genius. The 
problem is rather that there is a basic weakness in engineering skills, and the system’s 
mechanisms for generating innovation are almost non-existent.’97 Referring to the examples 
of Ipatieff mentioned above and other prominent Russian scientists-émigré whose careers 
developed outside of the Soviet Union, Sutton suggested that ‘the weakness is not in Russian 
scientific talent, but in a coercive system which stifles scientific achievement and provides no 
means for the rational application of technical progress’98 and believed that the central 
planning system was the Soviet Achilles’ heel.99  
 
In a similar vein, the 1983 US Congress Report highlighted two historic waves of notable 
machinery imports in the USSR. The first large-scale one took place in the First Five-Year 
Plan of 1928-32 and showed a fourfold increase in comparison with the previous five years. 
After its peak in 1931, the imports sharply decreased. The second wave began in 1965 and 
gradually continued while being varied in different sectors of the economy. The investments 
for imports increased from 2 per cent of the total investments in the mid-1950s to 5.5 per cent 
of the investments in agriculture, electricity, steel, food processing and building materials by 
the late 1970s and up to one-third in the chemical industry by 1976. Afterwards, these 
numbers decreased although not dramatically.100   
 
The report argued that ‘throughout the post-Stalin period, the Soviets have emphasized the 
importance of science and technology in their economic development,’101 aiming at achieving 
productive efficiency through the progress of the ongoing scientific and technological 
revolution (STR). However, the USSR remained inferior to the technologically developed 
Western countries, mostly due to its bureaucratically controlled planned system. According to 
the report, the Soviet system resisted any innovations which were, while being imposed from 
above, viewed as deviations of the Plan by bureaucrats in the vast R&D pyramid.  
 
During this period from 1965 to 1983, in the policy implementation less attention was given 
to the development of fundamental science in comparison to that of applied science. For 	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example, The Inventor’s Certificate system established in 1931 was reformed into The 
Socialist Patent System of a more Western type in 1965 in order to incentivise the scientists, 
stimulate the development of R&D within the countries of the Council for Economic Mutual 
Assistance (CEMA) and facilitate Western imports.102  
 
According to this 1983 report, the USSR and the Communist bloc benefited from the 
integration of CEMA science and technology as ‘Soviet technological potential ha[d] 
increased overall by about 25 percent,'103 the study read. This reform aimed at adopting the 
Soviet patent system to the Western standards, which would allow the Soviet Union the 
following: i) to earn hard currency through patent sales in the West; ii) to get access to the 
international innovations for monitoring and applications purposes and iii) to contribute to the 
efficiency of the CEMA cooperation. After the Soviet Union joined the Paris Convention for 
the Protection of Industrial Property in 1965, the number of the patents granted by the 
Western firms to the USSR rose dramatically from 52 in 1965 to 1,723 in 1970 and, 
consequently, to 2,448 in 1979.104  
 
According to the study, all the measures stipulated above did not lead to the efficiency as 
expected, mostly due to both the rigid control of the state patent system and the bureaucratic 
reluctance. This could not help telling on the Soviet economic performance, slowing down the 
pace of the growth and pushing the Soviet economy towards the development of other earning 
hard currency sectors, like oil and gas production, metallurgy, etc. The currency was mostly 
needed to balance the debt with the Western countries of USD14 billion, accumulated by 
1981 and resulted from the technology transfer.105 On the other hand, the Soviet government 
had managed to decrease the growth of the deficit in the late 1970s and the early 80s.106 This 
was achieved through a certain success of the import substitution programme in applying 
domestic R&D as well as increasing growth of the CEMA R&D investments (RDI). ‘By 
1980, more than 3,000 scientific and engineering institutes and organizations in the CEMA 
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countries were working on approximately 4,000 collaborative RDI projects,’107 the report 
confirmed.  
 
Although the Soviet technological system experienced multiple problems in assimilating 
foreign high-technology, their imports steadily increased from USD500 million and USD403 
million for machinery orders and high-technology imports respectively in 1970 to USD7,034 
million, USD3,800 million and USD2,985 million for machinery imports, machinery orders 
and high-technology imports respectively in 1976.108  
 
According to the study, the Soviet Union had practically no import of high-technology from 
abroad in the period from 1932 to the early and mid-60s:  
 
Unlike the current period, however, the earlier period of intense interest on 
Western technology was short-lived. After peaking in 1931, machinery and 
equipment imports declined rapidly to the level that prevailed before the First 
Five-Year Plan. Soviet officials abruptly terminated technical assistance 
agreements and rapidly reduced the number of people traveling to and from 
the Soviet Union. From the end of the First Five-Year Plan to the early 1960s, 
the Soviet Union went through an extended period in which trade with the 
West was assigned a distinctly lower priority in Soviet economic plans.109 
 
Even after 1965, the Soviet Union remained a relatively small importer of Western 
technology on a global scale. As calculated in the US Department of Commerce study, ‘total 
Western exports of "high-technology" products to all countries in 1970 totalled $24,770.9 
million. Of this, the Soviet Union imported $402.9 million, or less than 2 percent of the total. 
The Soviet share rose to over 2 percent in 1978 and 1979, before declining to approximately 
the 1970 share in 1980.’110 
 
According to the report, due to the lack of the material incentives within the system, the 
following structural problems prevented the system from realising the innovation potential 
more efficiently: 
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The necessary scientific and technological strides needed to facilitate 
continuous economic growth have not been made. Progress in this direction 
has been slow and incremental. Constraints, perhaps inherent in the Soviet 
system, have prevented the attainment of full scientific and technological 
potentials. A good deal of the Soviet scientific research and development 
continues to be conducted independent of the needs of industrial production; 
many inventions never reach the factory. Institutional barriers hinder 
necessary scientific interaction; no "invisible college" of scientists performs 
the function of disseminating research results. Soviet scientists in large part 
are financially secure and have little material incentive to focus on specific 
industrial needs. Moreover, industrial plant managers lack the incentive to 
incorporate new technology into their production schemes. The threat of 
failing to meet their production plan is too great for many to undertake the 
short-run risks associated with switching to new systems.111  
 
The report expressed solidarity with the official Soviet policy for S&T development which 
was viewed as the only approach to keep up in the global technological and, hence – in the 
economic race, however, the reality was somewhat different. Scientists, although privileged in 
society, had few incentives to focus on specific industrial needs whereas the production sector 
had few incentives to try and apply innovations. Thus, the Soviet system although having 
both the innovation capacity and industrial base, was failing, according to the report, to transit 
towards a more balanced regime in the interaction of the state, industry, and academia for an 
effective innovation system. 
 
In the next subsection, the second group of research representing more positive evaluations of 
Soviet technological development in conjunction with other, non-economic policies and 
factors is considered.  
 
2.1.2                              Non-Market Evaluation of Soviet Development  
 
As written by Julian Cooper in 1986, ‘it is widely believed that the Soviet economy was 
extremely backward, even primitive, with respect to the technology of the United States, 
Japan or West Europe […] these perceptions do not adequately capture the richness of the 
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technology in the Soviet Union,’ and that ‘Western technology is important, but by no means 
crucial [to] the economic strength and military might of the Soviet Union.’112  
 
In his multiple papers on the scientific, technological and economic development of the 
USSR,113 Cooper explored Soviet development in these three spheres with an emphasis on the 
defence and high-tech sectors, followed by a retrospective comment on the achievements and 
the problems inherited from the period of industrialisation. He emphasised the complexity of 
the multi-level pyramid involved in the production of Soviet S&T and R&D with 
approximately 1.5 million natural and social scientists involved. According to Cooper, in 
1986, the following proportion lasted proportionally from the 1930s: ten per cent of them 
were engaged by the Academy of Sciences with its branches throughout the 15 republics to 
work in fundamental spheres with the concentration of the best minds in Moscow and a few 
other centres; 40 per cent – in higher education, this category had little to do with R&D; 
whereas the other half was involved in the industrial sector, and 500,000 out of them were 
employed in various R&D bodies for engineering and applied sciences.114  
 
Cooper’s sectoral analysis showed that the defence industry occupied a special place in Soviet 
development from the early 1930s. In many cases, the defence industry served as a trigger for 
the development of many other not directly associated activities in applied matters and in 
fundamental science. Cooper’s papers stressed a high level of development of the defence 
industry in the Soviet Union, which was at par with that of the United States. According to 
him, ‘the latest United States Department of Defense assessment of technological level in 24 
deployed military systems puts the Soviet Union ahead of the United States in 4, equal in 7 
and behind in 13.’115 The Soviet defence sector, due to sanctions and security control, was the 
least dependent on transfer of foreign technology, being at the same time one of the most 
developed sectors in the economy.   
 
Regarding the role of imported technologies for Soviet economic performance, Cooper wrote 
that multiples embargoes, imposed on the Soviet economy during the Cold War, had been 
playing a role of a trigger to develop domestic innovation in order to avoid the dependency on 
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technology transfer.116 Moreover, many of the technologies imported could not perform well 
in Soviet conditions due to discrepancies in output materials, differences in locations in the 
economic pyramids and technological chains, as well as distinct managerial and labour skills. 
According to Cooper, all of that caused a disappointment in the community of the Soviet 
experts. He concluded that ‘[t]hus it would be a mistake to regard Western technology as 
always representing a sure, direct path for the modernization of the Soviet economy.’117 
Instead, many efforts were applied by the Soviet Union in its last years to develop either 
indigenous technologies or those received from or developed jointly with the CEMA partners.  
 
In Cooper’s view, the country held a leading position in manufacturing a wide range of 
microprocessors, automated robots, numerically controlled machine tools, industrial lasers, 
powder metallurgy, composite materials, plasma technologies, and biotech. The assessment of 
these types of productions was difficult, as most of the initial technologies were hidden from 
view in the defence industry, whereas ‘the more visible activities of civilian organizations did 
not reflect Soviet capability, heightening the impression of backwardness.’118 According to 
Cooper, ‘[T]he Soviet Union is capable of successful technological innovation and can 
produce goods of a high technological level,’119 emphasising that in the civilian sector the 
Soviet system in its very stratified economy faced problems of keeping up with the US and its 
allies in terms of production of consumer goods.   
 
Paul M. Cocks’ report120 was written as a part of a series of bilateral agreements signed from 
1972 in the fields of cooperation in science and technology between the US and the USSR. 
According to him, science was regarded in the USSR as ‘an indispensable tool for 
modernizing’121 the country, and, for the first time in world history, was recognised as a 
natural resource. The Kremlin’s ideology and science were synonymous, and the scientific 
optimism inherited by Marxism from the XVIII Century enlightenment was ‘more popular 
[…] among the intellectuals in the Soviet Union than in Western states where the appeal of 
this model ha[d] diminished.’122 Meanwhile, the SAS remained the last one of the XVIII 
Century European Academies still domineering in its nation’s science.123   
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According to Cocks, ‘No government [was] explicitly committed to science and technical 
progress as that of the USSR,’124 by contributing systematically notable portions of the 
budget to the promotion of research:  
 
While allocations for R&D rose in the US to 2.5 percent of the GNP in 1965 
and have fallen ever since, official expenditures on science as a portion of 
national income have risen in the Soviet Union from 1.3 percent in 1950, to 
2.7 percent in 1960, to 4.8 percent in 1975. If we add development activity at 
the enterprise level, which is not included in "official" science figures, then 
the total share of national income has probably been about 7 or 8 percent 
throughout the 1970s. While official allocations for science have tended to 
stabilize in recent years at around 5 percent of the national income, this rate is 
still significantly higher than that of any nation in the Western world.125 
 
In the 1920s, the Soviet Union became the first country in history to try to formulate an 
integrated policy for science and technology, and ‘[i]t began conducting statistical and 
organizational surveys of scientific personnel and institutions a decade before other countries, 
including the United States.’126 
 
Unlike the atomised and semi-independent structure of R&D in the US, the whole complex of 
the Soviet system represented a kind of giant public sector, as argued in the introduction.  
 
The SAS was centralised, which followed the overall tradition of power inherited from Tsarist 
Russia.127 According to the report, ‘[c]entralization of R&D was regarded not only as a means 
of eliminating the duplication of effort and secrecy that were characteristic of capitalist states 
but also of making the most effective use of Russia's scarce S&T resources.’128  However, as 
outlined by Cocks, the transition of the R&D decision from central policy to an individual 
rather followed a continuum.129 According to Cocks, this policy expressed in a coordination 
of R&D efforts did not correspond with the Western image of the tight Soviet centralisation 
being rather ‘a comprehensive and coherent national science and technology policy.’130 
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In the Soviet Union, the contradiction between the nature of the planned economy and the 
unpredictable character of fundamental scientific research was resolved through the 
establishment of the institution of the semi-independent SAS. Unlike the economy, science 
did not develop under the supervision of the State Planning Committee. In Cocks’ view, 
‘activities under research, development, and innovation in the USSR were seen as ‘too 
complex and numerous and the results too unpredictable and indefinite to be worth the effort 
of joining them into a single coherent plan.’131 No attempts to integrate the S&T development 
into the planning system were undertaken until the mid-1950s. Cocks, however, viewed this 
as a flaw and commented the following on the development of engineering: ‘Much like the 
American pattern, the Soviet R&D effort was structurally and administratively fragmented 
among multiple mission-oriented agencies with conflicting jurisdictions and interests.’132 
Meanwhile, a major problem of the Soviet S&T policy lay, according to Cocks, in translating 
of scientific findings into practical applications.133 
 
Cocks observed that historically both Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union fluctuated between 
two extremes in its relationship with foreign science, either imposing self-isolation or actively 
involved with cooperation and exchange in the times of its technological lag.134 It happened 
periodically, beginning from the modernisation of Peter the Great in the XVII-XVIII 
Centuries, and occurred twice in the XX Century during industrialisation of the 1930s and 
Détente of the 1970s.135 
 
Based on Soviet sources,136 Cocks presented the following structure of the Academy of 
Sciences of the USSR: 
 
Diagram 1         Structure of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR 137 
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The report also confirmed that the central Academy had branches in the other 14 Republics 
but the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (the RSFSR). It also had eight affiliates 
and centres in different regions and a dozen Academic Cities among which the Siberian 
Division of the Academy in Novosibirsk was particular. It enjoyed certain privileges and 
played the role of the RSFSR’s academy. According to Cocks, ‘[U]nlike the discipline-
oriented departments, it is governed by its own general assembly and presidium. It is 
administratively subordinate to both the USSR Academy and the Council of Ministers of the 
Russian Republic (RSFSR). Funding is provided by the RSFSR, which has no republic 
academy of its own. Thus, the Siberian Division has a certain measure of independence vis-a-
vis the Soviet Academy.’138 
 
The dynamics of the Academy’s development (established in 1724) from the 1920s and 30s, 
and in particular the 1940s and 50s, can be seen in the following. The 1940s was the period 
when most of the national republican branches were established. The relative sizes of the 
branches can be estimated from the numbers of the scientific institutions, the numbers of the 
full and corresponding members as well as the numbers of researchers, including those with 
advanced degrees. The central Academy and the branches in the two Slavic republics of 
Ukraine and Belarus were the biggest and most developed ones where the largest portion of 
the national research was concentrated, followed by the branches in Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan in Central Asia, and Georgia and Azerbaijan – in the Caucasus. The other six 
branches were significantly smaller in size. The central Academy had 733 members whereas 
Ukraine had 300; Belarus, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan had over 100 of them, and the 
remaining 10 less than 100. It was also similarly reflected in other criteria including the 
numbers of scientific institutions. If the central and governing body had 244, Ukraine had 70, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan – more than 30, and the other 10 – less than 30. Belarus, 
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan had the largest numbers of researchers in 
relation to their populations.139 
 
R&D research was accumulated in the urban centres as well as in the republican capitals, 
whereas only three cities, Moscow and Leningrad140 in Russia and Kiev in Ukraine, held one-
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National Economy of the USSR for 60 years; Jubilee Statistical Yearbook), 1977, Moscow, 144; the full table of 
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fourth of all the national scientific institutions and conducted 40 per cent of the overall 
research141 which was nonetheless established throughout the Soviet Union.  
 
The Academy of Sciences designed, planned, coordinated and functionalised all the regional 
R&D activity, including education, in cooperation with the GKNT (the State Committee for 
Science and Technology) and Gosplan. There were also specialised academies as a part of the 
overall scientific development in the Soviet Union such as the Academy of Agricultural 
Sciences under the USSR Ministry of Agriculture, the Academy of Medical Sciences under 
the USSR Ministry of Health and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences under the USSR 
Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education for conducting research in the 
appropriate disciplines.142   
 
In relation to science, technology, and innovation, Cocks believed that the system experienced 
problems of coordination and information exchange. The Soviets could not resolve some of 
the problems to like it was done by the American system by the 1960s, for instance, in terms 
of the system’s perception of technology as a form of mechanical transfer. Instead of 
‘technology transfer,’ ‘innovation process’ or ‘commercialisation cycle,’ the Soviet Union 
had its own a system of ‘scientific and technological complex of work,’ ‘research-production 
cycle’ and ‘complex of preproduction work.’ It was used extensively in the process of science 
planning and implementation from the 1960s,143 facing situations when ‘the economy ha[d] 
emerged to guide the planners.’144 
 
According to Loren R. Graham, ‘Within every society there exists “an environment for 
science” which to a greater or lesser degree, promotes the development of science by 
providing fertile soil for individual creativity.’145 He continued that although ‘the control of 
such factors as the philosophy of science can be attempted only by a society with very tight 
controls over intellectual life,’ the Soviets were designing the optimum environment for the 
flourishing of science in providing of the maximum variables in their policy ‘in the hope of 
facilitating this creativity […] No previous government in history was so openly and 
energetically in favor of science.’146  
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Graham argued that the crucial period of the establishment of the SAS was in 1927-32 which 
established the following specifics. Firstly, the SAS developed as a centralised and 
hierarchical public body in which the development of research in the Republics’ Academies 
of the USSR was supervised and coordinated from the centre not restricting research activities 
nevertheless and allowing the formers’ certain autonomy. Secondly, in terms of its 
governance, although the SAS was subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the USSR (as 
called from 1946), it was quite autonomous from the Soviet political system. The Academy 
was obliged to provide annual reports to the Council of Ministers. The SAS was run by its 
own President who was periodically elected by the members of the Academy in secret ballot. 
Presidents, Members, and Academicians of the branches were elected locally to be approved 
in the Central Academy and the Central Committee (the TsK) of the Communist 
Party. Thirdly, in its development, the SAS did not belong to the planning system, although 
its activity was tightly coordinated with the system of Gosplan and overall Soviet economic 
development. Fourthly, its funding mostly came directly from the Soviet government and was 
largely based on the needs and demands of the SAS. Last but not least, according to Graham, 
‘the reason for this expansion was the enormous prestige and talent of the Academy, which 
far exceeded that of any other body in the Soviet Union.’147  
 
This approach was in sharp contrast to that of Tsarist Russia as argued in the introduction. 
Although Russia had research in mathematics, chemistry, biology, geology, topography, and 
geography particularly developed, it, however, even in 1927, lacked management and 
coordination, and it was, unlike in other European leading countries of that time, unbalanced, 
relatively chaotic and not perfectly polished.148 Graham concluded:  
 
Despite two centuries of governmental interference and control, the Imperial 
Academy of Sciences, as it existed in the first decades of the 20th century, 
was an institution of remarkable talent and achievement. In a country 
extremely backward educationally and only beginning its great development 
economically, the leading scientists were abreast of those in western Europe. 
[…] To the communist reformers of Russia after 1917 this unique legacy 
became an opportunity which once seized and then transformed, resulted in a 
framework of scholarly research totally new in history.149  
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According to Graham, the Academy had survived the turbulent times of the Civil War 
relatively well, although with some notable losses of human capital. At the first stage after 
1917 the revolutionaries envisaged a new kind of socialist science which was supposed to 
emerge as part of a broader culture in society. It was to follow as a result of the inevitable 
transformation of culture, according to Marxism, as a derivative superstructure of the 
economic basis.150 In Graham’s account, the new characteristics of socialist science ‘would 
include a new theory of the place of science in the society, a more fertile economic 
environment for technological growth, unprecedented governmental support for research, a 
superior organizational scheme of research institutes, and a methodology for the planning of 
science.’151 Although the qualitative transformation for the new Soviet science to turn it into 
something completely new by its nature did not happen, the approach eventually led to 
building a new policy. As planning of science appeared impossible, planning for science 
became a viable option.152 
 
According to Graham, the peak of the struggle between the two opposing approaches, i.e. the 
ideological one vs. the pragmatic one, and the moment at which the policy towards science 
changed occurred during the public debate between Nikolay Bukharin, a leading economic 
ideologist, supervising the development of science and technology in the government and an 
active proponent of the construction of ‘new socialist science,’ and Vyacheslav Molotov, the 
chairman of the government, at the All-Union Conference for the Planning of Scientific-
Research Work in April of 1931.153   
 
Concerning Marxism, Graham noted: ‘The specific characteristics of scientific development 
in ancient China, the French Revolution, Renaissance, medieval period, Nazi Germany, and 
Soviet Russia cannot all be explained on the basis of the economic foundations of those 
societies. Furthermore, scientific and technological innovations are often not products of 
pressing material necessity.’154 Thus, a significant theoretical mistake for the Marxists, 
according to Graham, was in their visions of the history of natural science when ‘[t]hey 
believed that natural science […] develops in response to the needs of material 
production.’155 
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In Graham’s account, ‘[f]uture years would demonstrate ever more clearly that Soviet science, 
impressive as it became, would compete with the science of other nations on the same terms 
by which the scientists of those nations rated each other.’156 After conducting plenty of 
surveys and statistical research in 1921-34, it was officially declared that natural sciences did 
not belong within the ideological superstructure.157 Overall this pioneering research158 laid the 
foundation of the international methodological approach of the modern scientific institutional 
organisation. 
 
As a result, the SAS expanded during and after the industrialisation drive without falling 
under the purview of the planning system. Graham outlined that engineering became an 
integral part of the Academy’s activities: ‘Academy of Sciences’ relationship to Soviet 
industry in the early thirties was in some ways similar to that of a large industrial research 
laboratory in the West serving a particular industry with one difference being the fact that in 
the Soviet Union the particular industry was the whole industrialization effort.’159 Thus, 
altogether with the Party’s guidance in all institutions and the total mobilisation of the society 
for industrialisation, the Soviet scientific programme was pragmatic and formidable.160 In 
1960, Alexander Nesmyanov,161 President of the SAS, referred to the Academy as the 
‘director of the Soviet scientific orchestra.’162 
 
According to Graham, science was viewed by Soviet officials as a key to modernise both the 
economy in unlocking the country’s natural wealth and the national state of mind as opposed 
to the old and widespread religious mysticism.163 They actively and openly supported science 
and sought an optimal balance between power and development following the Marxist 
principle of the unity of theory and practice.164  
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In the Large Soviet Encyclopaedia in 1976, Dzhermen Gvishiani argued that the Soviet S&T 
potential ‘represent[ed] a dynamic combination of being implemented and not yet used 
objective capabilities and conditions for further growth of societal production. [...] The 
growth [of the potential] [wa]s one of the main conditions of socio-economic progress, 
provision of all-sided development of all members of the society and the utmost satisfaction 
of their material and cultural needs.’165 
 
This research capacity in itself represented a significant progressive and productive force. 
According to the encyclopaedia, in 1975 there were 1.2 million of researchers within the 
overall number of 4 million of the personnel allocated for R&D, and 9,1 million – in the 
sphere of education and culture.166 The number of the engineers in the economy reached 9.1 
million. The overall number of the researchers in the USSR accounted to one-quarter of the 
total global number.167  
 
In practical terms, it was partially reflected in the growing number of ‘inventions and 
rationalisation proposals’ (i.e. patents) based on S&T which grew from 591,000 in 1940 to 
5,113,000 in 1975, of which those of the applied ones – from 202,000 to 3,977,000.168 A 
direct economic effect of using these patents, in Gvishiani’s account, was estimated in saving 
SUR90 million and SUR4,805 million respectively.169  
 
According to Gvishiani, 16,600 new types of machinery and equipment were launched in the 
industrial production in 1971-5 against 8,400 in 1966-70.170 The share of the economy formed 
by the science-induced technology was 31 and 36 per cent in 1970 and 1975 respectively.171 
The growth of the electronics industry, in particular, was notable in the form of the 
‘automated management systems’ from 414 in 1966-70 to 2,364 in 1971-5. It conjured with 
10 national, 86 particular industrial R&D and 93 territorial data processing centres and 
166,000 people involved.172 
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As outlined by Alexander Korol in Soviet Education for Science and Technology,173 in the 
light of the unprecedented economic and technological development when science and 
engineering, in general, and physics, especially, became of particular importance, the Soviet 
educational system ‘was mobilized to challenge and compete’ 174  with the rest of the 
developed world. The Soviet education system (SES) was viewed as a foundation for Soviet 
achievements in physics and mechanical engineering, which were the main driver for Soviet 
economic development. According to this MIT scholar, ‘It is critically important, therefore, 
for us to examine Soviet education, especially in the fields of science and technology.’175  
 
In the system, ‘‘[P]olytechnic’ education for all up to age 17 was in 1919 proclaimed by the 
Communist Party as the objective and method of the Soviet School’ was referred to a type of 
teaching ‘by Marx and Engels which ‘familiarizes one with the basic principles of all 
productive processes and at the same time gives the child of the adolescent [age] the skill of 
using the simplest tools employed in every branch of production,’176 wrote Korol.  In 1931 the 
term polytechnisation received concretisation of ‘mastery of scientific fundamentals (in 
physics, chemistry, mathematics, native language, geography and other subjects)’177 and it 
was established as a priority in the official educational policy-making as a conventional 
method of instruction, rapidly distributed throughout the SES: 
 
Every attempt to disassociate polytechnization of the school from a 
systematic and firm mastery of science – especially of physics, chemistry, 
and mathematics, the teaching of which must be based upon rigorously 
defined and carefully worked our syllabi and curricula and carried out in 
accordance with a firmly established school calendar – represents a most 
fundamental perversion of the concept of the polytechnic school.178 
 
All the secondary school curricula contained a lasting balance between social sciences, 
science and other training such as music, art, and physical culture, and developing basic 
engineering and other skills, with a great emphasis on math and physics. Another important 	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ingredient was concluded in the constant updating of the curricula with the involvement of 
leading scientists. For instance, in the two years after 1952, in accordance with the policy of 
the ‘polytechnization of schools,’  
 
[…] in the lectures on general physics such topics as heat engines of different 
types, modern hydro-turbines, high-voltage transmissions, and technical uses 
of X-rays, ultraviolet rays, and gamma rays were treated in considerable 
detail. The courses in theoretical mechanics […] were adjusted to consider 
such topics as the technical aspects of friction, the influence of resonance on 
the performance of the machines, and the kinematics and dynamics of crank 
drive mechanisms. In teaching elementary mathematics, calculating skills 
were emphasized, graphic solutions of equations and inequalities 
demonstrated, and the topic of nomograms added.179  
 
Korol provided a comprehensive study of the Soviet educational system with a detailed and 
historical overview, including mandatory high school education for years seven to ten, and 
also in various labour and rural schools with some differences for the 15 national republics of 
the USSR. 
 
According to him, the only historical example of mass education in scale and structure, which 
can be compared with the SES, was the American educational system (AES). There were 
more differences than similarities between the two systems. The similarities included the 
numbers of years of attendance (10 in the SES vs. 12 in the AES) in high school and the 
structure of the S&T higher education, which was comparable to that of MIT, in Korol’s 
singular example. However, philosophy and practice differed dramatically. Whereas the 
American system relied on general education based on the principle of ‘the best specialized 
training for a certain selected few,’180 the Soviet system relied on the polytechnic instruction 
in its curricula as quality of mass education. This orientation of the Soviet ten-year school’s 
curriculum for science and mathematics made it closer to its European analogues, especially 
the German one, Oberrealschule,181 established though in the USSR within the ideological 
framework of Marxism-Leninism.  
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The authors of the polytechnic instructions defined the right and proportional balance between 
knowledge, ability, and skills by incorporating engineering and technology into the school 
course of physics with ‘metal fabrication, power generation and distribution, automation, 
radio, and railroad, automotive, and air transport’ as well as ‘the mastery of measuring 
technique – determination of weight, specific gravity, pressure, velocities, efficiency of 
machines, temperatures, specific heat, electric current characteristics, light and illumination 
intensities, and others.’182 Similarly, the course of school mathematics was thoroughly and 
widely prepared as well as enriched with plenty of measurements and instrumentations of 
applied mathematics. The overall list of the polytechnic objectives included over 200 pages 
with every method, phase and element of the teaching process, known to date.183 The 
polytechnic instructions continued to be updated in later years.184   
 
According to Korol, between 1929 and 1955, the number of elementary seven- and ten-year 
schools throughout the Soviet Union was around 200,000 with 75,000 schools built and 
reconstructed after being damaged during the war.185  
 
Korol provided plenty of data on the development of the system of Soviet higher education 
established during industrialisation. Many of them are important and given below in this 
thesis for the purpose of highlighting both the scale and character of the development of the 
Soviet education system from the 1930s to the 1950s which was a crucial period. As a result 
of this development, in 1955, those 33 universities, indicated in the introduction, were 
distributed throughout the diverse ethnic landscape of the other national republics of the 
USSR, including all the capitals of the 14 national republics and essential industrial and 
cultural centres in Russia, as well as in the capitals of some autonomous republics 
(Voronezh, Gorky,186 Irkutsk, Rostov-on-Don, Saratov, Tomsk, Sverdlovsk,187 Molotov,188 
Kazan in Tatarstan, Petrozavodsk in Karelia), Ukraine (Kharkov, Chernovtsy, Odessa, 
Lvov, Uzhgorod), Uzbekistan (Samarkand) and Estonia (Tartu).189  
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The principle of the prevalence of the polytechnic instruction became dominant in the 
system. In the 33 universities, there were 19 types of 232 faculties there. Overall, 145 out of 
them were dedicated to the disciplines in science and technology vs. 11 types of 85 faculties 
in humanities and social sciences.190 The disciplines in physics and mathematics became the 
absolute leader with 7 faculties in physics, 25 faculties in physics-mathematics, 7 in 
mechanics-mathematics and 1 in natural sciences-mathematics, accompanied by 25 faculties 
in chemistry and 29 faculties in biology and related disciplines, 24 faculties in geology and 
others.191 40 faculties specialising in physics and mathematics were offering 33 courses in 
mathematics, 33 courses in physics, 14 courses in mechanics, 3 courses in astronomy and 2 
courses in geophysics.192  
 
According to Korol, in terms of the university enrolment by faculties at the beginning of the 
1955-6 academic year in the USSR, among 115,652 students of all 33 universities, 25.64 
per cent were enrolled for mathematics and physics and 31.52 per cent for the other 
scientific disciplines. This constitutes 57.16 per cent of the total university enrolment.193  
 
In those 33 Soviet universities, the polytechnic instruction remained a dominant type of the 
education being nonetheless balanced with the humanities. Also, 19 polytechnic institutions 
specialising in science and technology were established in the country to cover a similarly 
extended geography.194 This number included 392 ‘specilaities’ taught at 132 faculties, with 
7 faculties and 20.6 ‘specialties’ in average per institute.195 Altogether with 4 industrial 
institutes and 2 correspondence (zaochnye) institutions, this made the overall number of the 
higher education institutions specialising in technology and engineering equal to 25 with 
167 faculties of 57 various types.196 In addition, there were 16 ‘machine construction, 
machine tools and, tools, mechanical and auto mechanical institutes’ established by the 
1950s with 43 faculties and 78 ‘specialties’ taught.197 
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In 1955, among 682 institutes198 (considered by Korol) out of the overall number of 762 of 
the higher education institutions, there was a balance between the types of the educational 
instructions in the study process. 318 out of them specialised in the polytechnic disciplines, 
and 364 in the humanities.199 Besides, 14 military schools were ‘devoted to other branches 
of engineering [to] play a similarly important role in their respective fields of applied 
science.’200  
 
The whole system was supervised by the single body, All-Union Committee on the Higher 
School (VKVsh), which became the Ministry of Higher Education in 1946. The Higher 
Attestation Commission (VAK) was formed as part of the Ministry of Higher Education and 
was in charge of granting academic degrees and titles. Korol stated that ‘[m]any observers 
of the educational scene in the Soviet Union have concluded that the degree of selectivity is 
high and that it is almost solely on academic merit,’ although it happened fully only after 
the discriminatory denial of the parental class  origin (bourgeois, or kulak) was removed in 
1936.201 Gender equality was also enormously advanced even in terms of modern times, as 
‘[a]pproximately 55 per cent of the 1955 graduates were women, who constituted about 40 
per cent of the graduates of schools for industry, construction, transport, and 
communications and about 80 per cent of the graduates of schools for teacher training.’202 
  
According to the 1984 NASA report by Morris Leroy Spearman, Scientific and Technical 
Training in the Soviet Union,203 the emphasis on science and technology was deeply rooted in 
Soviet philosophy and was driven by the goal to build communism and the theoretical base 
was briefly described as follows: 
 
For example, Karl Marx considered economy and technology to be directly 
proportional; Lenin related victory or defeat in war with the level of 
development of science and technology; Stalin said, ‘The main thing is to 
have the Bolshevich desire to master technology.’ Thus, to the U.S.S.R., the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Ibid., 140-1; the table, entitled Number of Institutions of Higher Education Listed by Categories and Type 
of Instruction, USSR, January 1955, can be found in Appendix E. 
199 Ibid. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Ibid., 173-4. 
202 Ibid., 201. 
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advancement of science to achieve and maintain technological superiority is a 
national objective.204 
 
Spearman explained the nature of the Soviet technological policy in connection with 
scientific, cultural, educational and social development. The scientist emphasised the 
importance of the psychological and military upbringing for the Soviet system in which the 
technological education came first in the following statement: 
 
The Soviet Union recognizes that the foundation of their system depends 
upon complete dedication of the people to the state through thorough 
psychological training as well as through military training, and through 
specialized education in the broad fields of engineering, natural sciences, life 
sciences, social sciences, and education. The overall cultural development of 
the people has always been a stated concern of the Soviet government.205 
 
He stressed the importance of both the elimination of illiteracy and the creation of the Soviet 
education system with the emphasis on S&T from the first days of Lenin in power, whose 
words ‘there must be a veritable revolution – the entire people must go through a period of 
cultural development’ were cited in the report.206 The S&T development was institutionalised 
through the following structure of power: 
 
Diagram 2        The USSR Scientific and Technical Organisation207 
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According to Spearman, ‘This organization shows the close relation between the government, 
the research institutes and design bureaus, industrial production, and the academic 
community. It is intended that this organization will assure that training, research, and 
production are directed toward the priority needs of the central government.’208 This structure 
was ensured by Soviet law in which the Soviet Constitution played the primary role.  
 
The functionality and interaction between the system’s elements was underpinned by the 
fundamental rights, freedoms and duties of the citizens of the USSR as established in the 
leading national act, the Soviet Constitution, through the clauses on social development and 
culture privileges, in which the Article 26 read: ‘In accordance with society's needs the state 
provides for planned development of science and the training of scientific personnel and 
organises introduction of the results of research in the economy and other spheres of life.’209 It 
also implied that the system of education was designed to fit the overall purpose of the 
development of science.  
 
The right to education was secured in the Constitution and ensured through the broad 
provision of all forms of education. Meanwhile, as described in the text: 
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Guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and artistic work are proclaimed 
in Article 47 as follows: Citizens of the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the aims 
of building communism, are guaranteed freedom of scientific, technical, and 
artistic work. This freedom is ensured by broadening scientific research, 
encouraging invention and innovation, and developing literature and the arts. 
The state provides the necessary material conditions for this and support for 
voluntary societies and unions of workers in the arts, organises introduction 
of inventions and innovations in production and other spheres of activity.210 
 
In accordance with Constitution, the Soviet system was obliged to create the conditions, 
incentivise its citizens to get them involved into development of science, technology, and 
culture (which were indicated as integrated phenomenon) as well as to facilitate the whole 
process in order to sparkle invention and innovation. The latter was viewed as a foundation of 
the production.  
 
Spearman outlined ‘the basic principles of public education in the U.S.S.R., as established by 
legislation, as follows:  
 
• Equality in obtaining an education, regardless of race, nationality, sex, religious 
attitude, or social status.   
• Compulsory education (through 8 years in 1958; through 10 years introduced in 
1975). State and public character of all educational institutions.  
• Free choice of language – Russian or some other language spoken in the U.S.S.R. 
(Russian is essential, however, for those who aspire to advance in the party, 
government, military, etc.)  
• Free tuition at all levels of education.  
• A unified system of education and continuity of instruction at all institutions.  
• Unity of instruction and communist upbringing between school, family, and society in 
raising the younger generation.  
• Linking education of the younger generation to meet the requirements of life and of 
the building of a communist society.  
• A scientific approach to education with constant improvement based on the latest 
developments in science, technology, and culture. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Ibid., 3. 
	   49	  
• Humanism and high moral principles in education and upbringing.  
• Co-education of boys and girls.  
• Secular character of education ruling out religious influences.’211 
 
The main features of the SES can be illustrated through the example of the Yeysk Higher 
Military Aviation School.212 Spearman made use of the five Soviet textbooks on aviation to 
illustrate the developed level of the indigenous industry (the footnote below).213 
 
According to Spearman, in engineering, ‘the U.S.S.R. produced greater numbers of graduates 
at persistently growing rates compared to the U.S. which produced a smaller number of 
engineers at an essentially constant rate.’214 He went on to say, ‘The U.S.S.R.’s rate of growth 
and increasing number of graduates [in engineering] is readily apparent, having grown from 
about 100,000 in 1960 to over 300,000 in 1982. The U.S. rate of growth is imperceptible and 
the number of graduates has remained constant at about 50,000 for the past twenty years.’215 	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design and performance of a variety of types of VTOL aircraft. Attention is given to power plants as the most 
important and decisive factor in VTOL design, stability and control, transition flight, jet interactions, and safety. 
It is interesting to note that one of the concepts included for a composite power plant VTOL design is quite 
similar to the YAK-36 Forger aircraft that was deployed on the Kiev cruiser in 1976.  
• Helicopters, Selection of Design Parameters by M. N. Tishchenko, A. V. Nekrasov, and A. s. Radin, Moscow 
1976. Prepared for publication by W. Z. Stepniewski and W. L. Metz, International Technical Associates, Ltd. 
for AVRAOCOM, Ames Research Center, Contract No. NAS2-10062, April 1979. This book may be of direct 
use to practicing engineers or for an academic course on the design of rotary-wing aircraft. The book deals 
primarily with transport-type helicopters and covers optimization parameters, effectiveness evaluation, 
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According to Spearman, overall, the USSR’s progressive growth in the numbers of graduates 
and the growth rate for the fields of natural sciences exceeded that of the US as shown in the 
following figure:  
 
Figure 1                 US/USSR Higher Education Graduates by Specialisation,  
                               1960-1975216 
 
 
 
This was defined by an ‘emphasis on engineering and natural sciences in the U.S.S.R. and 
emphasis on social sciences in the U.S. [which was] a reflection of the national priorities and 
objectives as perceived by the state in the U.S.S.R. and as perceived by the students and the 
schools in the U.S.’217 
 
Spearman concluded the NASA memorandum with the following statement:  
 
At the heart of the matter, the Marxist view that economy and technology are 
directly proportional appears to be evident […] The intensity and the 	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organization of the academics, coupled with practical work experience, and 
the persistent political indoctrination, provides the potential for a highly-
educated and highly-dedicated Soviet in the work force, military, or 
government. In any event, if the state-controlled system can be maintained, 
the Soviet Union will continue to be a dominant factor that cannot be ignored 
in world political, economical, technological, and military matters.218 
  
Overall, the NASA report outlined the connection between the development of the social and 
education base and the development of S&T on the one hand, and a Soviet leadership in 
technology on the other, emphasising the importance of technology for the economy.  
 
In 1970 Mstislav Keldysh, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR from 1961 to 
1975 and a leading scientific organiser of the Soviet space programme, made multiple 
statements in an article concerning Lenin’s personal involvement in matters of setting science 
and education as national priorities for Soviet policy.219  Keldysh directly connected the 
Soviet launch of Sputnik on 4 October 1957 to the Soviet education and science policy 
founded by Lenin who, ‘from the first, realized the importance of the role that science was to 
play in the rebuilding of his country.’220 
 
Referring to Lenin’s article Materialism and Empirio-criticism (1909),221 Keldysh observed:  
 
Our knowledge is relative, Lenin wrote, and knowledge of nature progresses 
by gradual improvement in scientific thought approaching ever closer to the 
truth. The great discoveries in physics at the turn of the century prove one 
thing, he said, namely, the inadequacy of the mechanistic concept. Matter 
does not "disappear" but manifests itself in new, more concrete forms, 
hitherto unknown, providing science with a deeper understanding of the 
physical properties of matter and the interrelations existing between its 
different states and conditions.222 	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According to Keldysh, Lenin contributed to the philosophy of science which later developed 
into the foundation of the methodology of contemporary science223 and emphasised the 
interconnection between social and natural sciences in the revolutionary’s own words of 
1922: ‘Natural science is progressing with such speed and undergoing such revolutionary 
upheavals in every field that the sciences cannot do without philosophical conclusions.’224 
Keldysh continued citing Lenin to outline the importance of technology and culture for 
development in Soviet philosophy: ‘[T]he genius of man's mind was used to provide the 
benefits of technology and culture to a part of the population, depriving the others of the basic 
essentials, education and progress. Now, all the wonders of technology, all the conquests of 
culture are to be the heritage of all people.’225 
 
Keldysh argued that Lenin’s contribution was not limited to theory and emphasised Lenin’s 
role in the establishment of Soviet science policy. In particular, the academician wrote, ‘Lenin 
was deeply conscious of the tremendous importance of science for development. He kept a 
permanent eye on all matters having to do with the organization of scientific research in the 
Soviet Union, and lost no opportunity to promote the maximum use of science and technology 
to improve the standard of living of the population.’226 Keldysh included in the article 
evidence of relevant Lenin’s decrees and orders which established or expanded research in 
various disciplines including geology, physics, aviation, optics, and engineering. 227  In 
particular, ‘[t]he activities of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences received his special attention. 
For Lenin, the participation of this scientific institution in the economic development of the 
country was of capital importance,’228 wrote the academician.  
 
In Soviet developmental policy, the role of the Academy of Sciences was viewed as 
prevailing ‘in bringing about a revolutionary change in the advancement of the country […] to 
mark its entire later development. Within half a century, the little coterie of scientists it had 
been composed of before the revolution, became a scientific centre of the very highest 
importance which was to direct the development of the natural and social sciences throughout 
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the nation.’229 The institutionalisation and expansion of scientific research in the Soviet Union 
were outlined by Keldysh as follows:  
 
[In] 1917 the Academy had only one research centre which consisted of a 
few laboratories and museums. Today it controls 210 scientific 
establishments including 160 research institutes all of which are 
contributing to the development of modern science. With a complement of 
some 250,000 research workers, the Academy's personnel has multiplied 
one hundredfold and its present budget is astronomical when compared to 
the meagre sum expended in the earlier years.230 
  
The policy led to the establishment of research in all the republics of the USSR, in which each 
Academy conducted research in the entire spectrum of modern disciplines, excelling at some 
particular of branch of research. For Ukraine they were cybernetics, solid state physics, 
geology, and physical chemistry; for Armenia – astrophysics; for Georgia – theoretical 
mechanics; for Uzbekistan – the chemistry of alkaloids; for Kazakhstan – the geological 
research; for Azerbaijan – the petrochemical studies; for Latvia – organic synthesis, etc.231 
Special attention was given to the development of fundamental research and the applied 
sciences in Siberia where Novosibirsk was developed as the coordinating centre. It took ‘the 
lead in certain branches of Soviet research and […] won world recognition for its pioneering 
work. New branches of the Academy [were] established in the Urals, the Far East, and other 
parts of the country.’232 
 
Meanwhile, ‘[t]he Academies of the Republics play[ed] a large part in solving particular 
regional problems. Those of Central Asia [paid] special attention to the scientific culture of 
cotton crops, the study of deserts and their exploitation and seismological problems.’233 
Keldysh pointed out that, apart from the SAS, research in agriculture, medicine and education 
was conducted in separate academies. He emphasised, in particular, ‘the brilliant successes of 
Soviet mathematics, discoveries in the field of radio-electronics, Soviet contributions to the 
theory of solids, the theory of resistance, aerodynamics and mechanics,’234 as well as in 
chemistry – to ‘the development of the theory of chain reactions, contributions to organic 	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chemistry, and the chemistry of elementary organic combinations. Soviet scientists have 
shown the way towards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and have enunciated the basic 
principles for the ultimate achievement of controlled nuclear reactions.’235 
 
According to Keldysh, Soviet urban planning established the republics’ Academy of Sciences 
in the national capitals as the central places of growth which had spill-over effects in other 
spheres of development. They were accompanied with around 800 establishments of higher 
education throughout the country which also carried out research in a wide spectrum of fields. 
One of the key characteristics of Soviet science was viewed in the close connection 
established ‘between fundamental research and the resolution of economic problems of a 
practical nature. For their part, those scientific organizations that serve[d] the various 
specialized sectors of the economy participate[d] widely in helping to solve the great 
problems of science,’236 concluded Keldysh, emphasising the primacy of research in modern 
economic development and the interconnection of science and production.  
 
According to I.G. Kurakov’s Science, Technology and Communism, Some Questions of 
Development, science was a direct productive force in the Soviet society:237 
 
The tasks of science should not be limited only to the study and analysis of 
natural and social phenomena. Scientists should not only explain such 
phenomena or discover the objective laws of the development of nature and 
society; they should also work out methods for their practical utilization in 
order to ensure the continual and rapid development of the productive 
forces of society and to create the material and technical basis of 
communism.238 
 
In Kurakov’s account, the mankind had been developing due to all the human knowledge 
accumulated, and if not for science, ‘society would have to start its development all over 
again from the Stone Age. The tremendous material destruction in our country made by the 
Nazi invaders was overcome in a short time largely because we had men with an even 
higher level of knowledge than before the war.’239 Thus, in his view, science played an 
irreplaceable role in material production and represented the main factor for the 	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development of the productive forces in the period of full-scale communist construction in 
the USSR. Meanwhile, techniques, technology and the organisation of production derived 
from science defining labour productivity, according to Kurakov.240  
 
While describing the methods and meaning of science, the scholar emphasised the essential 
social significance of knowledge. In his view, knowledge can be accumulated, primarily, 
through practice and experience, and ‘secondly, through purposeful investigations, 
constructive studies and generalizations of practice, in other words through science, which 
is itself a generalization of practice. For a long time the type of knowledge that accumulated 
through practical experience was the sole source of knowledge in society […] In our time 
science represents the basic source of fresh knowledge and consequently, science is also the 
basic means of increasing the social productivity of labour.’241 
 
According to Kurakov, the increase in labour productivity defined the growth of the national 
income stemming from the higher productivity of labour and making the volume of the total 
social product larger: ‘As is well known, the growth of labour productivity is basically due 
to the application of new science and technology. Thus, the fulfilment of the targets for the 
growth of labour productivity, defined in the Programme of the C.P.S.U., depends largely 
on the development of science.’242 This connected the development of both science and the 
Soviet society.  
 
As a Soviet scholar during the times of the Cold War, he claimed the superiority of the 
Soviet economy over all the capitalist countries due to its prevailing number of labour with 
a high standard of knowledge as the result of the Soviet development of science and 
education as follows:  
 
Forty per cent of all workers and 23 per cent of the collective farmers in our 
country have received higher and secondary education. The total number of 
qualified engineers engaged in the economy of the U.S.S.R. amounted to 
1,135,000 in 1960, as against 525,000 in the U.S.A. In the academic year of 
1961/62 the number of students per 10,000 inhabitants amounted to 120 in 
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the U.S.S.R. and to 111 in the USA; Japan had 63 in 1960/61, France 44 in 
1959/60 and the Federal Republic of Germany 34.243 
 
Meanwhile, Kurakov explicitly warned of the disadvantages of the existing Soviet system of 
material incentives claiming that the system was ‘not sufficiently closely connected with the 
productivity of labour’ and called for its fundamental change.244 In particular, he wrote the 
following: ‘The implicit slogan “fulfil the plan at any price” gradually came to be accepted 
by a considerable number of economists and managers and became a serious obstacle to the 
growth of the national economy.’245 In his approach, as the improvement of planning was 
one of the basic tasks of science, the latter was to provide ‘the continuous improvement of 
the plan indicators, of the methods for selecting the range and standard dimensions of the 
products to be produced, of the methods for fixing the annual rates of increase in the volume 
of production of each type of product’ in order to solve a series of other urgent problems in 
planning.246  
 
For instance, Kurakov indicated the examples for this in the production of new synthetic 
materials in the chemical industry and in the increase in the productive capacity of separate 
sections in the improvement of the quality of raw materials and fuel in the mining 
industry.247 He classified the problems into fundamental, sectoral, territorial, inter-sectoral 
and inter-territorial ones. Kurakov attributed the leading role in resolving the fundamental 
ones to the SAS and envisaged its assisting roles on the different levels to the various 
committees or territorial governments of the extensive Soviet structure in resolving the rest 
of the problems.248  In his approach, the role structure was dependant on the following 
structure of problems, themes and tasks:  
 
For instance, one of the directions in the improvement of the production of 
mechanical energy is the production of electricity by means of 
semiconductors, powerful solar batteries or other similar devices. The 
production of electricity by means of semiconductors is one of the problems 
in generating electricity by a fundamentally new method. This problem of 
semiconductors is then divided into a series of themes, for instance, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Ibid., 9. 
244 Ibid., 15. 
245 Ibid., 16.  
246 Ibid., 37-8 
247 Ibid., 71. 
248 Ibid., 71-3. 
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investigation of methods for obtaining germanium from coal and lignite, the 
production of high purity quartz, and so forth. Each of these is then sub-
divided into separate tasks.249 
 
Meanwhile, in his view, a continuous interaction of science and technology should be 
thoroughly planned in order to avoid delays in work as it had been increasingly done since 
1949 and, in particular, since 1956 250  in planning the provision of the scientific 
infrastructure, materials and machinery as well as in training of the key scientific 
personnel.251 He criticised the existing practice of the one-year scientific plans: ‘As a rule it 
takes several years to elaborate most of the scientific themes. If the plans are limited to one 
year only, the various stages of the research work are often delayed, either due to lack of 
sufficient means for its next stage, or due to lack of people to continue the work, or because 
pilot plants are not set up in time, or for some other reason.’252 
 
Kurakov provided an illustrative example of an early Soviet scientific discovery leading to a 
further development into technology and transforming Soviet and global industry and 
economy. It was the invention of synthetic rubber by the method developed by S. V. 
Lebedyev (Lebedev)253 at the beginning of the 1930s.254  
 
Kurakov stressed out the primary importance of basic research, without which rapid 
development of science and technology is impossible. As both the total costs or the 
economic potential for this kind of research work cannot be estimated in advance, as 
pointed out by him, it is not needed to define the economic potential for basic research 
activities. Meanwhile, the Soviet scholar particularly emphasised that  ‘[f]unds for basic 
research must be allocated according to requirements, although it is known in advance that 
some of this work will be useless.’255 He issued a warning that ‘[t]he slightest stagnation in 
science is immediately reflected in national economic development, reducing the rate of 
increase in the national income.’256  In general, according to Kurakov, the lack of a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 Ibid., 72. 
250 Ibid., 108. 
251 Ibid., 109. 
252 Ibid. 
253 Sergey Vasilevych Lebedev, Russian Chemist, Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved on 18.05.2019 from the 
Web, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sergey-Vasilyevich-Lebedev; hereafter referred to as Lebedev.  
254 Kurakov, 96. In more detail, this example is elaborated in subchapter 4.3 below. 
255 Ibid., 116. 
256 Ibid., 13. 
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successful solution of a certain problem in the field of science and technology can be 
explained by insufficient knowledge of the matter.257 
 
2.1.3                               Conclusion 
 
The key points of this dissertation’s literature review are the following. The variety of the 
views observed illustrates the gap in literature identified in the introduction and section 2.1 
above. Some of the Western scholars like Sutton or those of the 1983 US Congress Report 
regarded Soviet development based on the economic indicators and pluralist political system 
of the Anglo-Saxon countries. Meanwhile, the other group represented by Soviet and 
American scientists and engineers viewed the Soviet technological development in connection 
to Marxist non-economic, historical, educational, and other social factors. However, none of 
the scholars considered in the literature review would combine all of the Soviet paradigms 
into the whole. 
 
The continuum mentioned in section 2.1 illustrates that some of the authors’ attitudes of both 
groups towards Soviet development can be explained by their pretty natural biases due to their 
official positions during the Cold War. On the negative side, this can be the case for Anthony 
Sutton of the US Hoover Institution, who was doing his study in 1968-71, or for the 1983 US 
Congress Report. For example, Sutton did not mention Yuri Gagarin’s name in his three 
volumes dedicated to the Soviet technological development and whose name did not appear in 
the Index to Volume III on the period of 1945-65.258  The timing of the publishing is pretty 
indicative in this sense as well. Both studies were published at the two peaks of the Cold War 
before and after Détente of the 1970s and were possibly connected to the space race between 
the two superpowers and Ronald Reagan’s coming to power in the US at the end of 1980 
respectively. Meanwhile, the scientific report by Paul Cocks, written for the US National 
Science Foundation in the mid-1980 as a part of the mutual American-Soviet agreements of 
Détente, was more neutral in the evaluation of the state of the science and technology affairs 
in the Soviet Union.  
 
The praising attitude of Dzhermen Gvishiani (a deputy chairman of the USSR State 
Committee for Science and Technology) or Mstislav Keldysh (an official member of the 
Central Committee (the TsK) of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or the CPSU) can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Ibid., 8. 
258 Sutton III, 457-82, 466. 
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be, on the one hand, partly explained by ideological reasons. On the other, such an 
explanation would not shed light on a similar approach undertaken by Morris Leroy 
Spearman of NASA or Alexander Korol of MIT, both of whom stood positively towards 
Soviet development. Therefore it would not entirely fit the ideological or policy-making 
framework. Cocks’s, Korol’s, Keldysh’ and Spearman’s positioning as that of the 
representatives of science and technology whose papers were addressed to the scientific 
community should be perhaps rather understood from the concept of the universalism of 
science beyond borders and political views which is going to be discussed in chapter 4. As 
seen from the literature review, the assessments of what particular sets of the Soviet policies 
led to the Soviet industrial development varied quite dramatically. This was defined by the 
differences in scholars’ views on the role of science across the overall technology and 
innovation chain. The literature review illustrates that it is not a settled question and there is a 
gap which this thesis aims to fill in. 
 
The next section is dedicated to the methodology employed for this thesis to try to resolve the 
dichotomy established and address the research question.  
 
2.2                            Methodology 
 
As the primary research method, the qualitative approach is applied here which uses semi-
structured interviews and archival work. The latter includes analysis of historical and primary 
documents for data collection.  
 
In this thesis, qualitative study approaches are employed as best-suited to the analysis of those 
specific relationships of science with engineering, technology, and innovation across the 
overall industrial chain and in interaction with the particular sets of the various Soviet 
industrial and social policies in the development of the USSR. As seen from the literature 
review above, a quantitative methodological approach towards the technologies and their 
origin could not inform the reader in understanding of the drivers of Soviet development in 
full. In a similar vein, using quantitative methods towards Soviet social policies could be not 
enough to evaluate their possible effect on the formation of the human capital and industrial 
development. 
   
Thus, the qualitative method is chosen as a useful way to evaluate the development policies of 
the Soviet Union in the context of the interaction between the state, academia, and industry. 
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Information from all three institutions has been used separately to provide qualitative 
evidence. It does not invalidate a quantitative approach. An important piece of the study is the 
information received from the interviews through the questionnaire. The latter was designed 
in order to collect the following information.  
 
The full list of the questions for the interviewees can be found in Appendix A. The 
questionnaire was designed to shed light on science and its place in the interaction of the 
academia, state, and industry in Soviet development. In the literature review above, the 
scholars of both sides, like Sutton or Spearman, identified technology as a critical factor in 
Soviet development. However, their visions of the driving forces of the Soviet technological 
development varied quite dramatically. It raised questions on both the importance of 
technology transfer, and the role and place of fundamental research and education in relation 
to industrial research and technology. It requires a more profound analysis of the reasons of 
the Soviet industrial policy.  
 
The Soviet state allocated tremendous funding and applied many efforts in developing the 
Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the national human capital through education and 
social programmes, connecting these allocations to the industrial development. This makes 
the notion of science tangibly identified as connected to technology in Soviet policy and 
requires the delineation between science and technology as two distinct notions within the 
terms of Research & Development (R&D). Thus, a research method of collecting primary 
data through interviews was used in order to fill in these gaps designated above. 
 
The interviewees were divided into two groups. Unlike in the literature review above, the 
division was made not on the base of their attitude towards the sets of the particular Soviet 
policies but on the ground of the primary or secondary knowledge of the Soviet and successor 
systems from within or outside respectively. The questionnaire nonetheless remained identical 
for both of the groups.259  
 
The first seven questions were designed to shed light on the following: i) the role of 
fundamental science in connection with economic development; ii) how discoveries in 
fundamental science may lead to disruptive and marketable technologies; iii) whether a 
sustainable technological development of large developed countries (or companies) was 
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clearly linked to a strong fundamental science research base; iv) and whether discoveries in 
science could be driven by market demand (as a search for practical and profitable solutions). 
 
The other group of four questions was formed under the influence of the observation of the 
second group of the authors in the literature review above. It is about the Soviet industrial 
policy which used fundamental science for a rapid industrialisation and included the 
following topics: i) how crucial was technology transfer for the Soviet industrial 
development; ii) what was a Soviet science and technology contribution to global 
technological development; iii) and what was the respondent’s attitude, speaking of any 
country’s technological development, towards the idea to rely solely on technology transfer in 
order to achieve economic success instead of both educational and social structural reforms, 
as well as without developing an indigenous science and technology base. The question of 
Pyotr Kapitsa’s contribution to global science and technology was addressed to those 
scientists who might have been familiar with his discoveries in their scientific activities in a 
similar field. 
 
In the interviews of the first group of insiders from the Soviet system, the reconstruction of 
the historical context from a survivor of the era, Vladimir Nekrasov, was valuable and should 
be emphasised here. He was one of Stalin’s last assistants (referenty) in 1952-3, and 
afterwards, head of the legal department of the Soviet and Russian Government (1953-97). 
The interview took place during three days in 2013-4 and was conducted in the form of a non-
structured and unrecorded interview,260 and so was an interview with Galym Abilsiitov. In a 
similar vein, an interview with Giorgos Tsironis of the second group was through a less 
structured questionnaire as being the first one of that kind with a scientist. Meanwhile, it 
helped the author both develop a better understanding of the topic and design the 
questionnaire at a later stage. 
 
The first group also included the following interviewees: Galym Abilsiitov, a founding 
director of the Soviet R&D Centre for Laser Technology and a former and founding 
Minister for Science and New Technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan;261 Ovanes 
Mikoyan, a former deputy head of the MiG, the famous Soviet/Russian military aircraft 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Nekrasov, Vladimir, 2013-4, Three interviews at his dacha in Krasnovidovo near Moscow on 19-20 Nov 
2013 and 14-15 Dec 2014; hereafter referred to as Nekrasov. 
261 The interview with Galym Abilssitov was held on 15.01.2016 at his house in Troitsk, near Moscow; hereafter 
referred to as Abilsiitov. 
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design bureau, which was one of the pioneers of the global jet aviation; 262  Robert 
Nigmatulin, Real Member (Academician) of the Russian Academy of Sciences (the RAS), 
Member of Presidium of the RAS, Director of P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology;263 the 
three following the Lomonosov Moscow State University’s (the MSU’s) Professors in 
physics, chemistry and political economy respectively from Russia, namely Alexander 
Vasiliev,264 Andrey Kaul,265 and Alexander Buzgalin;266 physicist Viktor Eremenko (Ukraine 
and the Soviet Union);267 as well as Yuri Zhukov, a leading Soviet/Russian historian.268 In 
addition, some data from a joint interview with both Andrey Kaul and Alexander Molodyk 
(Russia)269 are included for consideration in revealing some particular technical aspects and 
details in the development of a contemporary Russian high-tech firm.  
 
Before detailing the second group of the interviewees from the outside of the Soviet system, it 
is necessary to mention the two following considerations of the difficulties emerged. Firstly, it 
was the loss of the interest in the studies on Soviet S&T in the West. In the conditions of a 
quarter of a century after the end of the USSR, these studies lost both the funding and the 
scholars. Among the survivors, only Julian Cooper (considered in the literature review) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
262 Mikoyan, Ovanes, the first deputy of the `General Director of the Russian Aircraft Corporation MiG and a 
son of Artyom Mikoyan, the founder of the MiG, formerly known as Mikoyan & Gurevich Design Bureau, two 
interviews took place on 12.12.2014 and 05.04.2017 in Moscow, Russia; hereafter referred to as Mikoyan. 
263 Nigmatulin, Robert Iskandrovich, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences (1971), Professor 
(1974), Real Member (Academician) of Russian Academy of Sciences (1991), Member of Presidium of Russian 
Academy of Sciences (2006), Director of P.P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology (2006 - present), Curriculum 
Vitae; retrieved on 04.07.2017 from the Web, http://www.ocean.ru/eng/content/view/94/; the interview took 
place on 05.04.2017 in Moscow; hereafter referred to as Nigmatulin. 
264 Vasiliev, Alexander N., Chair of Low Temperature Physics and Superconductivity, Head of Solid State 
Physics Division, Faculty of Physics, M.V. Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU); retrieved on 
04.07.2017 from the Web, http://www.ml.pan.wroc.pl/assets/files/male-goscie/Vasiliev_CV-2016B.pdf; the 
interview took place the interview was recorded on 04.03.2017 at the Division mentioned above, the MSU, 
Moscow; hereafter referred to as Vasiliev. 
265 Kaul, Andrey, Laboratory of Coordination Compound Chemistry, Head of Laboratory: Professor Andrey 
Rafailovich Kaul, Division of Inorganic Chemistry; retrieved on 06.04.2017 from the Moscow State University 
Web Site, http://www.chem.msu.ru/eng/chairs2/inorg/welcome.html, and a scientific supervisor of the SuperOx 
company, both a visit to the company's production facilities and the interview took place on 07.04.2017 in 
Moscow; hereafter referred to as Kaul. 
266 An interview with The Moscow State University Professor of Political Economy Alexander Buzgalin, 
recorded on 09.05.2017 at the University of Cambridge; hereafter referred to as Buzgalin. 
267 Viktor Eremenko, Senior Fellow and Advisor to the Directorate of B. Verkin Institute of Low Temperature 
Physics and Engineering (ILTPE) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine; retrieved on 03.07.2017 
from the Web, http://www.ilt.kharkov.ua/cpuei2012/eremenko_e.html; the interview was recorded on 
01.09.2016 in Kharkov, Ukraine; hereafter referred to as Eremenko. Unfortunately, this brilliant physicist passed 
away on 02.05.2017. 
268 Zhukov, Yuri Nikolaevich, Institut rossiyskoi istorii RAN (The Institute of the Russian History, The Russian 
Academy of Sciences); retrieved on 02.04.2017 from the Web, http://iriran.ru/?q=gukov. The interview was 
recorded on 03.04.2017 in Moscow; hereafter referred to as Zhukov. 
269 Molodyk, Alexander, Technical Director, SuperOx, both a visit to the company's production facilities and 
interviews took place on 07.04. 2017 in Moscow; retrieved on 21.04.2017 from the Web 
http://www.superox.ru/en/; hereafter referred to as Molodyk. 
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responded, who however concentrated his research on contemporary Russia having no longer 
interest to the subject of the Soviet Union after retiring.270  
 
Secondly, as mentioned above, unlike social scholars’ polar views, scientists’ view on the role 
of Soviet science as well as its connection with the technological development was pretty 
unified despite belonging to the different camps of the Cold War. Thus, an insight from 
scientists and engineers became important for addressing the research question. In particular, 
this would be the case for those scientists who could have combined the experience of 
working in both the Soviet and Western systems and could share their visions. However, 
approaching them revealed a challenge, e.g. David (Dima) Khmelnitskii, both Soviet and 
Cambridge’s physicist, refused to discuss the topic.271  Instead, an interview with Timour 
Paltashev, a Soviet/Russian-US computer scientist, was recorded and placed to finalise both 
groups of the interviews. Paltashev graduated from the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute in 
1978272 and obtained two Soviet scientific degrees (kandidat and doktor nauk, i.e. PhD, in 
Computer Science) in 1987 and 1994 respectively from National Research University of 
Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics (ITMO), St. Petersburg, Russia.273 He is full 
professor of the department of computer science & engineering of ITMO, and professor of the 
Northwestern Polytechnic University in California,274 the USA, as well as a current AMD275 
Radeon Technology Group senior manager, involved in applied and industrial technology 
research & development, as well as in start-up activities in the US, Russia and Kazakhstan. 
He is familiar with the Soviet and post-Soviet technological development.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 In the correspondence, on 16.08.2016 Cooper wrote to the author the following: ‘I am very sorry but I am 
now retired and my only involvement with university matters of any kind is my own personal research. This 
extends to students here in Birmingham as well as elsewhere. So, I wish you well with your research but will not 
read your [First Year] report. My work these days only relates to present-day Russia.’ 
271 David Khmelnistkii; retrieved on 10.03.2017 from the University of Cambridge's Website, 
http://www.tcm.phy.cam.ac.uk/~dek12/Welcome.html. In his letter of 13.03.2017, Khmelnistkii answered 
negatively to my request for an interview. 
272 Timour T. Paltashev, a AMD Radeon Technology Group senior manager, Professor of the University of 
California, Berkeley, the US and full professor of the department of computer science & engineering of National 
Research University of Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics (ITMO), St. Petersburg, Russia, and 
professor of the Northwestern Polytechnic University in California, the USA.; the interview was recorded on 
01.06.2018 in Almaty and complemented in the correspondence on 06.06.2018 with his presentation, available 
in the Web, http://www.ifmo.ru/file/news/1481/electronic_industry_engineering_revival_ifmo_lecture.pdf; 
hereafter referred to as Paltashev.  
273 National Research University of Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics, St. Petersburg, Russia; 
retrieved on 03.06.2018 from the Web, http://en.ifmo.ru/en/ . 
274 Northwestern Polytechnic University, Fremont, California; retrieved on 03.06.2018 from the Web, 
http://npu.edu/.  
275 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (AMD); retrieved on 03.06.2018 from the Web, https://www.amd.com/en. 
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The second group of interviewees is the international scientists and engineers, such as Peter 
Littlewood (the UK, the US),276 Gilbert Lonzarich (the US, Canada, the UK),277 Tony Raven 
(the UK),278 Siddharth Saxena (the UK, India, Central Asia, Russia),279 James Jackson (the 
UK, the US),280 Giorgos Tsironis (Greece, the US, Russia, Kazakhstan),281 and Shashikumar 
Chitre (India, the UK, the US).282 While their evaluations of the role of science across the 
overall industrial chain of the engineering, technology, and innovation is very valuable as the 
primary source, some of the interviewees’ visions of Soviet development could be viewed as 
partial and secondary ones due to their natural biases deriving from their background and 
official positions of not being experts on this particular subject. However, a profound look 
into the scientific approach, as implied during an analysis of Soviet science in connection 
with global development in chapters 4 and 5, might amend this impression.  
 
Thus, the questionnaire was designed to make an enquiry into the notion of science and its 
functionalities within the context of the industrial and overall development as well as to show 
the role of discovery in developing applications. The aim was to fill the gap in economic and 
business literature on fundamental science and its role in designing development policies in 
general and in the Soviet Union in particular as shown in chapter 3 and analysed in chapters 4 
and 5.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 Peter B. Littlewood, a former head of both the Argonne National Laboratory, Chicago, USA, and The 
Department of Physics/The Cavendish Laboratory; retrieved on 04.03.2017 from the University of Cambridge 
Web Site, https://physics.uchicago.edu/page/peter-littlewood; the interview was recorded on 02.03.2017 via 
Skype; hereafter referred to as Littlewood. 
277 Lonzarich, Gilbert, 2017, Replies to Chokan Laumulin’s Questionnaire for a PhD thesis, 
Gilbert G Lonzarich, Cambridge, 26-05-2017; hereafter referred to as Lonzarich. 
278 Dr. Tony Raven – Chief Executive, The University of Cambridge Enterprise; retrieved on 17.05.2017 from 
the Web, https://www.enterprise.cam.ac.uk/team/dr-tony-raven-2/; hereafter referred to as Raven-Bio. The 
interview was recorded on 24.03.2017 at the University of Cambridge Enterprise Office; hereafter referred to as 
Raven. 
279 Dr. Siddharth Saxena, Department of Physics/The Cavendish Laboratory; retrieved on 03.06.2017 from the 
University of Cambridge Web Site, http://www.phy.cam.ac.uk/directory/dr-siddharth-s-saxena, the interview 
took place in the Cavendish Lab on 05.07.2017; hereafter referred to as Saxena. 
280 Professor James Jackson, Former Head of Department, Professor, Geophysics, Geodynamics and Tectonics, 
Department of Earth Sciences, University of Cambridge; retrieved on 03.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.esc.cam.ac.uk/directory/james-jackson; Interviewed in the conference Earthquake Without Frontiers, 
organised by James Jackson in Almaty, Kazakhstan, September 2016; retrieved on 03.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://ewf.nerc.ac.uk/about-us/; as well as in the correspondence with the author on 29.02.2016; hereafter 
referred to as Jackson. 
281 Tsironis, Giorgos, P., Department of Physics, University of Crete, Curriculum Vitae; retrieved on 28.02.2017 
from the Web: https://nls.physics.uoc.gr/sites/nls.physics.uoc.gr/files/files/gts_CV.pdf, the interview was 
recorded on 21.02.2017 in Cambridge; hereafter referred to as Tsironis. 
282 Shashikumar M. Chitre, Active Member, the International Astronomic Union; retrieved on 04.07.2017 from 
the Web, https://www.iau.org/administration/membership/individual/2603/, the interview was recorded on 
07.06.2017 at Sheppard Flat, Churchill College, the University of Cambridge; hereafter referred to as Chitre. 
	   65	  
More than half of the fieldwork was done in March-April 2017. The other half was distributed 
throughout five years. The interviews took place in Moscow during several trips there 
(December 2013, November 2014, January 2016 and March-April 2017), Kharkov in Ukraine 
(September 2016), Almaty in Kazakhstan (September 2016 and June 2018) and Cambridge in 
the UK. A Skype interview with Peter Littlewood in the US was recorded in April 2017. All 
of these 17 interviews described above were either audio-recorded or received in writing but 
three of them, i.e. that of Nekrasov who in the best tradition of the old Soviet apparatchiks’ 
school allowed making notes only, that of Abilsiitov, and partially that of Jackson who 
emailed the author some of his thoughts shared during the conversations.  
 
In addition to his eight-hour interview, Gilbert Lonzarich kindly emailed the author his short 
answers to the questionnaire. They are available in Appendix N. Consent from all the 
respondents was obtained. The conversations in both Russian and English lasted from 45 to 
60 minutes with the exceptions of the case of the 8 hours mentioned just above and around 8 
hours of the conversation with Nekrasov during the three days’ stay at his place.  
 
12 out of the 17 interviews were transcribed and 3 out of those 10 in Russian were translated 
in English using professional transcription services in English from both the UK and US, a 
transcription service in Russian from Kazakhstan, and a Russian translation bureau from 
Moscow to translate from Russian to English. The quality of both transcriptions and 
translations was double-checked by the author as a Russian native speaker whose first degree 
in journalism was taught in Russian. Some extracts from the other six interviews (with 
Eremenko, Nekrasov, Nigmatulin, Kaul, Molodyk, Paltashev) in transcriptions or audio-
records were translated from Russian in English for this thesis by the author. Paltashev 
approved the transcript in English. In general, while collecting the evidence, the author’s 
knowledge of Russian was imperative for the study not only to be able to conduct interviews 
but in order to locate new sources of information and new angles of knowledge of the Soviet 
system, not available in the English literature.  
 
It should be mentioned that conducting research at such a globally acknowledged university 
as that of Cambridge significantly facilitated the access to the notable scientists from all over 
the world as seen from the overall list of the respondents. Many of them were directly 
working for Cambridge, some others were previously or currently associated with the 
university, while for the others, Cambridge’s reputation in the global scientific community, 
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including Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, was extremely helpful at establishing the 
contacts.  
  
Another vital source of collecting primary data and evidence for the research was through 
reading primary literature in relation to Soviet development such as the theorists of Marxism-
Leninism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, theorist and founder of the Soviet Union, 
Vladimir Lenin, Soviet leaders and policy-makers including Josef Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov 
and Nikita Khrushchev, Pyotr and Anna Kapitsa’s letters and memoirs, Soviet economic and 
other statistical data as well as various legal acts. This was done in libraries of Cambridge 
(The Rayleigh Library of the Cavendish Laboratory, the Darwin College Library, the 
Marshall Library in Economics, and the Cambridge University Library), London (the British 
Library and LSE Library), Moscow (the Russian State Library, so-called Leninka) and 
Almaty (The National Library, so-called Pushkinka, and the National Academic Library, so-
called Akademka) as well as online, and helped locating some important information as 
charted out in chapter 3 and analysed in chapters 4 and 5. Concerning the online sources, the 
references to the Nobel Prize Committee’s website as well as other scientific bodies are 
largely used throughout the thesis in general and in the data chapter of the interviews in 
particular to confirm the interviewees’ data and to inform the reader on the particular 
scientific discoveries related. 
 
The following two challenges have been identified while doing the thesis. The first one relates 
to the author’s limitation in education received through degrees in humanities and social 
sciences  (journalism and European political economy), i.e. not in science or engineering. 
This was particularly important in the light of the fact that scientific knowledge is very 
structured in terms of its both depth and hierarchy. Observations of the overall industrial 
chain would require a significant understanding of the scientific philosophy and methodology 
which can be difficult without appropriate training, not to mention the specific knowledge 
related to particular disciplines in, say, physics or chemistry. However, one should specify 
that even in science, a biologist’s knowledge in her discipline can hardly be fully applicable, 
for instance, to that of a physicist. Thus, in relation to this research, the understanding of the 
overall scientific principles, methodology, and philosophy is essential and can be achievable 
by a non-scientist.  
 
The second challenge lay in connecting the different generations and overcoming the views 
established during the Cold War. As mentioned in the introduction, both the Cold War’s 
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philosophy and approach have significantly affected Soviet and post-Soviet studies, including 
the considerations of the periods before and after the Cold War and making the task of 
restoring the historical context doubly important for the thesis.  
 
As well, it should be mentioned that Abilsiitov and Mikoyan avoided answering most of the 
questions related to technology possibly due to the high level of sensitivity of the subject and 
their involvement in the military sphere in the Soviet Union and Russia.  
 
However, in tackling these issues mentioned above a careful and thorough consideration of 
the primary and secondary data, and evidence, as well as the application of the comparative 
and triangulation analysis of the information received from multiple sources, are to be 
employed to assist in addressing the research question.  
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Chapter 3          Data from Interviews and Other Primary Sources 
 
This data chapter consists of two parts. In the first section, the data from the interviews are 
collected and organised as described in the methodology section above. The second section 
relates to the data derived from other various primary sources to address the research 
question, i.e. from a theoretical legacy of Marxism-Leninism, Soviet decrees, correspondence, 
policy reports, public speeches of the key Soviet policy-makers. Some data from economic 
and official social documentation and legal acts including the Soviet Constitution are 
considered in that section as well.  
 
It should be reiterated that this section focuses on data to support the arguments being made, 
rather than the literature more generally used to inform the overall research on Soviet history 
in the context of development of science and technology. Many statements are to be analysed 
in further chapters in order to become more comprehensible and interconnected.  
 
This chapter considers those data from the interviews and primary sources which are directly 
connected to the research question. Meanwhile, some other data received from the answers to 
the questionnaire and other primary sources, e.g. about the connection between science and 
industry, and the driving forces of science, or about Soviet contribution in global development 
and post-Soviet development, are given and analysed in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
3.1                            Interviews 
 
In this section, the interviewees’ answers to the questions are organised into two groups, from 
within and outside of the Soviet system. Meanwhile, there are two parts in the first group. In 
the first one, the interviews with the representatives of the Soviet state, industry, and 
academia are considered in relation to the research question in order to shed light on the 
Soviet policy which allowed the USSR to go through the rapid industrialisation and 
modernisation. Except for the unstructured interviews with Nekrasov, Zhukov, and Abilsiitov 
in subsection 3.1.1.1 below, all the other interviews were conducted following the 
questionnaire, as described in the methodology section of chapter 2 above and available in 
full in Appendix A.  
 
It is important to note that in his interview Buzgalin, a former member of the TsK of the 
CPSU, described its official policy judged by American scholars as ‘misguided and 
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ideological.’283 This policy nonetheless provided the Soviet broad funding of science and 
should be reflected in the thesis.  
 
In the second section, the interviews from the international scientists outside of the Soviet 
Union are considered. The last interview in this data chapter is Timour Paltashev’s, which is 
placed in subsection 3.1.3. He is both a Soviet/Russian and American scientist born and 
graduated with his first degree in Kazakhstan and can inform the thesis on both the questions 
designated as well as the post-Soviet S&T development in Russia and Kazakhstan in chapter 
5. 
 
3.1.1                             Insiders from the Soviet System 
 
The interviews of this group are organised in two parts. The first one includes the following 
people: Vladimir Nekrasov, head of the legal department of the Soviet government in the 
1960s-90s; Yuri Zhukov, senior research fellow of the Institute of the Russian History of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences (the RAS); Robert Nigmatulin, Director of P.P. Shirshov 
Institute of Oceanology of the RAS; Galym Abilsiitov, the founding director of the R&D 
Centre for Laser Technology in the USSR and a former minister for science and new 
technologies of the Republic of Kazakhstan; and Alexander Buzgalin, professor of political 
economy of the Moscow State University (the MSU). The interviews are to inform the reader 
on relevant details of the historical context important for the thesis, some aspects of the 
implementation of Soviet policy, including Kazakhstan, as well as on the Soviet doctrine for 
the science policy. Also, the interviews below help to understand science in the relationships 
between the academia, industry, and state in Soviet development which is going to be 
discussed in more detail in further chapters.  
 
3.1.1.1                                  Historical Context and Characteristics of Soviet Policy-   
                                             Making  
 
Vladimir Ivanovich Nekrasov worked in the Soviet/Russian government for nearly 45 years 
from 1952 to 1997 and provided details of the origin and deployment of the Soviet policy. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
283 Fitzpatrick (chapter 1). 
	   70	  
Nekrasov was born in Tula (the RSFSR) in 1927 in the family of the head of the local police 
(militsia) who was from the working classes. In the late 1952 as a PhD student in Law at the 
MSU, Vladimir Nekrasov was chosen by the faculty dean to work for the Kremlin following 
Stalin’s request to find him an additional personal assistant (referent in Russian, i.e. an 
official in charge of reporting and consulting on particular references) among the best PhD 
researchers at the faculty. In the evening of the same day when he was suddenly sent to the 
Kremlin without any explanations or preparations from his side, Nekrasov took part in his 
first large official meeting with high Soviet officials including Stalin. Afterwards, Nekrasov 
had a long career in the Soviet (and the Russian one after 1991) government from 1952 to 
1997, mostly being at the position of head of its legal department. 
 
During his long career, Nekrasov worked with all the Soviet leaders from Josef Stalin to 
Mikhail Gorbachev and the PMs, having made personal lifetime friends with Konstantin 
Chernenko284 and Alexei Kosygin.285 Nekrasov’s and Molotov’s dachas were next to each 
other, and the former spent many of his long holidays, which he as a high-level Soviet official 
was entitled to, in conversations with the latter throughout the 1960s and 70s.  
 
According to Nekrasov, Stalin regretted Kollektivizatsia (the collectivisation) of the 1920s 
and 1930s in his discussions with Molotov about possible mistakes in Soviet policy. 
Regarding the political cleansings of the 1930s, Molotov meanwhile insisted that there was no 
choice as it was a zeitgeist, and wondered why this particular French word les repressions 
(repressii in Russian) was chosen to label the action. In Nekrasov’s account, the purges 
nonetheless opened a career path for a new generation of technocrats at all levels of the Soviet 
system. Alexei Kosygin as a young and active director of a textile plant in Leningrad who had 
been noticed and promoted by Anastas Mikoyan286 became NarKom (Minister) of textile 
industry at the age of 35 in 1939, representing this new Soviet elite as educated in the Soviet 
system and devoted to it.  
 
With regard to Soviet policy-making, Nekrasov confirmed that, during Stalin’s time from the 
1930s, the SovNarKom (Council (Soviet) of Ministers) exercised more power even than the 
VKPb (the Communist Party) which changed with Khrushchev’s reforms. The Government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Konstantin Chernenko, President of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved 
on 15.07.2018 from the Web, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Konstantin-Chernenko. 
285 Alexey Nikolaevich Kosygin, Premier of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Encyclopaedia Britannica; 
retrieved on 15.07.2018 from the Web, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksey-Nikolayevich-Kosygin. 
286 Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved on 15.07.2018 from the Web, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Anastas-Ivanovich-Mikoyan.  
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mostly consisted of the people educated in science and technology. Nekrasov believed that 
Stalin, as Chairman of the Soviet Government, considered Kosygin, his deputy in that period, 
as the next and technocratic leader of the USSR, and recalled that in one of the Government’s 
meetings the former pointed to the latter as his successor.  
 
Soviet policy’s pursuit for the development of science and education was emphasised by 
Nekrasov throughout the interview. Scientists in the Soviet Union represented one of the 
most well-paid and key strata of the Soviet establishment. The elites of the academic 
community once they became Members and Academicians of the Academy of Sciences 
(including all 14 National Republican Academies) were granted personal chauffeur driven 
cars and were provided the best free housing in the same category with policy-makers and 
high-ranked Party’s bureaucrats of both regional and national levels. They enjoyed other 
privileges, like access to luxury resorts, sometimes almost for free, especially when 
compared with their salaries. In Stalin’s time, much of the professorship of science had 
most of these benefits as well. Corresponding with the Communist Party’s policy line, most 
of these rules were implemented in practice by Mikhail Smertukov, Nekrasov’s immediate 
boss, who had been in charge of the Soviet Government’s managerial and administrative 
affairs at various positions for 60 years.287 
 
The Soviet government poured generous funds into scientific infrastructure and development. 
Nekrasov witnessed that the broad funding of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in the 1960s 
was done on the basis from a one-two page note written by hand and presented annually by 
President of the Academy, Mstislav Keldysh, to Kosygin, a Soviet Premier.  
 
In a similar vein, Yuri Nikolaevich Zhukov, Soviet/Russian historian and senior research 
fellow of the Institute of the Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences (the RAS), 
provided some of the following historical details in his interview.  
 
According to Zhukov, Stalin continually emphasised the importance of the people with higher 
education for Soviet development. This kind of approach in policy was reflected in the 
following historical moments. Firstly, in February 1937, just prior to the height of the 1937-8 
political purges campaign the engineer cadres were given immunity by Stalin’s special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 Zhirnov, Evgenyi, 2011, Gosudarstvo – eto on (The State is Him), Kommersant Vlast’, 22 August; retrieved 
on 04.05.2017 from the Web, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1752433.  
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order from any political accusations, which should be considered solely by the leading level 
of the Party’s Central Committee, implying Stalin himself.288  
 
Secondly, in early 1941 at the last Party conference prior to the Great Patriotic War (as WWII 
was called in the USSR), Malenkov in his report openly declared that the Party did not require 
such members, including those of the pre-Revolution times, who had no higher education. 
Instead, engineers, scientists, medical doctors, including non-Party members, were demanded 
by development. The report had been evidently observed by Stalin beforehand. 
 
Thirdly, during WWII the engineers, technicians, and scientists were given immunity from 
being mobilised for military service in 1941-2. However in 1943 when the change in the 
war towards the victory was identified, those of them volunteered to war before were called 
off from the fronts by a special decree. It included universities’ lecturers, professors, and 
students after the first year of the study.  
 
Fourthly, the policy focussed on the formation of a new Soviet bureaucracy educated in 
science and technology. Georgy Malenkov’s example is prominent. He graduated from the 
Bauman Moscow State Technical University (BMSTU) in energy engineering in the 1920s289 
to continue his political career to even succeed Stalin as the Chairman of the Council of 
Ministers in 1953 after the latter’s death. 
 
Fifthly, during the first and second Five-Year plans Soviet industrialisation was supervised on 
the levels of cities and regions mostly by the local first secretaries of the Communist Party 
whose educational background included only attending either three classes of church’ school 
[or, alternatively, Madaris in the Islamic regions] or more often – Jewish Cheder. This 
implied education on the level of reading and writing skills only. As emphasised by Zhukov, 
many problems of industrialisation and afterwards derived from these incompetent people’s 
attempts to interfere and run the industrialisation process. 
 
As the historian stated, pre-revolutionary Russia had very few engineers, and their expertise 
was pretty narrow, whereas in the metallurgy industry, for example, foreign engineers, 
Belgian, French, English ones, in particular, were in charge. The Russian engineers were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 Zhukov, Yury, 2003, Inoi Stalin. Politicheskye reformy v SSSR v 1933-1937 gg. (Another Stalin. Political 
Reforms in the USSR in 1933-1937), Moscow, Vagrius, 369-70; hereafter referred to as Zhukov II. 
289 The Bauman Moscow State Technical University; retrieved on 25.04.2017 from the Web 
http://www.bmstu.ru/en/; hereafter referred to as the BMSTU.        
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present in either the military sector, like in the Putilov plant, or in the construction of the 
railways and bridges.  
 
While referring to Kapitsa being awarded Stalin’s Prize [of the 1st Degree] as early as in 
1943 for the discovery of superfluidity of liquid helium [in December 1937 – January 
1938],290 Zhukov emphasised the following. Firstly, the Prize was established by Stalin to 
be funded not from the Government’s budget but his savings resultant from the latter’s 
publications in many languages of the Soviet Union. All of these significant revenues were 
collected in the fund established for this purpose. This defined the prize’s title, in the 
historian’s view.  
 
Secondly, the procedure of awarding was set up as follows. According to Zhukov, in the 
TsK there were special departments including that of being in charge of science. They 
analysed the states of affairs in the appropriate disciplines by themselves or followed 
specific directives from Stalin to research a particular area of expertise. In doing so, they 
often attracted and relied on scientists from various scientific institutions to prepare 
reference letters. Stalin and the Politburo could always receive an objective and competent 
evaluation of a particular scientific discovery or a paper, i.e. of anything related to the 
development of science, as seen from the archives. Moreover, the history of science has 
revealed, as noted by Zhukov, that most of those evaluations were correct, unbiased and 
competent, like in Kapitsa’s case, so that Kapitsa’s contribution to physics was 
acknowledged by the 1978 Nobel Prize in Physics291 [35 years after the Stalin’s prize 
specified above].  
 
Zhukov gave a high evaluation to the key Soviet policy-makers’ overall competence in 
governing the state in general and managing science and technology in particular, as 
revealed in dealing with the SAS from the early the 1920s. Then the latter’s development 
received special attention, and the various S&T and R&D institutions began being 
established in the Academy’s expansion. 
 
Concerning the role of the Communist party during industrialisation, Stalin, according to 
Zhukov, aimed at the Party’s reformation. As the initial Bolsheviks’ vehicle to seize and 
retain the power, it fulfilled its role. In the new conditions of the construction of socialism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 As referred to in section 3.2 below. 
291 Kapitsa’s discovery was given a high evaluation by the scientists interviewed for this thesis as evident 
below, apart from his the 1978 Nobel Prize in physics. 
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in one country after the disillusionment for an immediate world revolution starting from 
Europe in the 1920s, another approach was demanded. In 1937 at the peak of the power 
struggle between the old revolutionaries of the Party, on the one hand, and the younger 
technocrats of the Government supported by Stalin and his group, on the other, as two 
opposite wings of the Party, Stalin tried to minimise the Party’s role in Soviet development. 
In particular, he tried to organise the elections in Verhovnyi Soviet SSSR (The Supreme 
Council of the USSR, the Parliament) in which ‘candidates could be two, three or more,’292 
(i.e. multiple candidates) including non-party members. It was designed to emphasise both 
the technocratic character of Soviet power and its shift from ideology and its dogmas towards 
further industrialisation, in Zhukov’s opinion. 
 
He emphasised Stalin’s role in designing the science, culture and education policy for the 
national republics of the USSR and the establishment of the republican SAS branches as well 
as operas, theatres, art galleries, and various educational institutions there in the 1930s. This 
process aimed to develop and unify the overall national cultural level including the change of 
the alphabets in some languages from Latin introduced in the 1920s to Cyrillic (Kazakhstan, 
1940). In parallel, this accompanied the establishment of the national republics within the 
borders designated, like in the case of the Kazakh SSR, founded as a separate republic within 
the USSR (not as a part of the RSFSR as before) on 5 December 1936.  
 
A former director of the R&D Centre for Laser Technology, Galym Abilsiitovich Abilsiitov 
in his interview strongly emphasised Soviet policy implementation based on the doctrine to 
include representatives of the working classes from the national republics of the USSR and 
the ethnic minorities as much as possible in obtaining the higher education in the leading 
national universities by giving his example. It was indicative as he was born in 1940 in a 
tiny small village, consisting of a few houses, in the Akmolinskaya oblast, 14 km away from 
Akmola (currently Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan),293 in a low-income family, which 
struggled to survive during the war times. Abilsiitov emphasised the high teaching 
standards of his high school established even in the remote rural steppe location of central 
Kazakhstan.  
 
According to Abilsiitov, in 1958 an order came from Moscow to find ethnic Kazakhs to 
study physics at the MSU. Due to the high entry conditions in Moscow, a special quota was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292  Zhukov II, 206; referring to Pravda, 15 October 1937. 
293 In March 2019, it was renamed into Nur-Sultan. 
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formed and a special commission was set up in Alma-Ata, the capital of the Kazakh SSR. 
He was chosen as one of the candidates and managed to enter this most prestigious Soviet 
university. Upon his graduation, Abilsiitov built up a successful career to become a deputy 
director of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy294 in 1971-9, which is one of the 
world’s leading research and development institutions in the field of nuclear energy. He 
supervised the construction of the academic city of Troitsk, near Moscow. In 1979 he 
became the founding director of the R&D Centre for Laser Technology and a leading figure 
of the Soviet military laser space technology. His research295 is still a part of the academic 
course for laser technology at the engineering universities in Russia.  
 
According to Robert Iskandrovich Nigmatulin, Real Member (Academician) of the 
SAS (from 1991), Member of Presidium of the RAS (from 2006) and Director of P.P. 
Shirshov Institute of Oceanology, this institute was established in 1946, and the decision for 
its establishment was taken by Stalin in December 1945, when the country was half-ruined 
after WWII. In 1947, the academician recalled while describing the zeitgeist, that when he 
went to primary school, half of his classmates could begin their study only at the age of 8 
instead of 7 as they were weak and depleted from malnutrition. Also, more than one-third of 
them had lost their fathers at war.   
 
Nonetheless, during WWII the S&T and R&D institutions were established by the orders of 
the Soviet leadership throughout the country, e.g. the Kazan Scientific Centre of the SAS296 in 
Tatarstan (the RSFSR) in April 1945. Being an ethnic Tatar from the Republic of 
Bashkortostan (the RSFSR) by his origin, Nigmatulin emphasised that the Bashkir branch of 
the SAS,297 which was established in 1951 in Ufa, had no record of science in history at all, 
unlike in Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan. According to Nigmatulin, Lenin established the 
Soviet science policy against all the odds aiming at exploring nature’s laws. For example, in 
the conditions of the Civil War, Lenin founded the Institute of Geography of the RAS in 
1918, noted the academician. The continuation of this policy was evident in 1947 in the 
establishment of the Nigmatulin’s institute designed to explore the oceans.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
294 The National Research Center Kurchatov Institute; retrieved on 29.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://eng.nrcki.ru/.  
295 Abilsiitov, G.A., Golubev V.S., 1981, Osnovnye problemy lazernoi tekhnologii i tekhnologicheskikh lazerov 
(Main Problems of Laser Technology and Technological Lasers), Troitsk; 
Abilsiitov G.A., 1991, Tekhnologicheskie lazery, Tom 1 (Technological Lasers, Volume 1), Moscow, 
Mashinostroenie.  
296 The Kazan Scientific Center of the RAS; retrieved on 09.06.2018 from the Web, http://knc.ru/. 
297 The Ufa Scientific Center of the RAS; retrieved on 09.06.2018 from the Web, http://www.ufaras.ru/. 
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In the USSR, the funding of his institute coming from the military sector for the research of 
the underwater objects, signals, vibrations and noises as important for submarines could reach 
up to one third of of the institute’s budget not differentiating between the fundamental and 
industrial research. Like in many other countries, the military funding contributed to the 
knowledge of the underwater acoustics as a fundamental scientific discipline. In 1987, the 
scientist was elected as Corresponding Member of the SAS and noticed how the priority of 
science in the overall Soviet policy sharply decreased in the late 1980s. Then the Academy 
started experiencing financial difficulties in the provision of the research infrastructure and 
equipment. 
 
Overall, as confirmed by Nigmatulin, the funding for fundamental science was centralised and 
provided from the budget to the Academy of Sciences in Moscow which, in turn, distributed 
the allocations to its various institutes, branches and republican Academies in accordance 
with the preliminary annual scientific plans.  
 
In Nigmatulin’s vision, the main contribution of Soviet science to global development was, as 
a result of the successes of Soviet science, in the attention which the rest of the world started 
giving to social development [which can, therefore, foster the development of science]. 
Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union, the overall level of the allocations for social development, 
i.e. healthcare, education, science, and culture exceeded a quarter of the GNP in the early 
1980s, according to Nigmatulin.  
 
He outlined that the Soviet system was far from being perfect, especially in terms of running 
the economy with the administrative methods. An economy is always a dynamic system. In a 
similar vein, when the Soviet policy interfered with biology, the development of genetics was 
slowed down. However, the overall Soviet policy towards science was very favourable, 
allowing a great extent of personal freedom in research for scientists. 
 
This high level of the personal freedom in combination with the highest wages attracted very 
talented people into science in general and in theoretical research in particular, whose share 
was significant in the overall development of the fundamental science, noted the scientist. It 
contributed to that high global status of the Soviet science. It was especially evident at 
international conferences frequently attended by Nigmatulin and his colleagues.   
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While in Soviet science, Nigmatulin was free in choosing subjects for his research, whereas 
nowadays the global approach towards science is mainly based on the project funding. In his 
view, however, all the knowledge accumulated in the fundamental science cannot be 
perceived solely through the approach of the immediate applications. Weak funding of 
science implies a weakness of industrial research, industry, and innovation as well as 
education, concluded the scientist. 
 
Alexander Vladimirovich Buzgalin, professor of political economy at the MSU and a former 
member of the Central Committee of the CPSU in 1990-1, emphasised the importance of 
industrialisation for Soviet development in his interview. 
 
Although by 1928, the USSR improved trade, developed small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) (kustarnoe proizvodstvo) and restored its economy mainly due to the introduction of 
the New Economic Policy (NEP) designed by Vladimir Lenin in 1921 as ‘state capitalism’ 
with many elements of market economy, it was not viewed by Stalin’s group as an efficient 
method for rapid and heavy industrialisation. The latter required the concentration of capital, 
resources, and labour on a far larger scale. Based on this approach, the policy-makers 
abandoned the NEP for a rapid development.  
 
According to Buzgalin, the development of science and research meanwhile was a vital and 
integral element of industrialisation. The Soviet doctrine for science policy was implemented 
as a methodological approach of Marxism through the allocation of the productive forces,298 
production relations and their manifestation, although science and technology were not 
clearly articulated there:  
 
The basic idea was that the future society would be the one in which a 
person would act as a controller and regulator within what is now called an 
‘automated production system.’ The future of automated production is a 
person who carries out creative functions. It was in the Marx’ economic 
manuscripts of 1857-59.  However, the key idea is really fruitful, that […] 
the industrial production leads to a system where a person, as a scientist and 
a manager, acts, and all other functions are performed by the system. As for 
the Soviet theory, the idea of turning science into a direct productive force 
was a banality that was included in all the textbooks of the political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 Kurakov, chapter 1, Science as a Direct Productive Force in Society, 1-13, and in particular, 1. 
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economy of socialism and scientific communism. Science was seen as 
something that creates social wealth directly and indirectly through 
application in the industrial process.299 
 
According to Buzgalin, the approach subsequently developed in Soviet papers viewed 
capitalism, in particular, the market and capital, as forming a system of such productive forces 
that were oriented towards the production of goods and the extraction of profit. On the 
contrary, in the system of socialism, the productive forces, meanwhile, were inclined towards 
human production, human qualities, social development and solving problems related to the 
liberation of a person. 
 
The understanding of working for some big task, a national or global goal, was important for 
Soviet scientists, continued the political economist.  The space programme, atomic projects, 
and everything else were based on the assumption that there would not be another world war 
due to a global balance of power. For Soviet people including scientists, a general idea of 
moving in the right direction of the social progress and human development towards a society 
where poets and scientists would be the central figures was important, emphasised Buzgalin. 
 
According to him, in the Stalin’s period (and continued less and less in Khrushchev’s and 
Brezhnev’s times), the quality of life of an academician or a famous writer did not differ from 
that of a minister. Meanwhile, the basic wages of scientists had not changed since the early 
1950s. At that time, a professor received SUR4,600 (SUR460 – after the denomination in 
1961) monthly until 1991, whereas an average worker’s monthly salary rose three times from 
SUR330 (minimum) to SUR1,000 in the same period. Meanwhile, in the post-war time, a 
professor could afford a luxury car, like Pobeda (Victory) at the expense of a few months’ 
salaries, Buzgalin concluded.  
 
In this subsection, the interviewees disclosed some specific context in which the formation 
and deployment of the Soviet science and development policy occurred. In the next 
subsection Soviet scientists’ and engineers’ interviews are to shed more light on the 
functioning of the Soviet science system from within and the details of their scientific 
activity. 
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3.1.1.2                                  Soviet Scientists and Engineers    
 
The interviews of this subsection are organised to inform the reader on the development of the 
particular areas of Soviet science and technology and include the following scientists and 
engineers: Ovanes Mikoyan, a former deputy head of the MiG aviation design bureau, the 
USSR/Russia; Viktor Eremenko, a scientist in the field of low temperature physics and a 
former director of the B. Verkin Institute of Low Temperature Physics and Engineering 
(ILTPE), the USSR/Ukraine; Alexander Vasiliev, chair of low temperature physics and 
superconductivity, head of solid state physics division, Faculty of Physics, the MSU, the 
USSR/Russia; Andrey Kaul, head of coordination compound chemistry laboratory, the MSU, 
and a scientific supervisor of the SuperOx company, the USSR/Russia; and Alexander 
Molodyk, technical director of SuperOx, Russia. 
 
A former deputy head of the MiG, the famous Soviet/Russian military aircraft design 
bureau, which was one of the pioneers of the global jet aviation, Ovanes Artemovich 
Mikoyan, struggled to distinguish between pure science and engineering in his field, 
emphasising, nonetheless, the primacy of basic research in the chain: 
 
One generates the other. I consider that without fundamental science it is 
impossible to progress at all. Society cannot progress without developing 
fundamental science, not its own but the worldwide one. It is necessary, of 
course, first of all, to develop fundamental science, and applied science will 
keep developing, which will lead to the overall growth of technologies, 
industry, production and, simply, culture.300   
 
He pointed out that, at least in the Soviet times, the MiG engineers had daily interaction 
with scientists, without whose expertise it would have been impossible to move forward. 
According to him, the development of the jet aviation was entirely dependent on science. 
Everything that was required to achieve the highest flight speed (for instance, heatproof 
materials), critically needed development in such research areas as aerodynamics, 
dynamics, material science, and others, which provided development of technologies in 
engine-making, radio-electronic industry, etc. The military paradigm ensured that the 
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scientific institutions received secure funding, and both scientists and engineers pushed 
forward the aircraft making together.   
 
Regarding the role of technology transfer, as the aviation engineer outlined, it had always 
been a part of the overall mutual and intertwined technology development for both sides of 
the Cold War. Sometimes it occurred illegally, or through the intelligence service. It was the 
case of a Soviet MiG-25 supersonic interceptor illegally obtained by the American side in 
1976. It was dismantled and carefully analysed before being returned to the Soviets from 
Japan.301 
 
Overall, while developing the technologies received in the 1940s and 50s, Soviet scientists 
and engineers could enter another superior level in the S&T development, and in the aviation 
and cosmonautics, in particular. The primary approach, according to Mikoyan, was as 
follows. If the Americans had been detected in achieving a technology superiority lag of ten 
years in a particular aircraft, Soviet scientists and engineers, responding to the challenge, 
aimed at developing a Soviet machine with a 20 years margin in the development of 
technology, concluded the aircraft designer.  
 
Viktor Valentinovich Eremenko was 'an outstanding Ukrainian scientist in the field of low 
temperature physics, whose scientific activity covers low-temperature magnetism, spectral 
and magneto-optical phenomena, magnetic phase transitions in antiferromagnets, 
superconductivity and the galvanomagnetic phenomena in metals, the exciton processes in 
antiferromagnetic, semiconducting and molecular crystals, […] The Editor in Chief for the 
journal “Low Temperature Physics” (1990), a member of the editorial board of the publishing 
house “Cambridge Scientific Publishers” (Cambridge, England),’302 senior fellow and advisor 
to the Directorate of B. Verkin Institute of Low Temperature Physics and Engineering 
(ILTPE) of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NASU). He emphasised the 
following in his interview.303  
 
According to Eremenko, the idea of abstract thought creating a material reality found its 
realisation at ILTPE where the best mathematical minds of high mathematics, geometry, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
301 Gordon, Yefim, 2008, Mikoyan MiG-25 Foxbat: Guardian of the Soviet Borders (Red Star Vol. 34). 
Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing Ltd. 
302 Victor Eremenko, B. Verkin ILTPE of NASU; retrieved on 03.07.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.ilt.kharkov.ua/cpuei2012/eremenko_e.html. 
303 The interview was assisted with his son Andrey, a physicist as well. 
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math physics of Ukraine such as [Alexei] Pogorelov304 or Vladimir Marchenko305 continued 
the tradition of the physics and math faculty of the Kharkov University being socially and 
politically supported by both the university and the NASU. In establishing the institute, the 
academician [Boris] Verkin306 could concentrate mathematicians,’ physicists’ and engineers’ 
activity at one place. 
 
Research in low-temperature physics was established in Kharkov first through the 
academician [Abram] Ioffe’s307 initiative who founded a lab for this research at the university. 
It developed further into a separate establishment under Prof. [Lev] Shubnikov’s supervision 
in the 1930s. As outlined by Eremenko, Shubnikov was very internationally recognised, 
including at Cambridge.308 Joint research in quantum matter has been conducted between 
Kharkov and Cambridge in parallel since, and in the 1960s, in particular. [Pyotr] Kapitsa was 
doing a similar thing up in Moscow. This kind of exchange has been continuing since and has 
been intensified in the last decade as many of the institute graduates are working abroad, 
especially in the US, as well as in Australia, Japan, Germany and Israel at present. 
 
The applied research received a particular development in the 1960s following the demand 
from [Sergei] Korolev’s309 space programme to research behaviour of certain materials and 
devices in space as a demonstration of the demand deriving from the industry to work 
efficiently with science, and not vice versa, Eremenko emphasised. 
 
Pyotr Kapitsa supported Eremenko’s research with all means and was a man of broad interests 
including literature as well. In Eremenko’s account, Kapitsa never followed the official line 
from above but recklessly tried to influence the science policy-making which sometimes was 
unsafe for him, like in the case of Landau (who was originally from Kharkov). The latter was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Alexei V. Pogorelov (1919-2002), B. Verkin ILTPE of NASU; retrieved on 14.06.2018 the Web, 
http://www.ilt.kharkov.ua/bvi/personnel/pogorelov_e.html. 
305 Vladimir Aleksandrovich Marchenko, School of Mathematical and Computational Sciences, University of St 
Andrews; retrieved on 14.06.2018 from the Web, http://www-groups.dcs.st-
and.ac.uk/history/Biographies/Marchenko.html. 
306 Verkin Boris Yeremyevich, All-Fizika.com; retrieved on 14.06.2018 from the Web, http://www.all-
fizika.com/article/index.php?id_article=664. 
307 Abram F. Ioffe (1880-1960), Ioffe Institute; retrieved on 24.04.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.ioffe.ru/ioffe.html. 
308 Rotter, Helmut, 1997, Lev Shubnikov: Physics Pioneer, Landau Ally, Secret-Police Victim, 1 December, 
Physics Today, 50, 12, 95; retrieved on 14.06.2018 from the Web, 
https://physicstoday.scitation.org/doi/10.1063/1.882041. 
309 ESA, 2007, Sergei Korolev, Father of the Soviet Union’s Success in Space, 9 March, European Space 
Agency; retrieved on 13.06.2018 from the Web, 
http://www.esa.int/About_Us/Welcome_to_ESA/ESA_history/50_years_of_humans_in_space/Sergei_Korolev_
Father_of_the_Soviet_Union_s_success_in_space. 
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saved from the prison due to the former’s efforts. Eremenko mentioned of Kapitsa, sending 
scientific references to Stalin after reading Physical Review and making notes for himself and 
Stalin. Although Stalin was not a physicist, Kapitsa had a chance to make sure that the former 
did read his letters sent after receiving a call on Stalin’s behalf to continue the 
correspondence, as pointed out by Eremenko.310 
 
The funding of the research in the Soviet era, according to him, was practically unlimited 
and was provided through the Academy of Sciences. It was driven by key Soviet policy-
makers’ understanding, conveyed to them by Verkin, of the importance of the research in 
low-temperature physics for Korolev’s space programme. The funding for this purpose 
became the institute’s main financial provision. Eremenko was convinced that, overall, 
science should be run by the people who are capable of understanding the importance of the 
fundamental research, physics and math in particular, for development, like in Verkin’s 
case. Keldysh who also worked with Korolev was such kind of person as well, according to 
Eremenko. 
 
Although financially unlimited in the SUR funding, the research was ascribed in the Soviet 
equipment and materials available whereas in the West their distinct kinds were produced. 
This determined the Soviet scientists’ lag which was eventually developed in certain areas 
of research. However, the Soviet Union had something unique to offer, like the 
superconducting wire developed solely due to Eremenko’s both research in superconducting 
materials with a high critical magnetic field, and magneto-optic and –spectral experiments, 
followed after experimenting in the impulse-magnetic fields. Eremenko prioritised the basic 
research over the applied science in his activity emphasising the former’s fundamental 
importance. 
 
By the 1960s a full cycle of the education for S&T was established in Kharkov starting from a 
republican specialised physics and math secondary school to higher education institutions.  
The school’s founder was Ivan Fedorovich Bulba,311 a WWII veteran, severely wounded then. 
While establishing the school, he managed to overcome the accusations of elitism as opposed 
to the overall Soviet policy of meritocracy. These efforts bore their fruits through delivering 
generations of scientists, especially in math and physics, who nowadays run many of the 
universities and scientific institutions not only in Kharkov but elsewhere in the post-Soviet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 More detail is provided in Appendices L and M. 
311 Ivan Fedotovich Bulba; retrieved on 14.06.2018 from the Web, https://www.proza.ru/2016/01/08/20. 
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space. According to Andrey Eremenko, Victor’s son, more than 20 of his high school 
classmates continued their education by studying at the departments of physics and 
mechanical mathematics of the Kharkov University.  
 
Both of the Eremenkos emphasised the importance of the interconnection and interaction of 
the social policy in healthcare and education, on one the hand, and the development of 
science, both fundamental and applied one on the other, for constantly accumulating a critical 
mass for the scientific development. In Kharkov, there were many institutions specialising in 
the applied sciences of various kinds including mathematics for managing flights, or physics 
of monocrystals as the examples. The NASU Institute for Problems of Cryobiology and 
Cryomedicine Issues312 in Kharkov is a daughter’s spinoff of ILTPE. The accumulation of the 
overall critical mass mentioned before which mainly started in the 1930s and continued 
through the 1970s, in the early 1980s began gradually fading away. However, even today the 
Ukrainian research in scintillation materials deriving from the studies of the monocrystals is a 
part of CERN. 
 
Social provision of scientists in Kharkov in the Soviet Union was of high importance and was 
delivered at both the Moscow’s and Ukrainian levels. The first one was larger and connected 
the research in Kharkov with that of Chernogolovka [an academic city] near Moscow. Then 
joint seminars were conducted on a monthly basis, and many scientists moved from Kiev or 
Kharkov to up there. Eremenko was invited continuously to do so however he preferred 
staying in Kharkov. This collaboration has been continuing through the present days. 
 
Eremenko outlined the importance of culture and art for the human capital development, 
especially in mathematics or theoretical physics as the brightest manifestations of human 
intellect. During his directorship at ILTPE, from the 1960s he established an art gallery there 
and used to promote and support local artists by all means including the contribution of the art 
instruments, like foreign paints or Japanese brushes, he could bring from many international 
conferences to the painters. As well, at ILTPE there was a music hall for 500 seats in which 
various events were conducted on a regular basis. According to Eremenko, there were many 
examples of how enjoying music and watching art objects contributed to solving particular 
scientific problems or making discoveries.  
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In his interview, Alexander Nikolaevich Vasiliev (The USSR/Russia), chair of low-
temperature physics and superconductivity, head of solid state physics division, Faculty of 
Physics, the MSU, outlined the following. According to him, in general scientists including 
himself prefer not thinking of the concepts broader than their particular research which is 
driven by pure curiosity.  
 
Overall, as assumed by Vasiliev, in supporting science as driven by human curiosity the state 
is put into a painful and challenging position by admitting in its policy that it should fund this 
kind of a very expensive curiosity in the expectations of the ultimate, invisible, not tangible 
and uncertain applications which even the scientists involved cannot imagine themselves. 
This makes the planning of science impossible. Vasiliev also emphasised the importance of 
Soviet industrialisation in establishing the modern technological state.  
 
A joint interview with Andrey Rafailovich Kaul (Russia), head of laboratory of coordination 
compound chemistry, division of inorganic chemistry, the MSU, and Alexander Molodyk, 
Technical Director, the SuperOx company, below, outlined Soviet development with the 
example of the technology of the SuperOx superconducting cable. The particular technology 
details are explained by Molodyk, whereas the questionnaire was answered by Kaul after the 
tour around the SuperOx plant in Moscow.  
  
Superconductivity as free motion of electrons, once functionalised in the cables, allows 
transportation and storage of energy with zero loss as well as with a high concentration of 
large volumes of energy, such as that of industrial electrical grids, in the miniature cables, 
as explained by both scientists. Nowadays the technology is widely used in the energy and 
high-tech sector to eliminate bottle-necks in energy transportation for short distances of up 
to 800 metres. This length is dictated by today’s level of theoretical understanding (or rather 
the lack of the latter yet) of the superconductivity phenomenon, according to Molodyk. This 
defines the technological limits for the lengths of the cables in their production in the realm 
of the current understanding of the phenomenon. In other words, the maximal lengths, 
efficiency and production quality control depend on the size of the reels used in the 
production. Both Kaul and Molodyk believe that further research in this area could expand 
the knowledge, leading to wider and explosive usage of the technology. 
 
However, this limited length already allows transportation of high volumes of energy within 
short and critical distances in aircrafts, high-tech advanced connections and those parts of 
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the electrical grids, which can be in proximity of residential arrays, as the technology, 
unlike today’s electricity networks, in harmless and environmentally safe, as highlighted by 
Molodyk. More importantly, it can prevent accidental power blackouts of any type, which 
used to be a part of life in the densely populated and highly industrial areas. Power outage 
put public and environmental safety at risk as well as required significant funding for 
energy back-ups in industries, hospitals and elsewhere. Spreading of this technology has a 
potential to end industrial power outages and create a significant global economic effect, 
outlined Molodyk.  
 
As specified by him, the SuperOx company is a global leader in the production of 
superconducting cables, i.e. those of with the zero-loss transmission of electricity, and is 
one out of just five producers in the world. The company’s clientele includes major energy 
companies, high-tech conglomerates and leading research institutions such as CERN 
(Switzerland), Airbus (the EU), University of Cambridge (the UK), MIT (the USA), 
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (Germany), Paul Scherrer Institute (Switzerland), CNRS 
– The French National Center for Scientific Research (Grenoble, France), CEA – The 
Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (France), ICMAB – The Institute of 
Material Science of Barcelona (Spain), GSI – The GSI Helmholtz Centre for Heavy Ion 
Research (Germany), ENEA – The Italian National Agency for New Technologies, Energy 
and Sustainable Economic Development (Italy), Slovak Academy of Sciences and some 
others, undisclosed for this research. 
 
The SuperOx superconducting cable consists of the nine layers of the different materials 
providing the overall cable’s functionality altogether. The photographs of the SuperOx 
superconducting cable from inside and of the layers of the different materials of the 
SuperOx in which the black layer is the superconducting rare earth compound can be found 
in Appendices I and J respectively. 
 
As outlined by Kaul, this innovation is attributed to Soviet development and research in the 
following. The company was founded in 2006 as a classical spin-off of the faculty of 
Chemistry of the MSU, driven by research by Prof. Andrey Kaul and under his scientific 
supervision. Most of the employees and its management have been his graduates. The 
founder of the company, Andrey Vavilov,313 a former Russian politician, is an economist by 
education; however, both his interest in and understanding of the high-tech sector were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Vavilov, Andrey, Lenta.ru; retrieved on 21.06.2018 from the Web, https://lenta.ru/lib/14160897/full.htm. 
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predetermined by his graduation from a specialised physics and math high school in the 
USSR. 
 
The technology is a production of a tape covered with a superconductor (it involves Zhores 
Alferov’s research, the 1970s, marked with the 2000 Nobel Prize).314 A superconductor is a 
rare earth compound, either from Russia or Kazakhstan. On the stage of the second layer, 
the coating is made with laser (related to Nikolay Basov’s research of the 1950s, who 
received the 1964 Nobel Prize in Physics).315 
 
According to Kaul, a scientific consultant and supervisor, and Molodyk, a technical 
director, the following is essential. Firstly, fundamental research is not only a founding 
stone, but a continuing part of the process as the company’s progress is impossible without 
a constant affiliation and research at the MSU faculty of chemistry. Secondly, the process is 
based in its primary functions on the indigenous scientific and engineering advances. 
Thirdly, the imported equipment and technology play a secondary role and can be easily 
replaced with its domestic analogues. Fourthly, the patent regime is not critical and it is not 
used in the production. Fifthly, the delay of almost 15 years in the launch of the technology 
and innovation was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the suspension at the 
edge of the destruction of both the academic activity and the functioning of the 
technological chains involved in the production. Kaul does not find market conditions to be 
critical for the company’s emergence as well as for its functioning and considers that, if not 
for the disruption of the process, the technology would have been further developed and 
implemented in the Soviet Union at, most likely, a much greater both speed and on an 
industrial scale. 
 
This kind of the particular superconductor was discovered in 1986, and as early as in 1987 
the superconductivity research at the MSU was intensified in the aftermath of the joint 
decree of the TsK of the CPSU and the Soviet Government On Superconductivity, which 
provided a broad funding mostly due to the efforts of the academician Yuri Andreevich 
Osypian,316 although the latter was not specialising in superconductivity. He used to be the 
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Director of the Institute of Solid State Physics in Chernogolovka where the members of the 
GKNT prepared the decree. The process was followed by the introduction of the all-Union 
programme on the development of the superconductivity research which was divided into 
three parts, i.e. physics and electronics, chemistry, and engineering. After three years the 
funding decreased to cease existing after the collapse of the USSR. 
 
Kaul pointed out that the symbiosis of Soviet science and engineering was in many ways 
driven by the opportunity for the scientists to create something independent. This approach 
was nurtured in Soviet science, which resulted in the appearance of the technology given. 
 
Molodyk mentioned Kapitsa’s contribution to the development of physics of low temperature 
and particularly emphasised the importance of the science policy designed by Stalin for the 
development of the research of this phenomenon. 
 
This joint interview concludes the series of the primary data collected from the 
representatives of the Soviet state, industry, and academia to transit for the consideration of 
the interviews taken from the international scientists and engineers outside of the USSR in 
the next subsection. 
  
3.1.2                              Outsiders from the Soviet System 
 
In this subsection, the data from the notable international scientists are considered through 
the questionnaire to shed light on Soviet development. As indicated in the methodology 
section, it is important to note that all the interviewees’ experience is not limited to a single 
nation and the research they do involves from two to four and more countries, like in the 
case of Tsironis who apart from Greece has been actively involved in research in Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Britain, or Siddharth Saxena doing so in across the borders of the UK, Italy, 
India, Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian nations.  
 
Thus, the following scientists have been interviewed for the thesis. They are Giorgos 
Tsironis, Department of Physics, vice-rector of the University of Crete (Greece); 
Shashikumar M. Chitre (India, the UK), a Cambridge and Indian mathematician and 
astrophysicist; Peter Littlewood, Director of Argonne National Laboratory (the US) and a 
former head of the Cavendish Lab/Department of Physics, the University of Cambridge (the 
UK); Gilbert G. Lonzarich, head of the Quantum Matter Group at the Cavendish Laboratory 
	   88	  
of Cambridge (Canada, the UK, the US); Tony Raven, head of the University of Cambridge 
Enterprise (the UK); and Siddharth (Montu) Saxena, an experimental physicist at the 
Quantum Matter Group, the Cavendish Laboratory, the University of Cambridge (India, the 
U.K and the other countries designated above). 
 
Giorgos Tsironis, Department of Physics, University of Crete, (Greece), graduate of the 
University of Athens and the University of Rochester, New York (Master’s and PhD), spent 
a couple of years at the University of New Mexico, after which he was a research fellow at 
the University of California San Diego, the US. His last appointment in the US was at the 
University of North Texas.317 He is a theorist in condensed matter physics, physics of 
nonlinear dynamics, as ‘complexity that involves multiple interaction systems,’ according to 
himself. They are conveyed from very fundamental phenomena of condensed matter physics 
to industrial, societal and all scale outputs. It is little disciplinary research, founded on the 
basic principles of the condensed matter physics, as explained by Tsironis. 
 
Without commenting much on Soviet development, Tsironis brought an example of [the 
academician and biologist Trofim] Lysenko318 and the interference of the ideology in 
genetics named as ‘bourgeois science,’ which, due to the doctrine of materialism imposed, 
led to a disaster, as any external doctrine should not determine how everything might work. 
It could in some cases be correct, however in relation to biology, Lysenko tried to 
experiment based on this premise. It did not work, and for many years the development of 
biology was lagged behind in the Soviet Union.  
 
In an analogy of the market forces, continued the physicist, this is a counter-productive 
example of how either the society or ideology or market force or anything interferes too 
much and is put before science. On the other hand, from his general impression about the 
history of science and technology in the Soviet Union and from knowing people of the 
Soviet Union, it seemed to Tsironis that it was understood to a large extent there that basic 
science can generate knowledge which leads to technology. For that reason, the Academy of 
Sciences [of the USSR] was a prestigious and important body because the society 
understood that it could rely on science to be better-off in life and other things.  
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318 Ings, Simon, 2016, ‘How did anyone dare insult Comrade Lysenko?,’ Stalin and the Scientists, A History of 
Triumph and Tradegy. 1905 – 1953, London, Faber & Faber, 340-66, hereafter referred to as Ings. 
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In terms of technology transfer, Tsironis addressed to Vannevar Bush,319 an advisor to F.D. 
Roosevelt, who wrote a report320 on the connection between science and technology by the 
end of WWII. He had a statement there of the importance of basic research and technology 
for the nations’ sovereignty and ability to defend themselves. In Tsironis’ opinion, 
indigenous know-how in science is essential although this would depend on a scale of a 
country. Nonetheless, a nation should have a stratum of people with knowledge in science 
and technology which is very important for the country to be able to develop. One cannot 
bring everything from outside and not think of tomorrow, believed the scientist and brought 
an example of agriculture in which a dependence on foreign companies in seeds can put 
sovereignty at stake. According to Tsironis, having know-how on basic aspects of science 
and technology is really a developmental apex for any country. 
 
In Tsironis’ view, every country has its group of scientists who move around. A decent 
salary is vital for them however it is not the most important question, unlike some stable 
conditions where scientists can work in, operate without too much bureaucracy and obtain 
not negligible but substantial funding. In order to have long-term success in science, they 
need a stable environment and a reasonable amount of funding.  
 
Thus, in the scientific development, a constant and quiet environment for scientists to work 
was defined by Tsironis as essential. Meanwhile, social policy should be smart enough to 
involve people into science, and science policy should be designed by good scientists in 
order to set up the rules and provision of basic funding, as well as to exclude an 
unnecessary intervention. In his view, education and the existence of scientific 
infrastructure for experimenting are viable as well.   
 
Shashikumar M. Chitre (India, the UK), a Cambridge and Indian mathematician and 
astrophysicist, marked with the highest Indian civilian Padma award,321 an Active Member 
of the International Astronomic Union,322 in his interview emphasised the importance of the 
literacy issue in the national policy-making in an early Soviet development.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319 Dennis, Michael Aaron, 2016, Vannevar Bush, American Engineer, Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved on 
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Bio. 
320 Bush, Vannevar, 1945, Science, the Endless Frontier, National Science Foundation, Washington DC, 
reprinted July 1960; hereafter referred to as Bush. Appendix M. 
321 Press Information Bureau, 2012, Government of India, Padma Awards Announced, 25 January; retrieved on 
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According to him, overall in science policy, due to the psyche of the people in a particular 
country, one does not necessarily apply some of the practices which are not acceptable to the 
society. In the Soviet Union, they could implement it and became not depend on merely 
technology transfer after WWII as he explained:  
 
They developed their technology because the educational foundation was so 
strong that they could develop and put Sputnik up in space before the 
Americans. All the Americans were surprised. It was 1957, which was very 
commendable and incorrigible that they mastered the space technology to 
[…] put the satellite. It was a breakthrough which in a way triggered the 
United States' space programme. That was what prompted John Kennedy to 
make the statement that before this decade is out, the 1960s, America should 
put a man on the moon and bring him back safely.323 
 
In the Soviet Union, they strengthened the university as the foundation [for the development]. 
Not all of the graduates come into science necessarily but, having learned in the university for 
five years in various basic sciences courses, they could go into administration or management, 
and they would have a feel of how to manage science. It is the polytechnic instruction, like in 
the USSR, or in France as a prime example with the French polytechnic institute. According 
to Chitre, he ‘admire[d] the Soviet Union that they took that step of being self-sufficient. That 
was possible only because they had a very solid basis. The basis has to be really firmed up at 
the level of secondary education schools or tertiary school, and post-[graduate education].’324  
This became possible due to a high level of education and self-education of the key Soviet 
policy-makers. Discussing Stalin who did not receive a proper scientific training [apart from a 
year or two at a geophysical observatory] but had a deep understanding of science, Chitre 
brought an example of [Yakov] Zel’dovich, a Soviet physicist who was not trained formally 
as well, but picked up everything practically by himself to contribute a lot to the development 
of nuclear energy.325  
 
While talking about Kapitsa and the transfer of the Mond laboratory from Cambridge into the 
USSR in 1934-6 with Rutherford’s active involvement, Chitre noted that both Lord Adrian 
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324 Ibid. 
325 Yakov Zeldovich Dies, A Top Soviet Physicist, 1987, The NY Times; retrieved on 22.06.2018 from the Web, 
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[the 1932 Nobel Prize recipient in Physiology326], a future Master of Trinity College, and 
John Cockcroft [the 1951 Nobel Prize recipient in Physics327], a future Master of Churchill 
College, in later years stated in their Cambridge lectures attended by Chitre that they had 
assisted to the laboratory’s transfer. 
 
Peter Littlewood is Director of Argonne National Laboratory (the US) and a former head of 
the Cavendish Lab/Department of Physics, the University of Cambridge (the UK) who did his 
PhD there in 1980.328 His research in theoretical physics and condensed matter physics ‘has 
focused on the dynamics of collective transport; phenomenology and microscopic theory of 
high-temperature superconductors, transition metal oxides and other correlated electronic 
systems; and optical properties of highly excited semiconductors. He has applied his methods 
to engineering, including holographic storage, optical fibers and devices.’329 
 
In his interview, Littlewood found quite a lot of parallels between the USSR and the US as 
their research was driven by the military paradigm. As pointed out by him, one of the best 
institutes in the Soviet Union was the Institute of Radio Engineering and Electronics in 
Moscow [established in 1953].330 According to him, ‘they did some absolutely world-leading 
science,’ but nonetheless, the reasons for this were very much that this was a military 
technology and they wanted to develop it there, just as in the US. 
 
Littlewood noted that previously industry and technology goals were set in a consensus way. 
In the Soviet Union, they had five-year plans, maybe less so in the West but nonetheless there 
was a very strong consensus to push for all of those things, and that was what created modern 
information technology, and so now, the business coming on to the market are things that 
people can make money out of but mostly have no redeeming social value, according to him. 
 
Littlewood emphasised that the main product of science is scientists. Generations of students 
and postdocs who have acquired ways of thinking and tools would make analogies and take 	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from one subject to another one and create something different and new which is important. 
There was a little bit of separation between Soviet physics and the West; there was a distinct 
Landau school which is a way of thinking. However, that way of thinking could maybe be 
applied to from obscure things like superconductors to more practical things like magnetism.  
 
According to him, human capital is critical for development because, of course, not all of the 
Kapitsa's students are going to go on to become research professors. They will go off into 
other parts of the economy, taking their skills and their way of thinking with them.  
 
Regarding technology transfer, in the short term, one may think to get successes, but one of 
the problems with that is that if there is no a scientific base of people who can absorb the 
technologies, the technology transfer does not happen very well, continued the physicist. The 
first thing is there has to be some level or receptivity, and that depends on people, their 
training, their understanding and their abilities to work with this, and so that the main thing 
that one can actually get are gains from educational and social reforms which are reflected in 
the ability of a country to absorb technology.  
 
About Soviet development, Gilbert G. Lonzarich, professor of physics (decorated with the 
highest award for his research in superconductivity)331 and a former head of the Quantum 
Matter Group at the Cavendish Laboratory of Cambridge, who was nominated for the 2018 
Oliver E Buckley prize for ‘his groundbreaking experiments and physical insight that has 
established a new framework for discovery and understanding of emergent states in 
superconducting, magnetic and ferroelectric systems alike,’332 stated the following in his 
interview: 
 
Soviet science and technology has brought us the space age. This is a 
monumental contribution not only to the history of civilization, but that of life 
on earth itself. In general, the Soviet Union invested heavily in both 
fundamental science and technology and has many contributions of 
worldwide importance. I am particularly aware of contributions in metallurgy 
and materials science and in theoretical physics, particularly in the field of 	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superconductivity. The theories that we use in practice in the field of 
superconductivity depend heavily on the seminal works of Soviet scientists. I 
personally use Soviet theoretical inventions on a regular basis.333 
 
Meanwhile, technology transfer, in Lonzarich’ view, should not permanently restrict the 
development of the nation’s own science and technology base without which a nation could 
remain in a subordinate position.  ‘This will lead to a state of mind that will prevent the 
nation’s unique genius from flourishing,’ continued the scientist explaining that the dominant 
powers would wish smaller nations to remain so.334 Achieving economic success solely 
through technology transfer without funding the educational and social development through 
structural reforms would ensure that subordinate status to become for such smaller nations 
permanent on the ‘road to serfdom,’ emphasised Lonzarich.335 
 
Tony Raven, head of the Cambridge Enterprise,336 the special entity of the University of 
Cambridge launched to ‘help students and staff commercialise their expertise and ideas,’337 
joined the Cambridge Enterprise as Chief Executive in December 2011. After graduating in 
physics from Manchester University, he obtained his MSc and DPhil from the University of 
Oxford. Raven is a Fellow of the Institute of Physics and a Member of the Institute of 
Directors and was involved in launching a range of successful start-ups.338 
 
According to him, the social aspect is critical in science, and it always has something to do 
with the environment which pushes creativity, and sometimes very differently with the same 
people. In terms of the role of the technology transfer in development, Raven explained the 
latter is impossible unless the receiving side’s technological and scientific competence is as 
good as that of the source of the import. 
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In his view, it is challenging to enter new industrial areas, not knowing anything about them 
and being not capable even of hiring a good advisory because one could not know what a 
good one looked like:  
 
Without that understanding of the science moving into, it [would be] difficult 
even to know how to start. They say that the first thing is you need to find an 
expert, but you do not know what an expert looks like. It is where a lot of 
consultancy fails as well. You get someone external to tell you what to do but 
you do not really understand what they have told you.339 
 
Thus, the capacity to absorb, according to Raven, is vital for development. 
 
According to Siddharth (Montu) Saxena, an experimental physicist at the Quantum Matter 
Group, the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge,340 science is a reservoir of knowledge from 
which practical solutions of engineering, technology, and innovation are drawn. Indeed 
often to further science one has to develop new instrumentation and methods which is very 
much in the technology and innovation realm. Equally missing pieces and new needs in 
technology require digging back into the scientific reservoir. However, the quality and 
breadth of that reservoir intrinsically affect the quality of technology that is derived from it. It 
will be a very limited reservoir if it only relied on directed need-based understanding to fill it. 
 
As outlined by Saxena, the core of science remains as the curiosity-driven pursuit of 
understanding natural phenomena and as a quest to translate the strange into familiar. It also 
brings up the question of the difference between discovery and invention and requires the 
delineation between the notions of science and technology.  
 
Saxena firmly agreed with the notion that the primary process that leads to sustainable 
technological development of large developed countries (or companies) is clearly linked to 
a robust fundamental science research base and illustrated it with the following example: 
‘Many electronic devices in use today globally contain materials invented in the Soviet 
Union including Kazakhstan.’341  
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Saxena’s interview concludes the subsection above in which international scientists have 
disclosed their views on the nature of the driving forces in science and the connection 
between the notions of science, engineering, and technology in general and in their 
particular fields.     
 
3.1.3                             Insight from Both Systems 
 
In concluding both subsections above of the interviews with those from inside and outside 
of the Soviet system, Timour Paltashev’s vision is provided in representing both 
Soviet/post-Soviet and Western systems as that of full professor of the department of 
computer science & engineering of National Research University of Information Technology, 
Mechanics and Optics (ITMO),342 St. Petersburg, Russia, and professor of the Northwestern 
Polytechnic University in California,343 the USA, as well as a current AMD344 Radeon 
Technology Group senior manager, involved in applied  and industrial technology research & 
development as well as in start-ups activity in the US, Russia, and Kazakhstan.345 He 
graduated from the Kazakh Polytechnic Institute346 (Alma-Ata, the Kazakh SSR, the Soviet 
Union, Paltashev’s hometown) in 1978 and obtained his both degrees of PhD and Doctor of 
Sciences in computer engineering at ITMO in 1987 and 1994 respectively.  
 
According to him, investments in the development of fundamental science become 
immediately justified in dealing with natural and technogenic disasters providing the expertise 
required, as seen in the examples of Japan and the USSR. In the absence of the school of 
nuclear physics in Japan, the reactor in Fukushima after the 2011 accident keeps producing 
radiation whereas the Soviet Union could localise the source of radiation in Chernobyl in 
1986 due to the deep Soviet expertise in this discipline.  
 
Paltashev outlined that Soviet industry was based on and constructed by research. For 
example, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the state policy brought exogenous research from the 
other developed parts of the USSR before and during, in particular, WWII to establish and 
develop the indigenous schools of basic research as the drivers of the industrial development 	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and the centres of the knowledge and expertise in various fields including those dealing with 
natural disasters. 
 
According to him, in Soviet development, the implementation of the principle of the 
particular importance of fundamental science for the industrial development received special 
attention during WWII. It occurred due to the need of the improvement of both the quality of 
the industrial research established mainly throughout the 1920s and 30s, as resultant from the 
industrial technology and production of the massive preceding technology transfer, e.g. in the 
steel industry and aviation turbines in particular. The problem became even more acute in the 
light of facing the nuclear weapon challenge of the creation of the own super-weapon as a 
counter-measure. It was the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project which was totally related to the 
development of fundamental science in general and nuclear physics in particular and in which 
Abram Ioffe [or Joffe], ‘the father’ of the Soviet physics school, played a crucial role of 
concentrating of the dispersed physicists’ knowledge in one place. During WWII and in the 
post-war period, for the USSR, unlike for the US, it was a matter of the nation’s survival, 
continued the scientist. 
 
He emphasised that, in terms of the role of the technology transfer for this project, the 
development of the Soviet Bomb went in both directions, i.e. the implementation of the 
exact copy of the American Bomb (as an illegal technology transfer via intelligence service) 
and an own self-engineered Soviet device. Both of them exploded, noted Paltashev.  
 
Regarding the technology transfer, in the industry, in general, it is impossible to reproduce 
both new technology and a new product simultaneously. Once the technology is transferred, 
an old product is produced first. Once the former is adopted, a new product could be 
developed and produced which is a widespread industrial practice, as stressed out by him: 
 
During industrialisation, technology transfer was very important for Soviet 
development and the Government’s policy was correct in doing the 
following. It purchased a plant on turn-key-solutions or technology of full 
cycle and hired experts to launch it and teach Soviet personnel.347  
 
According to Paltashev, a main technology transfer trap lies within a possibility of being 
refused with further import. Any credible government tries to get rid of the imported critical 	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parts and components in its telecommunications infrastructure. The latter means survival in 
the modern world. The same is relevant for the infrastructure electronics of all the critical 
industries, e.g. in the energy sector, machinery, and transport, etc. The price of the 
civilisation can be measured in two days without electrical power. The approach is based on 
the understanding that, in case of an emergency, 70 per cent of the functions in a particular 
infrastructure should remain working.  
 
Brain drain can be performed in two ways: either by transferring the experts or by assigning 
them with own tasks. Technology transfer is important for establishing an original 
technology to reproduce goods and develop own new products in the next generation, in 
Paltashev’s view.   
 
He outlined that technology transfer is limited in time. Once performed, it cannot function 
longer than for 30 years without being developed; it is a single-use action and useless if the 
overall industrial, marketing, logistics, research, and education infrastructure is not 
established. Universally, development of research and technology is driven by human 
capital which derives from education. Meanwhile, development of education requires a 
comprehensive social approach.  
 
Paltashev emphasised the quality of Soviet education for science and technology at the 
example of Phystech, or MFTI, The Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology,348 
established by Pyotr Kapitsa in 1946.349 Today there it is ordinary practice for its graduates to 
obtain their PhDs at leading global universities, including Princeton, Stanford or Berkeley in 
the US. 
 
Paltashev noted that Kapitsa, Rutherford’s man, is an iconic figure in science. The fact that he 
could have made such a scientific and engineering career in both worlds of the West and the 
USSR demonstrated his incredible talent apart from his and his son’s contribution in science. 
His fate became the evidence of the non-dominance of the ideological approach for the Soviet 
leadership in the science and technology policy. Some of Kapitsa’s public views alternative to 
the official Party’s line on Soviet development were either ignored or forgiven by the system 
due to the prevailing importance of Kapitsa doing his business.350 The main contribution in 	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establishing the Soviet school of physics is credited to Abram Ioffe and Pyotr Kapitsa. The 
Soviet Atomic Project came from Ioffe’s school. The name of Kapitsa should always be 
associated with Ioffe, as it is in the US scientific community, where the former is not that 
known, and Ioffe is a leading and founding figure of the Soviet school of physics, concluded 
this Soviet/Russian/American scientist originally from Kazakhstan.    
 
Paltashev’s interview concludes the section of the interviews. The next section of the data 
chapter is dedicated to the factual evidence obtained from primary literature relevant to 
address the research question. 
 
3.2                            Data from Other Primary Sources 
 
As mentioned in the methodology section of chapter 2, the data and theoretical research from 
various primary literature sources have been used for this thesis, including the theorists of 
Marxism-Leninism, the speeches, decrees and articles of the key Soviet policy-makers such as 
Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev and others, Soviet legal acts and statistical documents as well as 
some memoirs and correspondence. Some other data, like those from the memoirs of Anna 
Kapitsa, Pyotr Kapitsa’s wife, as well as his correspondence with the Soviet leadership, are 
considered in Appendices L and M and analysed in comparison with Vannevar Bush’s report 
to Roosevelt, which is a legitimate primary source as well. Last but not least, the data from 
the Nobel Prize Committee’s website as well as other scientific institutions are widely used 
throughout the thesis to illustrate the interviewees’ data and analysis. Thus, the study of the 
primary sources reveals the following data.  
 
The Soviet development policy was in line with Marxist-Leninist ideology. The driving force 
for productivity in the Soviet Union became technical progress which was key to forming a 
socialist society, as per the Marxist theory of political economy. In terms of economic 
theory, the latter was based on the classical British economic theories, e.g. ‘division of 
labour’ by Adam Smith,351 David Ricardo’s labour theory of value352 as well as Thomas 
Robert Malthus’ demographic research on growth and surplus of population.353 Karl Marx 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Smith, Adam, 1776, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edwin Cannan, ed. 
1904, Library of Economics and Liberty; retrieved on 9.03.2018 from the Web, 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN1.html.  
352 Ricardo, David, 1817, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 1821, Library of Economics and 
Liberty; retrieved on 9.03.2018 from the Web, http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html.  
353 Malthus, Thomas Robert, 1798, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Library of Economics and Liberty; 
retrieved on 09.03.2018 from the Web, http://www.econlib.org/library/Malthus/malPop.html.  
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combined and developed these theories into his teaching on the role of surplus value,354 
including labour, to be socialised for the overall increase in productivity in the socialist 
society. Unlike Malthus, Marx viewed the primary cause of the labour growth in economic, 
not biological terms. According to Marx, technical progress changes the means and modes 
of production (constant capital) in order to increase productivity, labour and the rate of 
surplus value (variable capital). 
 
This theory was primarily used by the Bolsheviks in transforming the backward Russia, 
whose state of affairs was described by Vladimir Lenin in his 1913 article as follows: 
‘There is no other country in Europe so barbarous in which the masses are robbed to such 
an extent of education, light and knowledge [...] No other country in Europe has remained 
in this condition; Russia is the exception.’355 Lenin prioritised the role of education in the 
new main policy line as follows: 
 
We can build communism only on the basis of the totality of knowledge, 
organisations and institutions, only by using the stock of human forces and 
means that have been left to us by the old society. Only by radically 
remoulding the teaching, organisation and training of the youth shall we be 
able to ensure that the efforts of the younger generation will result in the 
creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e., in the creation of 
a communist society.356 
 
The policy for education started on 9 November (27 October) 1917 by forming the People’s 
Commissariat for Education with Anatoly Lunacharsky as its head.357 This step became the 
foundation stone for the preparation of the programme to eliminate illiteracy, or Likbez. By 
signing a decree On Liquidation of Illiteracy among the Population of RSFSR in 1919, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
354 Marx, Karl, 1867, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I, Book One: The Process of Production 
of Capital, First English edition of 1887 (4th German edition changes included as indicated) with some 
modernisation of spelling, Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR; retrieved on 09.08.2018 from the Web, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867-c1/.  
355 Lenin, Vladimir, 1913, The Question of Ministry of Education Policy, Lenin Collected Works, Progress 
Publishers, 1977, Moscow, Vol. 19, 138.  
356 Lenin, Vladimir, 1920, The Tasks of the Youth Leagues, Speech Delivered At The Third All-Russia 
Congress of The Russian Young Communist League, 2 October,  
First Published: Pravda Nos. 221, 222 and 223, October 5, 6 and 7, 1920, Collected Works, Volume 31; retrieved 
on 12 May 2019 from the Web, https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/oct/02.htm#1.  
357 Sobranie uzakonenii I rasporiazhenii rabochego i krestianskogo pravitel’stva (Collection of Legalisation and 
Orders of the Workers 'and Peasants' Government), Division one. Petrograd, 1917, No. 1, art. 1. 
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Lenin launched the Likbez campaign, which aimed at making everyone from 8 to 50 years 
old to become literate in her native or Russian languages.358  
 
In parallel, the Central Commission for the Improvement of the Life of Scientists 
(TsEKUBU) under the SNK of the RSFSR as the executive body of the Soviet government 
was created according to the resolution of the SNK of the RSFSR of December 6, 1921 ‘On 
improving the life of scientists’ signed by Alexander Tsyurupa (as the chairman of the SNK) 
and Nikolay Gorbunov.359 This body’s task was ‘to create working conditions for the 
scientific, technical and creative intelligentsia of Russia in war communism.’360 It existed in 
its original form until 1931 when it was transformed into the Commission for Assistance to 
Scientists at the SNK of the USSR which worked until 1937.361 
 
The GOELRO plan of the electrification of the country designed by Lenin became a kind of 
the first big Soviet industrial plan, a precursor and necessary prerequisite for further 
industrialisation which was worded by him as follows: ‘Communism is Soviet power plus 
the electrification of the whole country, since industry cannot be developed without 
electrification.’362  
 
The XIV Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) during 18–31 December 
1925 placed the task of turning the USSR from a country dependent on imports into a self-
sustaining heavy industry producer.363 As evident from the literature review and the previous 
section, foreign involvement became the main factor of Soviet industrialisation, during 
which, the ideological constraints were abandoned for cooperation between two opposite 
systems. This was officially recognised by the country’s leaders, including Stalin and 
Molotov. In particular, Stalin proclaimed the following:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358 Dekret SNK o likvidatsii bezgramotnosti sredi naselenia RSFSR, 26 dekabrya 1919 (The SNK Decree About 
Liquidation of Illiteracy in Population of the RSFSR, 26 December 1919), Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiyskoi 
Federatsii (The State Archive of the Russian Federation), F, R-130, Op. 2. D. 1, 38. 
359 Komissiya Sodeystviya Uchenym (KSU) pri Soviete Narodnykh Komissarov SSSR. 1921 – 1937 (Commission 
of Assistance to Scientists (CCU) at the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. 1921 – 1937), 
Rusarchive; retrieved on 17.07.2019 from the Web,  
http://guides.rusarchives.ru/browse/gbfond.html?bid=203&fund_id=1153241.  
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid. 
362 Lenin V.I., 1920, Our Foreign and Domestic Position and Party Tasks, Speech Delivered To The Moscow 
Gubernia Conference Of The R.C.P.(B.), November 21, Collected Works, 4th English Edition, Progress 
Publishers, Moscow, 1965, Vol. 31, 408-26; retrieved on 15.07.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1920/nov/21.htm. 
363 Stalin, J. V., The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Works, Vol. 7, 1925 Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, Moscow, 1954; retrieved on 3 July 2018 from the Web,  
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1925/12/18.htm.    
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Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 rubles in foreign currency 
obtained as a result of a most rigorous economy, and spent on building up 
our industry, for importing raw materials, and for increasing the output of 
articles of general consumption. That is also a ‘plan,’ in a way. But with 
such a ‘plan’ we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a 
machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or aeroplanes and 
tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign 
foes.364  
 
Molotov, number two in the Kremlin’s hierarchy, admitted in his 1935 official report that 
‘[i]n a complicated international situation, competition and, at the same time, a 
collaboration of two opposite systems happens.’365 Industrialisation took place within two 
five-year plans of 1928-32 and 1933-7. The main funding sources for the first plan were 
identified as follows: the light industry and agricultural sector, the monopoly from the 
overseas trade, the taxation of the SME, tax duties on alcohol imposed, and the loans from 
the population.366 In 1931 while trying to justify an increasingly growing pressure of the 
industrialisation on the population, Stalin declared that ‘we are fifty or a hundred years 
behind the advanced countries. We must make up this distance in ten years. Either we do it, 
or we shall go under.’367    
 
In 1931, polytechnisation of the Soviet education aiming to support the industrialisation 
development became the leading education instruction at the SES as evident from the 1931 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
364 Stalin, Josef, 1935, Address Delivered in the Kremlin Palace to the Graduates From the Red Army 
Academies, on May 4, 1935. Pravda, 6 May 1935, from Stalin, Josef, Problems of Leninism, Foreign Languages 
Press, Peking, 1976, 767-74, Source: Works, Vol. 14, Red Star Press Ltd., London, 1978; retrieved on 3 July 
2017 from the Web, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1935/05/04.htm. 
365 Molotov, Vyacheslav, 1935, Iz doklada Predsedatelia Sovieta Narodnykh Komissarov SSSR na VII siezde 
Sovietov 28 yanvaria 1935 goda (From the Report of the Chairman of the SNK of the USSR on the VII 
Congress of the Soviets on 28 Jan 1935), Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del SSSR, Dokumenty Vneshnei Politiki 
SSSR (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, The Documents of Foreign Policy), Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi 
Literatury, Moscow, Vol. 18, 1973, 43. 
366 Doklad tovarischa Molotova o vtorom pyatiletnem plane razvitiya narodnogo khoziastva SSSR. Zasedanie 
pyatnadtsatoe 3 fevralia 1934 g., utrennee. XVII s’iezd VKP (b). 26 yanvaria - 10 fevralia 1934 г. 
Stenograficheskyi otchet (Report by the Comrade Molotov on the Second Five-Year Plan of People’s Economy 
of the USSR, The session 15, 3 Feb 1934, in the Morning. XVII Congress of VKP[b]., 26 Jan – 10 Feb 1934, 
Verbatim report), 1934, Partizdat; retrieved on 17.05.2015 from the Web, 
http://www.hrono.info/vkpb_17/15_1.htm.  
367 Stalin, Josef, 1931, O zadachakh khoziastvennikov (The Tasks of Business Executives), Speech Delivered at 
the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry 1, February 4, Works, Vol. 13, 1930 - 
January 1934, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1954. First published in Pravda, No. 35, 
February 5, 1931. 
	   102	  
directive of the VKP(b) (the Communist Party)368 based on Stalin’s views. His following 
writings that ‘our industry would be lifted to a height beyond the reach of the industries of 
other countries,’ if ‘the majority of workers should raise their cultural-technical level to the 
level of engineering-technician personnel,’ and the emphasis of the importance of 
combining both theoretical knowledge and skills in opposition to ‘a sterile training in trades 
– ‘technicianism’’ are cited in there.369 The references to Stalin as well as his cult in Soviet 
life was named as ‘the cult of personality’ in the Soviet political terminology by Nikita 
Khrushchev in his 1956 Report on the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union.370  
 
In prioritising polytechnisation in Soviet development, in 1940 Stalin, while learning about 
both Soviet delegation’s inspection of the German aviation and reports on the 
unpreparedness of the Soviet aviation before a possible war, gave the following and not that 
widely known definition of Soviet power: 
 
What is the Soviet power? […] If any problem arises that does not 
contradict the laws of physics, mechanics and chemistry, and its solution is 
necessary for the Motherland, then it will be solved — that is what Soviet 
power.371 
 
Meanwhile, by the end of the 1930s, the goal of industrialisation was achieved. According 
to Gosplan’s (The State Planning Committee) official report, the USSR had become the 
largest European and the second global industrial power after the US in terms of industrial 
output, having reduced imports rapidly to the level of just 1 per cent of GDP.372  
 
The period from the 1930s to 50s in its different stages was characterised by the mixed 
forms of the social organisations. Apart from the dominant state ownership, as evident from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 O nachal’noi i srednei shkole (On the Elementary and Secondary School), 1931, September 5, Direktivy 
VKP(b) I postanovleniya sovetskogo pravitelstva o narodnom obrazovanii za 1917-1947 gg. (Directives of 
VKP[b] and Regulations of the Soviet Government on People’s Education in 1917-1947), Vol. I, 8. 
369 Ibid., citing from Stalin, I.V., 1952, Ekonomychekiye problemy sotsializma v SSSR (Economic Problems of 
Socialism in the USSR), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 28. 
370 Khrushchev N.S., 1956, O kul’te lichnosti i ego posledtviyakh (On the Cult of Personality and its 
Consequences), Report on the XX Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 25 February, 
published in 1989, Izvestia TsK KPSS, N. 3.   
371 Petrov, I.F., 1992, Aviatsia i viya zhizn’ (Aviation and All Life), Moscow, Izdatel’skii Otdel TsAGI, 50. 
372  Itogi vypolnenia vtorogo pyatiletnego plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaystva Soyuza SSR (Results of the 
Execution of the Second Five Years Plan of People’s Economy of the USSR), 1939, Moscow, Gosplanizdat; 
retrieved on 01.07.2017 from the Web, 
http://istmat.info/files/uploads/32068/itogi_vypolneniya_vtorogo_pyatiletnego_plana_0.pdf.  
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the official economic reports, the production share of capitalistic and private industry in the 
GNP was reduced from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 0.2 per cent in 1937.373 Cooperative 
industry in the form of the collective ownership, so-called Arteli (the artels), kept playing a 
decreasing but notable role in the total GNP with the following numbers: 13.9 per cent in 
1928, 9.5 in 1937, 8.2 in 1950, 8 in 1955, 6 in 1958 and 1959, 3 in 1960.374 It was reduced 
substantially and disappeared from the new and extended forms of the statistical reports 
during and afterwards Khrushchev’s era from 1962.375    
 
In terms of the Soviet population’s literacy, the following was achieved, as seen from the 
All-Union Soviet censuses of 1939 and 1959. By 1939 the male literacy reached 90.8 per 
cent and female literacy 72.5 per cent, which, as an example, constituted 89.7 per cent in the 
RSFSR, aged 9-10, according to the 1939 Soviet census.376 It is important to note that by the 
1950s the initial goal of almost 100 (98.5) per cent literacy of the entire population was 
reached and stabilised.377  
 
In terms of the Soviet higher education policy, the establishment of the leading national 
universities was closely supervised by the high political leadership, as indicated in the two 
following examples among many others. The National University of Science and 
Technology MISIS (mentioned in Tsironis’ interview before) was established in 1930 by a 
direct decree by Stalin and it was carried his name till 1962 (Moskovskyi Institute Stali 
Imeni J.V. Stalina, Moscow Institute of Steel named after J.V. Stalin).378  
 
In 1947 upon Stalin’s personal proposal the Government took a decision to construct the 
Lomonosov Moscow State University’s new colossal building and massive campus in 
central Moscow.379 The construction of the MSU large campus was begun with Stalin’s and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373 Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1960 godu (Statisticheskii ezhegodnik) (People's Economy of the USSR in 
1960 [Statistical Yearbook]), 1961, Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, Moscow, 213.  
374 Ibid. 
375 Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1961 godu (Statisticheskii ezhegodnik) (People's Economy of the USSR in 
1961 [Statistical Yearbook]), 1962, Gosstatizdat TsSU SSSR, Moscow. 
376 Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1939 goda, Tablitsa 12, Gramotnost, obrazovaniye i obuchenue po 
vostrastnym gruppam, chislo sostoyavshikh v brake (All-Union census of the population of 1939, Table 12, 
Literacy, education and learning in various groups, the number of the married), RGAE. F. 1562. OP. 336, D 640. 
377 Vsesoyuznaya perepis’ naseleniya 1959 goda, Tablitsa 7, Raspredelenie naseleniya po vozrastu i urovnu 
obrazovaniya (All-Union census of the population of 1959, Table 7, Distribution of the population in age and 
educational level), RGAE. F. 1562. OP. 336, D. 1591-94. 
378 MISIS, National University of Science and Technology, Moscow, Russia; retrieved on 17.07.2017 from the 
Web, http://en.misis.ru/ - formerly the Stalin Moscow Institute of Steel, established in 1930; hereafter referred to 
as MISIS. 
379 Stalin J.V., Chadaev Y., 1947, Postanovlenie Sovieta Ministrov SSSR O Stroitelstve v g. Moskva 
Vyjujetazhnykh zdanyi (Decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR On Construction of Multi-stories 
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Chadaev’s decree on behalf of the Soviet Government on 15 March 1948380 and finished on 
1 September 1953.  
 
Central Asia was regarded as the most backward region of the Soviet Union, and the first 
results of the policy of human capital development can be shown through the illustrative 
example of Kazakhstan in the following data, taken from the economic and statistical official 
reports of the era.  
 
In the republic, the overall number of the engineers which was counted as 746 and ethnic 
Kazakh among them as 14 in 1915 reached 2,882 in 1927.381 Due to a set of measures on the 
formation of the new national intelligentsia in Kazakhstan, its number by 1930 grew 8 times 
from 22,500 to 177,900 people.382 In 1932, 12 R&D institutes, 15 experimental stations, 186 
hydro stations, and labs were established.383 Additionally, 4,300 people from Kazakhstan 
were studying at the universities and scientific institutions of Moscow, Leningrad, Kazan, 
Tomsk, Kharkov, Omsk, Astrakhan, and other cities.384 The number of the researchers grew 
steadily. For example, as described in the All-Soviet Union census poll in 1926, in 
Kazakhstan there were 47 lecturers and professors, 58 the authors and editors, and 143 
librarians and museum workers. In 1931 the number of the researchers was 324, and by 
1932 it increased to 558.385 
 
In 1933 the Politburo of the TsK issued a decree to establish two leading higher education 
institutions of Kazakhstan, i.e. the Kazakh Mining-Engineering Institute386 and the Kazakh 
State University387 which were established in 1934, and to develop an extensive programme 
of preparing specialists of medium levels for various industries.388 Overall 12 higher 	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381 Sotsialistichekoye stroitel'stvo v KazSSR (Socialist Construction in the Kazakh SSR), Statistical compilation, 
1960, Alma-Ata, 239. 
382 Narodnoye khozyaystvo Kazakhstana (People's Economy of Kazakhstan), 1930, № 3-4, Alma-Ata, 17, 19. 
383 Kul’turnoe stroitelstvo Kazakhskoi SSR (Cultural Construction of the Kazakh SSR), 1960, Statistical 
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387 The Al-Farabi Kazakh National University; retrieved on 03.07.2018 from the Web, http://www.kaznu.kz/en. 
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k p. 44/25, PB N148 (About Preparation of Personnel for Kazakhstan [Approved by Politburo TsL VKP[b] 
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education institutions were established in the 1930s in Kazakhstan as well as the 
Kazakhstani base of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1932 which was converted 
into a branch in 1938 and became established as the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh 
SSR in 1946.389  
 
As evident from an announcement below published by the Kazakh State University in 1955 
inviting applications to compete for academic appointments, the polytechnic instruction was 
founded there as a leading one. The priority was given to such following scientific subjects 
as, for instance, physics or mathematics, and the teaching process included the most diverse 
spectrum of various disciplines: 
 
Kazakh State University Named after S.M. Kirov, of the USSR Ministry of 
Higher education, announces a competition for the following positions: 
    Department Heads, professors or: general physics, higher algebra, 
physical chemistry, Russian language, foreign languages, history of the 
USSR, psychology and pedagogy, physical education and sports, foundation 
of Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, industrial economics, general history 
higher geometry, and oil and gas geology; 
    Docents and Senior Teachers in the Departments of general physics, 
higher algebra, physical chemistry, Russian language, foreign languages, 
history of the USSR, psychology and pedagogy, physical education and 
sports, foundations of Marxism-Leninism, philosophy, optics and 
spectroscopy, differential equations, theoretical mechanics, economic 
geography, physical geography, general geology, oil and gas geology, 
Russian literature, general history (medieval and ancient), economic 
statistics, finances and credit, bookkeeping-accounting, organization of 
Soviet trade, and commodities study; 
     Assistants and Teachers in the Departments of: general physics, physical 
chemistry, Russian language, foreign languages, physical education and 
sports, foundation of Marxism-Leninism.390 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
389 The National Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan, The Electronic Encyclopaedia, Tomsk Polytechnic 
University; retrieved on 15.07.2017 from the Web, 
http://wiki.tpu.ru/wiki/%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%
8C%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%8F_%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1
%8F_%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%83%D0%BA_%D0%9A%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D1%85%D1%81%D
1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B0. 
390 Announcement by the Kazakh State University Named after S.M. Kirov, of the USSR Ministry of Higher 
education, Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, April 29, 1955, 4. 
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In terms of social policy, a large number of the social privileges were proclaimed in the last 
two out of the three constitutions of the USSR391 as well as other legal acts.  
 
All three constitutions cover three periods of the lifespan of the Soviet Union in 1924, 1936 
and 1977. They are closely associated with the names of the leaders – Lenin, Stalin and 
Brezhnev respectively. Whereas the 1924 Constitution was dedicated to the establishment 
of the new state and, unlike the later ones, lacked a detailed chapter of citizens’ individual 
social rights, it defined public hygiene as a constitutional act392 and obliged the state to be 
its main guarantor and provider. The state policy played an increasing role in the society in 
subsequent years. Most of these social benefits which were introduced in Stalin’s 
Constitution were reinforced in the Constitution of 1977 and would be detailed in chapter 4.  
 
As considered in the literature review and the interviews, in Soviet development the SAS 
played a significant and distinct role, which was defined by many notable scientists. The 
members of the Academy elected Head of the Academy on the democratic basis as evident 
from the RAN’s protocol of Alexander Karpinsky’s elections in May 1917.393 This principle 
continued during the Soviet rule. 
 
Another aspect that should be mentioned with about the state of affairs in Soviet science 
during Stalin’s time is the existence of so-called sharashkas, which was an informal name 
for the Experimental Design Bureaus (Opytnye konstruktorskie buro, or OKB), secret R&D 
laboratories in the Soviet Gulag camp system. The imprisonment mostly affected, due to 
unclear and disputable reasons, the aviation and rocket industry, including Andrey Tupolev, 
the future founder of the Tupolev aviation design bureau (which designed the first 
supersonic passenger jet in 1968 to be launched on the regular route between Alma-Ata and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
391 Chapter X, Fundamental Right and Duties of Citizens, The 1936 Constitution of the USSR, 1936; retrieved on 
04.03.2017 from the Web: 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/36cons04.html#chap10; 
- Chapter 7: The Basic Rights, Freedoms, and Duties of Citizens of the USSR, Constitution (Fundamental Law) 
of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), 1977; retrieved on 04.03.2017 from the Web: 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian/const/1977toc.html.  
392 q, 1, Chapter I, Attributions of the Supreme Organs of Power of the Union, The 1924 Constitution of the 
Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, 1924; retrieved on 04.03.2017 from the Web, 
http://constitution.sokolniki.com/eng/History/RussianConstitutions/10266.aspx.   
393 O izbranii A.P. Karpinskogo presidentom Rossiyskoi akademii nauk, § 173, 8 zasedanie ot 15 maia 1917 
goda (About the Election of A.P. Karpinsky as the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, § 173, the 8th 
meeting of 15 May 1917), 1917, Protokoly Ekstraordinarnogo obshchego sobrania Rossiyskoi akademii nauk 
(Protocols of Extraordinary General Meeting of the Russian Academy of Sciences), SBbF, RAN, 212; hereafter 
referred to as Karpinsky. 
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Moscow among many other achievements),394 and Sergey Korolev, the future chief engineer 
of the Soviet Space programme,395 as well as some others. Meanwhile, the study of such 
primary sources, as the decree by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, confirmed 
that the overall number of these specific laboratories was limited to five.396 
 
With regard to the influence of the Soviet military paradigm on the development of 
fundamental science, the statement by Nikolay Basov397 below is notable. Basov was the 
1964 Nobel Laureate in Physics for the discovery of laser. In his interview to an American 
physicist Arthur Guenther 398  in 1984 in Moscow, Basov strongly denied the alleged 
connection of the advance to the pressure of any apparent war or military needs: 
 
As far as masers and lasers are concerned, then of course, one should 
mention that the centimeter waves used in radiolocation had been the 
creation of the war. The radio engineering and radio physics were well 
represented at our laboratory as radio astronomy and radio spectroscopy. 
But we were dealing with those problems without any connection with 
military investigations. In our investigations we aimed at creation of such 
radiation sources that would continuously cover a wide range of centimeter 
waves (just with that purpose we studied the synchrotron radiation). That 
was necessary for the atmospheric investigations, for the analysis of various 
substances and their properties in the cm wavelength region. One didn’t feel 
any war spirit in the laboratory.399 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
394 The Editors, 1998, Andrey Nikolayevich Tupolev, Soviet Aircraft Designer, 20 July, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica; retrieved on 26.06.2017 from the Web, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Andrey-
Nikolayevich-Tupolev.  
395  The Editors, 1998, Sergey Pavlovich Korolyov, Soviet Scientist, Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved on 
26.06.2017 from the Web, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Sergey-Pavlovich-Korolyov.  
396 Kruglov, S., 1949, 31 Prikaz ministra vnutrennikh del Soyza SSSR (31 Decree by the Minister of the Internal 
Affairs of the Union of SSR), N001020, 9 November, Moscow; retrieved on 26.06.2017 from the Web,  
http://www.memorial.krsk.ru/DOKUMENT/USSR/491109.htm.  
397 Basov. 
398 In Memoriam: Arthur H. Guenther, 2007, OSA Mourns the Loss of Arthur H. Guenther, 21 April, The 
Optical Society; retrieved on 04.07.2017 from the Web, http://www.osa.org/en-
us/about_osa/newsroom/obituaries/earlier/arthur_guenther/.  
399 Basov, N.G., 1984, Oral Histories Interviews, Interviewed by Arthur Guenter, 14 September, American 
Institute of Physics; retrieved on 04.06.2017 from the Web, https://www.aip.org/history-programs/niels-bohr-
library/oral-histories/4495.  
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Meanwhile, in his paper Soviet Science: Thirty Years,400 Sergey (Sergei) Vavilov,401 the 
third President of the SAS in 1945-1951 and a younger brother of Nikolay Vavilov,402 
depicted the involvement of the Soviet scientists in WWII as follows:  
 
Despite the difficult and unaccustomed conditions, science kept pace with the 
country's increased requirements: Soviet men of science were to be found 
everywhere — in the air force, the navy, the artillery, the engineers, the 
railway troops, the hospitals, the war plants, the collective farms. And 
everywhere they offered help and counsel. Soviet science may claim its share 
in the victory of the Soviet Army.403 
 
Sergey Vavilov emphasised a high level of Russian science developing from the XVIII 
Century and its connection with that of Europe. According to him, ‘Russia in the nineteenth 
century had many brilliant scientists and could pride herself upon a lengthy roll of momentous 
discoveries and inventions; but, with only rare exceptions, she had no systematically 
developing national science.’404 As well, ‘[T]he Russian scientists were constantly haunted by 
a sense of futility, of unwantedness, of divorcement from their native soil — the inevitable 
consequence of old Russia's social order and of the tsarist government's fatuous disregard of 
science.’405 
 
Vavilov described the process of the transformative expansion of science in the USSR 
through the SAS. He highly praised the role of the policy-makers in this process which 
occurred, in his account, in the full accordance with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism and 
widely involved planning for science: 
 
And the complete dedication of our science to the service of the people and 
the state has made planning in science an absolute necessity. That is one of 
the chief distinguishing features of science! in the socialist: state. Such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
400 Vavilov S.I., 1948, Soviet Science, Thirty Years, Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow; retrieved on 
11.05.2019 from the Web, https://www.marxists.org/archive/vavilov/1948/30-years/x01.htm; hereafter referred 
to as Vavilov.  
401 Bolotovski, Boris M., Vavilov Yuri N., Shmeleva, Alevtina P., 2004, Sergei Vavilov: luminary of Russian 
physics, CERN Courier, 12 November; retrieved on 11.05.2019 from the Web, https://cerncourier.com/sergei-
vavilov-luminary-of-russian-physics/. 
402 Section 4.3. 
403 Vavilov. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid. 
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planning includes not only scope — institutions, personnel, equipment — but 
also content, i.e., the themes of scientific research.406 
 
Nonetheless, Vavilov clearly stressed out the unpredictable character of the development of 
science and delineated it from the planning economic system:  
 
The plan of scientific development in a socialist state must, of course, link up 
with the state economic plan; but it should not be forgotten that the prospects 
opened up by the constant growth of science will often considerably exceed 
the prospects outlined in economic planning. Science has its own peculiar 
logic of development, a logic which it is essential to take into account. 
Science must always work ahead, accumulating reserves for the future; only 
then will it be working in its natural element.407 
 
Thus this citation of Vavilov, President of the SAS, concludes the section of the primary 
literature sources as well as the overall data chapter. The next chapter is an analysis which 
is based on the data from the interviews and primary sources. 
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Chapter 4          Analysis of the Data 
 
This chapter addresses the dichotomy in the views on the drivers of Soviet development and 
while answering the research question on how within 25-40 years such an initially backward 
country as the Soviet Union whose development was wrecked in various cataclysms could 
catch up in the level of the human capital and industrial development with the industrial 
powers of that time and lead in some areas. The following approaches to build an analytical 
framework up are identified in looking over the data from the chapter 3 to constitute three 
sections of this chapter and to be continued in the next chapters. 
 
Firstly, an evaluation of the importance of the exogenous impact, i.e. the foreign expertise, 
transfer, control, and development of technology, for Soviet industrialisation is required. The 
latter was viewed by many scholars as a crucial factor in the establishment of the USSR as a 
global actor after WWII.  
 
Secondly, disclosing the first approach would help define the role of the Marxist social factors 
to have been either a façade for the technology transfer or the essence of the Soviet industrial 
policy. The latter needs to be analysed in conjunction with other Soviet social policies that 
became recognised in the data chapter previously.   
 
Thirdly, in the intertwined character of the industrial development with that of the human 
capital, it would require to understand to what extent, on the one hand, the establishment of 
the Soviet education and social base was viable for Soviet industrialisation, and if the 
development of the indigenous science and engineering was important to industrialisation, on 
the other.  
 
Fourthly, it would require shedding light on the character of the relationship between science, 
engineering, and technology, in order to understand what connection the Soviet science policy 
being closely integrated with the various Soviet social policies had with the development of 
engineering and technology. 
 
Last but not least, this would lead the research to address the notion of what Soviet science 
was in its features, manifestations and internal driving forces in relation to global 
development.  
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4.1                            Soviet Industrialisation and Technology Transfer 
 
Russia’s defeat in WWI resulted in the 1917 Revolutions which were followed by the Civil 
War. It demonstrated that Russia needed modernisation and a dramatic change of policy in 
order to both survive and to be able to address its current and future challenges, as seen from 
Lenin’s articles and speeches above. The Bolsheviks, armed with Marx’ political theory of the 
hegemony of the working class and inspired by the ideals of the French Revolution such as 
Liberté, égalité, fraternité, were keen to modernise the former Russian Empire and change the 
course of global history. Meanwhile, Marx’s economic theory of productive forces, as 
outlined by Buzgalin, did not provide much detail on the development of technology and 
industry in terms of a new industrial revolution occurred in the early XX Century. Thus, the 
actual implementation of the Soviet industrial policy can inform the reader more than its 
official concept.  
 
Once the GOELRO energy plan designed by Lenin (as seen from the decree in the previous 
chapter) was implemented, big industrial projects became a distinct feature of Soviet 
development. According to Buzgalin, in the Soviet science policy, the involvement in the 
projects of both the national or global importance was a driving and motivational force for 
scientists and other participants. The scale of the two first five-year plans continued this 
approach established in the implementation of the GOELRO.   
 
In terms of the role of the exogenous technology transfer in industrialisation, both Zhukov 
and Paltashev outlined that in the 1920s the USSR could not have enough of qualified 
engineers to perform industrialisation within the time constraint dictated by the pressure of 
another inevitable, in Stalin’s view (as shown in section 3.2), and impending war. The 
constraint resulted in a sharp political struggle between two groups of the Communist Party.  
Nonetheless, despite a low competence of many old revolutionaries trying to resist and run 
industrialisation at the industrial locations, Stalin’s technocratic government could have 
implemented industrialisation and won in the political struggle within the VKP(b), 
according to Zhukov. As a result, by the end of the 1930s, polytechnisation was established 
as the primary approach in education, management, governance and elsewhere. As 
confirmed by both Zhukov and Nekrasov, the human capital in science and technology was 
cherished and nurtured by the system. 
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In this new expansionist industrial policy, the ruling group demonstrated a high level of 
expertise in choosing useful technology or finding correct approaches towards its adoption 
as confirmed by Paltashev in chapter 3 or by Sutton, as an opponent of the Soviet system 
(considered in the literature review). In particular, Sutton worded this as follows: ‘...there 
was a clear recognition of the place of technology. The machine was the Marxian engine of 
progress.’408 As detailed by Paltashev, the Soviets purchased plants ‘on turn-key-solutions 
or technology of full cycle and hired experts to launch it and teach Soviet personnel.’409 
According to him, the technology transfer for the reproduction of an old product was 
successfully adopted by the Soviet industry, after which new products were developed and 
produced. 
 
Therefore, the external input of the expertise and technology was essential for Soviet 
industrialisation, as confirmed in Zhukov’s and Paltashev’s interviews, on the one hand. 
However, the following should be taken into consideration on the other. 
 
Firstly, technology transfer has been a widespread industrial practice implemented by all the 
historical actors, including the US before the USSR or South East Asian countries after the 
USSR, and excluding Britain that was the pioneer of industrialisation, according to 
Paltashev.410 In this sense, one can conclude, therefore, that the speed and results, i.e. the 
success of the process itself, in other words, is valuable for this analysis.  
 
Secondly, as pointed out by Littlewood, Lonzarich, Tsironis and, in particular, Raven and 
Paltashev, a success of technology transfer to a large extent is determined by a preparedness 
of the particular recipient to accept, adopt, sustain and develop the import, otherwise, it 
could not last for decades. According to Raven, the recipient’s competence in S&T should 
be as good as that of the exporting side.  Even once assimilated successfully, the horizon of 
the use of technology is limited to 30 years as the maximum (Paltashev). Meanwhile, as 
seen from the literature review, the second wave of the transfer, although not that large as 
that of the 1930s, which started in the 1960s was not that successful mostly due to a 
significant incompatibility of Soviet technology to its new Western analogues.411 Thus, the 
technology transfer in the industrialisation of the 1930s was successfully assimilated as well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Sutton I, 318. 
409 Paltashev. 
410 Ibid. 
411 Gold; Holliday; Cooper in chapter 2. 
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as largely independently developed as seen by the development of the Soviet 
microelectronics (Paltashev) or aviation industry (Mikoyan).412  
 
Thirdly, overall from the very beginning, the correct technological approach towards 
choosing and assimilating foreign technology mentioned above and demonstrated by Soviet 
industrial managers would have been impossible without their deep level of the expertise in 
the matters of S&T, as implied by the scientists interviewed such as Raven, Lonzarich, 
Tsironis, Saxena, and Littlewood.  
 
On the one hand, this expertise as confirmed by Zhukov was provided by the previous 
‘Tsarist’ scientific and engineering personnel which pledged to the new Soviet power, like 
the first president of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the Soviet rule, Karpinsky, 
mentioned in section 3.2 and considered in more detail below, who became the first 
president of the SAS.413 On the other hand, this level of the managerial expertise derived 
from the knowledge obtained within the Soviet education and S&T system, as evident from 
the biographies of Malenkov or Kosygin, highlighted by Zhukov and Nekrasov respectively.  
 
Last but not least, the Soviet Union managed to avoid the trap of the technology transfer 
which was described by Lonzarich, Paltashev for this thesis, and Kapitsa. Even in 1936, the 
latter, in his letter to Stalin, described the Soviet Union, in terms of technology, as ‘the full 
colony of the West.’414  The development of the indigenous research and education became 
a considerable contribution to the national technological sovereignty, which allowed the 
USSR together with the Allies to win WWII as well as to consequently conduct independent 
foreign policy as a global actor in the conditions of the Cold War afterwards. This had not 
happened if the dependence on the technology transfer, in particular from the US which, 
according to Sutton, was the main contributor to Soviet industrialisation, would have 
remained in place. 
 
One should mention a positive impact of war (both WWII and partially the Cold War) on the 
Soviet technological advance and engineering choices, as well as the organisation and 
efficiency of production processes.415 
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413 Section 4.3. 
414 Appendix M. 
415 Howe, Christopher, 2019, VIVA, Chokan Laumulin’s Thesis, 2 May, Centre of Development Studies, 
University of Cambridge; hereafter referred to as Howe, 2019. 
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Thus, in evaluating any industrial transfer in general, and that of Soviet industrialisation in 
particular, an actual engineering capacity to absorb and develop technology is critical 
implying the importance of education and research.  
  
4.2                           Soviet Social Policies  
 
In addressing the second approach on identifying such possible driving forces of Soviet 
industrialisation and development as research and education, the following aspects of the 
establishment of the Soviet social system in which education was an integral part of the 
overall package of the Soviet social policies should be taken into consideration, therefore. 
 
4.2.1                                 Soviet Education  
 
As Tsarist Russia was not an industrialised country, its working class was underdeveloped 
and tiny. As seen from the decree on education in section 3.2 and Nigmatulin’s example of 
the establishment of the Institute of Geography in 1918, Lenin and the Bolsheviks’ 
government viewed research and education as the national priorities for Soviet development 
from the first days in power. One of the first things enacted was the introduction of a multi-
purposed integral policy for education that started virtually on the second day after the 
October Revolution. The act became the cornerstone of the Soviet education policy and 
included the preparation of specialists for industrialisation in the longer-term, in particular, in 
the sphere of science, engineering, and technology, as one of its most important goals.  
 
The need to create human capital and labour as the driving forces of future industrialisation 
predetermined the universal and meritocratic character of the Soviet educational system. The 
latter became evident from Eremenko’s, Nigmatulin’s and Abilsiitov’s interviews which 
indicated that education and research were established in the areas where it had either been 
underdeveloped (Ukraine and Tatarstan) or never existed (Kazakhstan and Bashkortostan), 
and became accessible to almost all the strata of the Soviet society (both Nigmatulin’s and 
Abilsiitov’s biographies) in its most extended geography and remote locations. 
 
The achievement of the total literacy of the population was viewed as a necessary precursor 
for the process of ‘Socialist Construction’ which implied the involvement of the masses into 
the development of science and technology and was underpinned by the expansion of all the 
forms of education from primary to post-graduate ones.  
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The network of high schools, technical high schools, higher education and research 
institutions were introduced throughout the large territory of the country. Considering the 
total number of the population of 178.3 million in 1914416 and 195.2 million in 1940417 
respectively, the school enrolment, as shown in the introduction, rose roughly four times in 
both absolute and comparative terms. The average of the education longevity in years of the 
high school population older than 9 years old grew five times from 1,112 in 1917 to 5,442 
in 1947 to reach 8,833 in 1987.418 
 
Another critical indicator to assess the quality of the educational process worldwide is 
pupil-teacher ratio which in the Russian Empire was 34 to 1, and in the Soviet Union by 
1955-6 it gradually came to 17 to 1 with ‘an enrolment of 28.1 million pupils and 1,655,000 
teachers in the regular schools.’419 Notably, this ratio continued thereafter, and in 1989 it 
was 16 to 1.420  
 
Unlike in Tsarist Russia, where education had been rather a privilege of the high classes and 
clergy, in the USSR it became classless, mostly free of charge421 and compulsory. 
 
In particular, the Central Asian republics were transformed. As a result of the programme of 
Likbez, in 1939, Kazakhstan, for instance, reached the level of 61.5 per cent422 from two per 
cent which had been recorded before the October Revolution.423 More importantly, this rapid 
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rise of literacy was made not only in terms of quantity but also in quality. The Soviet youth, 
despite their gender, were taught mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and all the range 
of the subjects, which could have been considered modern and advanced. In Abilsiitov’s case, 
that knowledge received in a rural Soviet school in northern Kazakhstan made sufficient for 
him to enter and graduated in physics from the most prestigious Soviet university (the MSU). 
 
The polytechnic instruction for education proclaimed in 1919 (chapters 1 and 3) and 
introduced in the early 1930s as an Soviet analogue of both the German Oberrealschule and 
French polytechnic education systems (mentioned by Chitre), as considered by Korol and in 
section 3.2, became the logical continuation as well as the necessary prerequisite for the 
overall development of science and research in the united system of education and science 
for the purpose of industrialisation and development. 
 
The table 2 below is designed to illustrate the place of the polytechnic instruction 
mentioned above in the Soviet secondary high school curricula. The basic curriculum 
introduced in 1934 remained mostly identical throughout the different periods of Stalin’s, 
Khrushchev’s or Brezhnev’s eras. The table indicates the place of mathematics, S&T 
subjects among other disciplines in grades from 8 to 10. It is extracted from three tables of 
the ten-year curricula at different periods in which the first and second ones mark the 
transition from the Stalinist period, and the third one reflects a later Soviet stage (they can 
be found in Appendices B, C and D respectively). One can see that in all three periods there 
was a balance between mathematics and S&T subjects (including manual training and shop 
work),424 on the one hand, and humanities (including Russian and Russian literature, 
history, logic, geography, psychology, native and foreign languages), on the other, with a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Kazakhstan some scholars increased it to 5 and 8 per cent, which is still very low. However, it should be noted 
that the literacy in Russian only was likely considered in Soviet sources. 
424 The real richness of the polytechnic instruction is detailed by Korol as follows: ‘The abilities and skills to 
be emphasized in a polytechnic approach instruction in mathematics are comprehensively and minutely listed, 
including the following: 
 
… rapid mental and written computation; ability to round-off numbers and to check results of operations; 
ability to use tables, handbooks, abacus, and slide rule; ability, in reading formulas, to understand the 
direction of change in its numerical value with given change in its component parts; ability readily to plot 
points corresponding to the given coordinates and to write coordinates of given points and otherwise to use 
graph paper; ability to use scales, measuring tapes and chains, compass, calipers, triangles and squares, 
protractors and simple geodetical instruments; ability to take field measurements and to make field layouts, 
compute areas and volumes by direct measurements or from maps and drawings, to lay out plots of land of 
given sizes, to determine elevations and contours, to make diagrams and sketches; the skill of analysing and 
synthesizing special forms; ability to formulate and solve equations in working out various technical and 
economic problems; ability to carry out bookkeeping, budgetary, and cost computations – 
 
‘and so forth’;’ Korol, 29.   
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prevalence of the former ones. The curricula were complemented with hours for physical 
development and in the earlier grades with singing and drawing (art) as well as the study of 
the USSR Constitution. 
 
Table 2             Mathematics, Science and Technology Subjects in Three Schools      
                          Curricula for Grades 8-10 in Three Periods       
 
Subject 1952-3 1955-6 1983-4 
Hours Per 
Week 
Per Cent Hours Per 
Week 
Per Cent Hours Per 
Week 
Per 
Cent 
Mathematics 18 18.4 18 18.2 16 15.1 
Physics 9.5 9.7 11.5 11.6 12 11.3 
Chemistry 7.5 9.7 8.5 8.6 8 7.5 
Biology 4 4.1 3 3 6 5.7 
Astronomy 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Drafting 
(Engnrg.) 
3 3.1 3 3 6 5.7 
Manual 
Training and 
Shop Work 
  6 6.1 6 5.7 
Total 43 46 51 51.5 55 52 
 
 
The table indicates that there was little difference in the school’s curricula in the period 
from 1952 to 1984. In terms of the polytechnic subjects, it is important to emphasise that 
the establishment of the curriculum occurred during the expansion of the human knowledge 
in physics and chemistry as scientific disciplines which found their appropriate updates in 
the Soviet school curricula, according to Korol in the literature review.  
 
The prevalence of the polytechnic approach in the curricula is seen in the S&T subjects 
occupying around 50 per cent there along with humanities and sport (physical culture). 
Meanwhile, a proportional balance between mathematics, science, and related disciplines, 
on the one hand, and the humanities and cultural subjects, on the other, as well as sport, 
aimed altogether at harmonious development of Soviet children’s human and physical 
capital.  
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Regarding the place of the polytechnic instruction in the Soviet higher education system, the 
data from Table 3 below indicate the prevalence of the science and technology institutions 
in the numbers of the higher education institutions (including those of the correspondence 
instruction425). In 1955 fundamental science was mostly studied in universities (33) and 
engineering and technology in specialised polytechnic institutions (25) as well as in 
hundreds of other entities related to medicine, technology or industry. However, it is 
important to remember that as well science was a significant part of technology courses and 
curricula in the 14 engineering and military institutions,426 as evident from the curriculum of 
the Yeysk Higher Military Aviation school in which, among other scientific subjects, higher 
physics was a part of three first years out of four.427 
 
Table 3             Number of Institutions of Higher Education Listed by Categories,        
                                                 January 1955428 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 Table 40, Ibid., 203. 
426 Ibid., 140-1; the table, entitled Number of Institutions of Higher Education Listed by Categories and Type 
of Instruction, USSR, January 1955, can be found in Appendix E. 
427 Spearman, 9-10. 
428 Constructed from the table, entitled Number of Institutions of Higher Education Listed by Categories and 
Type of Instruction, USSR, January 1955, Korol, 140-1, (Appendix E). The table constructed includes the 
resident type of instruction only.  
Categories Total Total 
1. Universities                                      33  
                                               Institutes:   
2.  Polytechnic and industrial  25 
3. Power, Electrotechnical, Radiotechnical, and 
Physiotechnical 
 7 
4. Machine construction, Shipbuilding, Aviation, Polygraphic, 
and Motion Picture Engineering 
 26 
 
5. Geologic, Mining, Oil, Peat, and Metallurgical  24 
6.  Chemical technology  9 
7. Food and Fishing Industries  11 
8. Light Industries  7 
9. Engineering-Construction, Geodetic, and Automotive 
Highways  
 25 
10. Hydrometerological  2 
	   119	  
 
The 12 categories (including 32 subcategories429) of the institutes with the polytechnic 
instruction, including the medical institutes, demonstrate the whole spectrum of the 
industrial disciplines which were taught in all its diversity throughout the USSR and which 
were covering the latest scientific and industrial developments of that era. Spearman in the 
literature review specified the high quality of the Soviet higher education for S&T. This is 
also implied by the international scientists interviewed in recognition of the Soviet 
knowledge and expertise in their respective scientific fields which would have been 
unthinkable without an appropriate education base in place.    
   
As outlined by Tsironis, Littlewood, Chitre, and Saxena, a significant part of the university 
graduates in S&T do not continue their careers directly in the sphere as a general rule, 
becoming a valuable human capital for governance, management, economy or elsewhere. 
This was applicable in the Soviet case, as seen from Malenkov’s or Kunaev’s 430 
biographies. As well, in both engineering and pedagogy, courses of mathematics and 
physics occupied the central place making science the focal point of the study process.431 
Thus, the polytechnic instruction was a driving force of both the Soviet higher education 
system and overall development of the USSR. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
429 Appendix E. 
430 Details of Kunaev’s biography are given in subsection 4.2.2. 
431 Korol, 235-56. 
11. Transport and communication  25 
12. Agriculture and Forestry  106 
13. Medical  75 
Subtotal for Science, Technology, Industry and Medicine  318 
14. Economics  22 
15. Law  5 
16. Art  46 
17. Pedagogical   206 
18. Historic Archives and Library  72 
18. Physical Culture  13 
Subtotal for Humanities and others  364 
Total 33 682 
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Meanwhile, the education policy could not be a success without the development of the 
leading national universities which established the guiding principles of teaching and 
research and sat goals for the whole industry of education and research. This process was 
under the personal control of the key political leadership as seen in section 3.2 from the 
example of MISIS and the establishment of the Lomonosov Moscow State University’s 
campus in central Moscow. Both of the universities are cutting-edge global research centres 
in the XXI Century, as confirmed, on the one hand, by Tsironis and Saxena collaborating 
with MISIS, and Vasiliev and Kaul in the data on their research at the MSU, on the other.  
 
As higher education was free and students were given modest stipends, the Soviet system 
was designed to educate as many people as possible from across all the social strata, classes 
and genders which implied a deployment and provision of a whole set of some other social 
policies considered below.    
 
4.2.2                             Various Soviet Social Policies    
 
The Soviet Government applied tremendous efforts in integrating the masses into 
intellectual activity as a part of the Soviet development programme which resulted in an 
unprecedented change in the social structure. It aimed at forming such a social environment 
which as an ecosystem would be favourable towards developing human capital for various 
and interconnected spheres of education, culture, and research with a particular emphasis on 
science and technology.  
 
In particular, as McAuley wrote: ‘The Soviet experiment has been instructive. It has shown 
that a determined government can bring about radical changes in social behaviour – as the 
Soviet government has managed to reverse the traditional disparity in the educational 
attainment of men and women.’432 Women being equalled in all the civil rights became a 
significant source of human capital for Soviet development in which the state policy tried to 
establish all the conditions for incentivising and incorporating them into labour, 
management, governance, education, and research, including the space programme.433  
 
It is important to emphasise the integral and comprehensive character of the Soviet social 
policy aiming at the human capital development. It included most various elements such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432 McAuley II, 209.  
433 Sharp, Tim, 2018, Valentina Tereshkova: First Woman in Space, 22 January, Space.com; retrieved on 
17.07.2018 from the Web, https://www.space.com/21571-valentina-tereshkova.html. 
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the establishment of both the free healthcare system enhancing all the Soviet population 
with the effective primary health care and the solidarity pension system in which ‘the 
retirement age was set at 60 for men and 55 for women.’434 As a result, which was described 
in the introduction, the Soviet population was more than doubled within 70 years and its 
average life expectancy rose from 44 years in 1926-7 to 69.95 (66.1 for men and 73.8 for 
women) in 1965-6.  
 
In particular, in Kazakhstan, the Kazakh population grew from 3,713,394 in 1926435 to 
6,534,616 in 1989,436 whose average life expectancy at birth eventually reached 68-9 (64 for 
men, and 73 for women) in 1985-6.437  
 
The 20-year period from 1938-9 to 1958-9 is also characterised by a significant decrease in 
children’s mortality which is another vital social indicator to measure development. Its 
index measured in the ratio of the babies deceased at the age younger than one year to 1,000 
newly born in 1959 became 40.6 against 181.5 in 1940, i.e. it went down four times.438 In 
particular, this was connected to the extensive introduction of the sulfamide medications 
and antibiotics. In general, all these social achievements would have been impossible if not 
for a very extensive and a functioning system of free primary health care especially in the 
field of preventive diagnostics.  
 
The global importance of the Soviet achievements in primary health care was de facto fixed 
in the Alma-Ata Declaration439 in Almaty (formerly Alma-Ata), Kazakhstan (formerly the 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR), in 1978 at the World Health Organization 
(WHO) conference which was the first international declaration stressing the importance of 
primary health care. This healthcare model was adopted as a standard since then by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Russia will raise pension ages that date back to Stalin, The Economist, June 30th, 2018; retrieved on 
20.08.2018 from the Web, https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/06/30/russia-will-raise-pension-ages-that-
date-back-to-stalin. 
435  Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naselenia 1926 goda (All-Union Census of the Population of 1926), Moscow, Izdanie 
TsSU Soyuza SSR, 1928-29; retrieved on 10.09.2018 from the Web, 
http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_26.php?reg=1476. 
436 Rabochii arkhiv Goskomstata Rossii, Tablitsa 9c, Raspredelenie naselenia po natsional’nosti i rodnomu 
yazuku (Working archive of Goskomstat of Russia, Table 9c, Distribution of the population by nationality and 
mother tongue); retrieved on 10.09.2018 from the Web, 
http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/sng_nac_89.php?reg=5. 
437 Ryan, 1513. 
438 Dmitrieva R.M., Andreev E.M., 1977, Snizhenie smernosti v SSSR za gody Sovetskoi vlasti (Reduction of 
Mortality in the USSR during the Years of the Soviet Rule), Collection of Articles, Brachnost,’ rozhdaemost,’ 
smernost’ v Rossii i v SSSR (Marriage, Birth Rate and Mortality in Russia and in the USSR), Statistika, Moskva.  
439 Declaration of Alma-Ata, International Conference on Primary Healthcare, 6-12 September 1978, Alma-Ata, 
USSR, World Health Organization; retrieved on 25.04.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.who.int/publications/almaata_declaration_en.pdf.  
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member countries for the WHO as the key to achieving the goal of Health For All, at first, 
only for developing countries and for all other countries five years later. One of the sections 
in the declaration underlined the role of the state in providing adequate health and social 
measures to be taken.  
 
This section’s call for Health For All became a campaign for the WHO in the coming years. 
Health for All was defined as the accomplishment by all peoples of the world by the year 
2000 of a level of health that would allow them to lead a socially and economically 
productive life. In the spirit of social justice, the declaration urged governments, 
international organisations and the global community to set this up as a principal social 
goal.440  
 
In chapter 3 Nigmatulin emphasised that attention which the world started paying to the 
connection of social development to successes of science due to the Soviet policy. On the 
other hand, this was the interconnection. According to World Health Organization in 2018, 
the Alma-Ata Declaration, ‘endorsed at that conference, formed the foundation for the last 40 
years of global primary healthcare efforts,’441 which could not have occurred if not for Soviet 
science.  
 
In terms of material welfare and personal consumption, both of them, according to 
McAuley, ‘did not carry a high priority in the early five-year plans,’ 442 although the issue of 
general poverty was rather successfully addressed. Furthermore, in later years after 1955, 
the Soviet Union undertook various measures on poverty reduction to raise the population’s 
living standards and reduce inequality, considering welfare as of important social value.  
 
‘[A] decent provision for the poor is the true test of civilization,’443 McAuley concluded in 
1979, continuing that ‘the USSR bids fair to become more civilized that the rest of 
Europe’444 to indicate the success of this policy after WWII. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Ibid.  
441 From Alma-Ata towards universal health coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals, 2018, World 
Health Organization; retrieved on 19.08.2108 from the Web, http://www.who.int/primary-health/conference-
phc. 
442 McAuley I, 3. 
443 Ibid., 317. 
444 Khanin I. 
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This was expressed in a significant increase in the Soviet people’s living standards and 
personal consumption. Khanin noted that if in the early 1950s the level of consumption of 
basic food products such as meat, milk, sugar, vegetables, and fruits was rather typical for a 
developing country, by the 1960s as the result of the double growth, it reached the level of the 
developed countries, and the malnutrition practically disappeared.445  
 
Meanwhile, a similar growth, according to Khanin, was in the consumption of the expensive 
apparel materials made of cotton, silk, and leather.446 In particular, the growth of the sales of 
personal watches, home radio-electronics, bicycles and motorbikes, sewing machines was 
rapid.447 Although the production of the TV sets, fridges and washing machines was low, they 
were becoming more and more available to Soviet people.448 The financial stabilisation 
resulted in the reduction of some retail prices with overall low inflation.449 More importantly, 
the Soviet Union reached or almost reached the level of the developed countries in the 
provision of housing and the life expectancy as shown in the introduction and above. The 
working hours were reduced to 40 hours per week, political cleansings were abandoned, and 
cultural life was developing.450 
 
Although the market of consumer goods in the USSR was not as developed as in the other 
countries of the first world, the main human needs like housing, education, or healthcare 
were all provided for free. At their basic level, modern consumer needs like affordable and 
comfortable traveling and having basic consumer goods and electronics were satisfied.  
 
All of these mentioned above allowed Khanin to conclude that ‘in the 1950s a new country, 
free from poverty and pretty prosperous in the world’s standards, although not rich, emerged 
for its own citizens’451 to stipulate that within 30-40 years the Soviet Union changed from an 
agricultural, sickle and plough economy into an industrial powerhouse and a modern 
knowledge economy due to its set of the science, education, social and industrial policies 
merged together and successfully deployed.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 Ibid. 
446 Ibid. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Ibid. 
449 Ibid. 
450 Ibid. 
451 Ibid. 
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As mentioned in chapter 1, this was accompanied by a constant growth for social 
expenditures making this policy a vehicle for the overall Soviet development.  
 
As seen from the analysis of the Soviet Constitutions mentioned in section 3.2, the 
following social rights were guaranteed by Stalin’s and Brezhnev’s Constitutions and 
relentlessly pursued in the policy, i.e. those to eight hours working day and an annual leave 
paid; the employee’s right not be fired upon an administration’s initiative without Trade 
Union’s or the Party’s consent; to be employed, where graduates of special professional 
educational institutions had the right to obligatory employment with housing provided; to 
free general and professional high and higher education; to free access to nursery, 
kindergarten and children’s camps; to free medical care; to free medical resort’s treatment; 
to free housing; to free or privileged transportation to the workplace or place of study; to a 
three year maternity leaf paid; to free social welfare for a child under one year age; to free 
milk supply for babies under three years old. A detailed consideration of the provision of all 
the policies designated above would go far beyond the purpose and abilities of this thesis. 
However, one should emphasise that 27 per cent of the national income was allocated for 
the provision of these social policies in the USSR in 1980, as argued in chapter 1 and 
mentioned by Nigmatulin.452 It should be stressed out that the funding of science was an 
integral part of this package. 
 
The policies were social innovations of the time and became a robust platform for the 
transformation and unification across the enormous territory of the USSR. The 
embracement of such generous social package became possible due to the state’s rapidly 
increasing presence in the economic life in order to accumulate the resources needed for 
industrialisation. It was not coincidental that these social duties and guarantees (as well as 
the growth in real wages in the industry) were introduced in 1936 as a result of the First 
Five-Year Plan. It was the stage at which the Soviet state could afford such an act under the 
conditions of a highly centralised and socialised, according to Marx, economy. The New 
Economic Policy (NEP) became negligible and industrialisation was soon accomplished. 
 
As a result of its science, education, social and industrial policy finally combined during 
industrialisation, in the post-WWII period, the Soviet Union developed such high tech 
industries as space programme, nuclear energy, computing, electro-energetics, black 
metallurgy, continuous casting of steel, the production of hovercrafts and others which are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Nigmatulin. 
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considered in chapter 5. Khanin noted that the period was characterised with rapid structural 
changes in the economy expressed in the urbanisation, the development of new industries 
such as radio-electronics, chemical one, aviation, the reconstruction of the railways system 
and the emergence of new scientific productions (rare metals, for instance), coming from the 
development of the S&T institutions.453  
 
These many various policies were assembled in a whole set and promoted in Soviet cultural 
policy under the key features of the primacy of collectivism over individualism and the 
establishment of high moral principles in society. This policy was known in Soviet arts and 
literature as the concept of ‘socialist realism.’ It should be however emphasised that the 
Soviet cultural policy was by no means restricted solely to this. It was accompanied by a 
rich and comprehensive programme of developing fine arts and literature in Russian and 
multiple other languages of the national republics and minorities along with classical music 
and the famous Russian ballet. Opera, ballet theatres and art galleries were established 
throughout the country, as mentioned by Zhukov at the example of Kazakhstan.  
 
In 1934 a pretty vast theatre of opera and ballet was founded in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan,454 as 
well as in all the other capitals of the national republics in addition to large galleries and 
museums of arts.455 In the case of Kazakhstan, a whole cohort of artists emerged as a result 
of this policy, ‘Socialist in content, national in form’ (Stalin).456  These people remain 
unmatched in Kazakh culture even today and include names such as Abylkhan Kasteev457 in 
art, Kulyash Baiseitova458 in opera, Ahmet Zhubanov459 in classical and traditional music, 
Mukhtar Auezov460 in literature, or Shaken Aimanov461 in cinema as well as many others. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
453 Khanin I. 
454 The Kazakh State Academic Theatre of Opera and Ballet named after Abay; retrieved on 30.06.2017 from the 
Web, http://www.gatob.kz/en/.  
455 The Shevchenko Kazakh State Gallery was established in Alma-Ata 1935, which, altogether with the 
Republic Museum of Decorative and Applied Art (established in 1970), merged into The A. Kasteyev State 
Museum of Arts; retrieved on 30.06.2017 from the Web, http://www.gmirk.kz/index.php/en/.  
456 Stalin J. V., 1925, O politicheskykh zadachakh universiteta narodov Vostoka, Rech na sobranii studentov 
KUTV, 18 maya 1925 g. (On Political Tasks of The Universities of the Peoples of the Orient, Speech in the 
meeting of the students of KUTV, 18 May 1925), Sochinenia (Works), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo 
politicheskoi literatury, 1952. Vol. 7,138. 
457 Abylkhan Kasteev; retrieved on 21.12.2017 from the Web, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110722142440/http://oyu.kz/en/authors/kasteyev_a.html.  
458 Kulyash Baiseitova; retrieved on 21.12.2017 from the Web, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kulyash_Baiseitova.  
459 Ahmet Kuanovich Zhubanov; retrieved on 21.12.2017 from the Web, 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%96%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2,_%D0%90
%D1%85%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%82_%D0%9A%D1%83%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8
%D1%87.  
460 Mukhtar Auezov, Prominent Figures, Kazakhstan History Portal; retrieved on 21.12.2017 from the Web,  
http://e-history.kz/en/biography/view/5.  
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Within less than 20 years after the October Revolution, a range of artists of the highest 
standards of the European culture appeared from scratch in Kazakhstan as well as in the 
other national republics. The development and cultural policy in all the republics were in 
contrast to the policies of either the Russian Empire or other colonial powers of the time. 
This ensured a support and even enthusiasm in a majority of the Soviet population.  
 
As mentioned above, one of the most important aspects of the social policy was the 
elimination of the inequality in gender, social or ethnic origin, although it was not routed 
out completely. The discrimination of the Tsarist elite and rich peasantry was significantly 
smaller, compared to the development and career opportunities, which were accessible to 
the masses in the population. Moreover, most of the family members of the ‘enemies of the 
people,’462 including those of the first Bolsheviks repressed in the 1937-8, managed to get 
through the system to obtain education or pursue academic and other careers, including 
political offices.  
 
Turar Ryskulov, an ethnic Kazakh of humble origin, is an example of the Soviet policy 
based on meritocracy and internationalism. Ryskulov, although he was executed in 1938 
during the purges, had built an impressive political career to reach the level of the number 
two in the government of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (the RSFSR), the 
largest and key entity within the USSR463 which is the Russian Federation now.  
 
The bureaucracy became the most important element of the implementation of this policy. 
According to Peter Nolan, ‘a key point of the modernisation drive was the creation of a 
professional government administration.’464 In contrast to the lifestyle of the previous 
Tsarist elite and even that of the first revolutionaries who were the first generation of Soviet 
bureaucrats, 465  the newly introduced modest lifestyle of society, including Stalin (as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Shaken Aimanov Kenzhetaevich, National Digital History of Kazakhstan; retrieved on 15.02.2018 from the 
Web, http://e-history.kz/en/biography/view/154.  
462 This expression was applied to those repressed in the 1930s for political reasons in the USSR. It was 
borrowed from the lexicon of the French revolution, when the royalists were named as ennemi du peuple. In 
turn, it had been taken from Roman law, implying the execution of the public enemy, hostis publicus, as the 
outlaw and equalling her to the armed enemy soldier at war.  
463 Kozhakhmetov G. Z., Botagarin R.B., 2013, Gosudarstvennaya i politicheskaya deyatel’nost’ Turara 
Ryskulova v Kazakhstane v 20-30-t gody XX veka (State and Political Activity of Turar Ryskulov in Kazakhstan 
in the 1920s – 30s of the 20th Century), Vestnik KarGU; retrieved on 15.07.2017 from the Web, 
https://articlekz.com/article/6199.  
464 Nolan, Peter, 1995, Political Economy and the Reform of Stalinism: The Chinese Puzzle, The Transformation 
of the Communist Economies against the Mainstream, Edited by Ha-Joon Chang and Peter Nolan, St. Martin’s 
Press, 407; hereafter referred to as Nolan, 1995. 
465 Khanin G. I., 2008, Ekonomicheskaya istoria Rossii v noveishee vremya, Tom 1, Ekonomika SSSR v kontse 
30-kh godov (Economic History of Russia in the XX Century, Vol. 1, Soviet Economy from the End of the 1930s 
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described by Nekrasov and Zhukov) and the new Soviet technocrats, contributed to the 
formation of a more equitable social milieu. Both Nekrasov and Zhukov brought examples 
of Kosygin and Malenkov respectively as two Soviet leaders whose careers were defined by 
their education in S&T. 
 
Similarly, Dinmukhamed Kunaev (or Kunayev), a leader of the Communist Party in the 
Kazakh SSR, graduated as a mining engineer from the Institute of Non-Ferrous and Fine 
Metallurgy in Moscow in 1936. He became the deputy head of the republican government at 
the age of 32 in 1942, the head of the local Academy of Sciences at age 40 and the first 
secretary of Kazakhstan’s Communist Party in 1960-2 and 1962-86. Under his leadership, 
Kazakhstan continued becoming a highly industrialised and culturally developed Soviet 
republic.466  
 
One should mention the name of Kanysh Satpaev (or Satbayev), the first president of the 
Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR and the founder of both Soviet metallogeny as a 
scientific discipline and the Kazakh school of geological sciences. His both humble origin 
and career is another example of the Soviet science, education and national policies 
combined.467 Keldysh in chapter 2, Saxena in chapter 3 and Jackson468 emphasised a global 
significance of Kazakh geology. 
 
Geological sciences, mining, and metallurgy helped develop Kazakh SSR’s economy and 
continue to determine Kazakhstan’s economy today. In terms of its both economy and 
territory, Kazakhstan is the second largest country after Russia among the post-Soviet states 
lagging behind Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan in terms of the population. The extraction 
and processing of natural resources is the main contributor to its current GDP of 
USD133.657 billion which exceeds those of the other Central Asian countries combined 
(Uzbekistan – USD67.22 billion; Turkmenistan – USD38.18 billion; Tajikistan – USD6.952 
billion, and Kyrgyzstan – USD6.551 billion),469 or that of Ukraine (USD93.27 billion).470  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to 1987), Novosibirsk State Technical University, Novosibirsk, 13-19; retrieved on 22.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://istmat.info/files/uploads/56774/hanin_g.i._-
_ekonomicheskaya_istoriya_rossii_v_noveyshee_vremya._tom_1.pdf; hereafter referred to as Khanin II. 
466 Vronskaya, Jeanne, 1993, Obituary: Dinmukhamed Kunayev, 24 August, The Independent; retrieved on 
15.07.2017 from the Web, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-dinmukhamed-kunayev-
1463084.html.  
467 Satpaev Kanysh Imantaevich (1899-1964), Unesco.kz; retrieved on 25.04.2017 from the Web, 
http://old.unesco.kz/heritagenet/kz/participant/scientists/satpaev.htm. 
468 Jackson. 
469 World Bank, 2016; retrieved on 28.09.2017 from the Web, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.  
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Thus, the Academy of Sciences was a primary source of human capital not only for science 
but industry and politics as well. It is essential to point out that Kunaev came to power in 
Kazakhstan from the position of the president of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh 
SSR being fully trained and qualified in the matters of industry, science, and technology. 
Being intertwined with the development of Kazakhstan, Kunaev’s biography above is 
indicative as an example of how various Soviet policies, i.e. social, national, industrial, 
science and technology ones, were juxtaposed in a whole comprehensive set aiming at the 
development of a particular Soviet republic to contribute to the overall development of the 
USSR. 
 
Meanwhile, as shown from these examples and the other data above, in the Soviet 
development policy science likely was a critical element without which the technology 
transfer and Soviet development would have been impossible. Research was considered as 
the necessary prerequisite and determinant for industrialisation, as well as the foundation of 
the social change as evident in the example of Kazakhstan. In the USSR, the overall social 
stability, job security, high educational and healthcare, as well as the high societal status of 
education, science, and culture, formed the environment favourable towards the formation 
of the valuable scientific human capital.  
 
As seen from the data, the Soviets expanded the base for the scientific upbringing of 
students in the overall education system, on the one hand; and on the other invested 
intensively in the development of cutting-edge science and the appropriate infrastructure 
necessary. In terms of efficiency, such general allocation of the direct investments for R&D 
required the deployment of an appropriate particular social policy aiming at both providing 
widespread access to knowledge and developing a scientific culture in the Soviet society. 
 
4.2.3                            Access to Knowledge and Libraries 
 
Scientific publishing is a critically important means of knowledge exchange in the 
development of science in general. In the USSR, leading foreign scientific articles and 
journals were persistently translated into Russian and published in various Soviet research 
journals. Their overall quantity reached 119, 15 out of which had been established in the 
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Russian Empire, and 104 in the Soviet period.471 A majority of the Soviet scientific journals 
were founded in the period of Stalin’s time and its immediate aftermath, i.e. from 1934 to 
1959.472 Many of them, like Zhurnal Eksperimental’noi I Teoreticheskoi Fiziki (ZhETF) 
(The Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics [JETP]),473 that was established in 
1931, or Yadernaya Fizika 474  (Physics of Atomic Nuclei), 475  have been published 
simultaneously in both Russian and English (the JETP since 1955 and the latter since its 
establishment in 1965). Some of the journals were additionally published abroad in English, 
like Fizika i Tekhnika Poluprovodnikov  (Physics and Technics of Semiconductors) – in the 
US as Soviet Physics, Semiconductors by The American Institute of Physics; 476  or 
Paleontologicheskyi Zhurnal (Paleontological Journal) 477  – in the US by Pleiades 
Publishing, Inc.478 The translation was provided by the Soviet publishing house Nauka 
(Science). Established in 1923 under the title of the USSR Academy of Sciences Publishing 
House (renamed in 1963), it eventually became the largest scientific and research publisher 
in the world.479  
 
All the scientific literature and journals considered have been largely available in the vast 
network of the libraries, created and persistently expanded from the first days of the 
Bolsheviks in power. Literally on the second day after the October Revolution, on 9 
November 1917 Lenin held a meeting with Narkom of Enlightenment (Minister of 
Education) Lunacharsky on the organisation of the librarian business in the country.480 From 
then every year of the calendar was marked with the appropriate policy decrees and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 Nauchnye Zhurnaly v SSSR (Scientific Journals in the USSR), Wikipedia; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the 
Web, 
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%B3%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%
D1%8F:%D0%9D%D0%B0%D1%83%D1%87%D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%B6%D1%83%D1%80%
D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BB%D1%8B_%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A1%D0%A0, in which the total number of 
124 is mistakenly indicated. However, a further study reveals that four out of 124 journals mentioned were 
established after 1991, and one of the journals was, in fact, a Soviet children’s magazine. The rest of information 
indicated was double-checked, and that is why this Wikipedia’s article was used for the indicative purpose. 
472 Ibid. 
473 The Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Physics; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://jetp.ac.ru/; hereafter referred to as ZhETF for the publications in Russian, and JETP – in English.   
474 Yadernaya Fizika (Physics of Atomic Nuclei); retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://journals.ioffe.ru/journals/2.  
475 Physics of Atomic Nuclei, The SpringerLink Database; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://link.springer.com/journal/11450. 
476 Soviet Physics, Semiconductors, The WorldCat Database, retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.worldcat.org/title/soviet-physics-semiconductors/oclc/1766265.  
477 Paleontologicheskyi Zhurnal (Paleontological Journal); retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.maik.ru/ru/journal/palrus/.  
478 Paleontological Journal; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, http://pleiades.online/ru/journal/paleng/.  
479 Sikorsky N. M. (Ed.), 1982, Nauka (Science), Knigovedenie (Bibliology), Ensyclopedicheskyi Slovar' 
(Encyclopedic Dictionary), Sovetskaya Ensyclopedia, 664. 
480 Abramov K. I., 1980, Istoria bibliotechnogo dela v SSSR (History of Librarian Business in the USSR), Kniga, 
Moscow, 336.  
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events of opening the libraries throughout the USSR.481 Among many of them the most 
significant were those two of VTsIK SSSR (the All-Union Executive Committee of the 
USSR) which systemised the organisation and established the expansion of the libraries on 
more regular basis in March 1934482 and which launched the State Fund of the Narkompros 
(the Ministry of Education) in 1943 for rebuilding of the libraries destroyed during the 
WWII by Nazi occupation483 respectively.  
 
In 1914, in the Russian Empire, the number of the libraries was limited to 13,876,484 and 
they represented mostly private libraries, whose funds were contributed primarily by the 
general public in the form of mainly non-academic literature.485 Those libraries were poorly 
equipped, bad-lit and serviced by non-trained volunteers. In addition, they were tightly 
controlled by the church and police censorship.  
 
In the 1920s and 30s, the libraries were opened in all other republics of the USSR. For 
instance, in Kazakhstan, the first large library was established on 12 March 1931,486 and 
their overall number grew from 2 in 1914 to 578 in 1976.487 In 1935 a special national 
higher education institute of librarian business was established in Kharkov, Ukraine.488 The 
most indicative period of the growth of the numbers of the mass and scientific libraries 
happened in 1930s when their number grew from 115,542 with almost 300 million books in 
1934 489  to 280,000 with 520 million books by 1941. 490  This process was invariably 
accompanied by the growth of the number of the scientific libraries, which were 16,000 
(with 112,5 million of books) in 1934,491 as well as by the establishment of bibliology 
(librarian business) for the preparation and education of the specialists, and the constant 
improvement of the conditions and quality of the libraries. 
 
As a result of this consistent policy, by 1976 the total number of the mass libraries in the 
USSR reached the global record of 131,354 with the total number of books of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Ibid., 336-43. 
482 Ibid., 339. 
483 Ibid., 340. 
484 Ibid., 327. 
485 Ibid., 90-1. 
486 Ibid., 338. 
487 Ibid., 327. 
488 Ibid., 339. 
489 Ibid., 234. 
490 Ibid., 257. 
491 Ibid., 241. 
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1,541,179,000 and average 603 per citizen in the contrast to state of these affairs in the 
Russian Empire, where the last two indicators were 9,442,000 and 6 respectively.492 
 
One of the most important features of this policy was the development of the scientific and 
specialised libraries for the professional audience. The following table indicates it. 
 
Table 4              Number of Scientific and Specialised Libraries in Types, and their  
                           Book Funds (at the beginning of 1976)493 
 
 
          Types of libraries                                                Libraries          Their books (in      
                                                                                                              Thousands)  
Scientific, of R&D entities, of central 
        design bureaus                                                           4,060                   504,096 
Of higher educational and specialised 
        high educational entities                                            5,357                   596,151 
Of educational entities of professional 
       technical training and various courses                        6,920                   104,639 
Of entities of industry, construction, 
       transport and communication                                    16,507                   242,887 
Of central and local organisations and entities                 20,838                  450,862 
Of healthcare entities and sports organisations                    3,389                   20,714 
Of organisations and entities of agriculture and others       7,351                    99,447 
                            Total                                                     64,422                2,018,826 
 
 
One can see the prevalence of the scientific and technical literature over the other types of 
books available in the USSR, i.e. 2 billion vs. 1,5 billion in total. Even considering a 
significant share of the political propaganda books, presumably included in the first number, 
the overall dominance of the scientific and technical literature cannot be questioned, 
especially in the light of the fact that this type of the literature was also widely presented in 
the mass libraries as well. Meanwhile, from a cultural point of view, the libraries in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
492 Ibid., 327. 
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USSR were popular public places and spending time there was a consistent feature of the 
Soviet lifestyle. 
 
4.2.4                            Culture of Science in the Soviet Society 
 
Overall, a high status of science and education in a progressing society is a necessary 
prerequisite for development. It is achieved through popularisation of science and 
enlightenment of both the public opinion and the policy-makers to create such a socio-
ecological system in which science, as well as culture, is viewed as the most vital 
instrument to progress in all senses. This kind of environment is a gracious field for science 
and culture to recruit their followers for advances to be made for benefits of a society and 
all mankind. This culture as the cult of knowledge and science in all their manifestations 
was exceptionally well developed and supported in the USSR through multiple books, 
films, TV programmes as a significant part of the overall policy as analysed below.  
 
Both the audience and circulations of the books by such science fictions authors as the 
Strugatsky brothers reached millions,494 for example. The circulation of such a scientific 
popular monthly magazine as Nauka i Zhizn’ (Science and Life),495 established in 1890 and 
reborn in October 1934, reached 3 million in the 1970s and 80s and became one of the most 
popular Soviet mass media. Its circulations were as follows: № 1/1950 — 50,000; 
№ 1/1958 — 180,000; № 8/1985 — 3,000,000; № 1/1990 — 2,700,000; № 1/2007 — 
44,225.496  
 
Various other multiple science magazines such as Znanie – Sila497 (Knowledge is Power), 
Yunyi Technik498 (Young Technician), Tekhnika Molodezhi499 (Technology of Youth), Yunyi 
Naturalist500 (Young Naturalist) and many others were of tremendous popularity. The same 
can be referred to TV-programmes, and in particular to the one called Ochevidnoye-
Neveroyatnoye (Evident but Incredible) by Sergey Kapitsa, a Pyotr Kapitsa’s son, and a 
Soviet physicist and demographer.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 von Geldern, James (2014), 1968: Strugatsky Brothers, Seventeen Moments in Soviet History, Macalester 
College; retrieved on 04.05.2014 from the Web, http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1973-2/strugatsky-brothers/.  
495 Nauka I Zhizn’ (Science and Life); retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, https://www.nkj.ru/.  
496 The data are extracted from the magazine’s last cover page. 
497 Znanie – Sila (Knowledge Is Power); retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, http://www.znanie-sila.su/.  
498 Yunyi Technik (The Young Technician); retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, http://xn-----
6kcwbqeldsdd4a9ag6b6f6b.xn--p1ai/.  
499 Tekhnika Molodezhi (Technics of Youth); retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://technicamolodezhi.ru/.  
500 Yunyi Naturalist (TheYoung Naturalist); retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, http://unnaturalist.ru/.  
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Sergey Kapitsa became an influential public figure in the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet 
Russia with his tireless efforts at popularising science, emphasising its importance for the 
future of not only a single country but for the global development and continuing his 
father’s public activity. His TV-programme was launched in the air in 1973 and continued 
till 1994, and with breaks – till 2012, the year of Sergey Kapitsa’s death.501 The tremendous 
popularity and longevity of the programme which spanned 40 years was the evidence of the 
vivid public interest and the high-status science possessed in the Soviet society. 
 
The Soviet film industry launched dozens if not hundreds of movies in different years 
dedicated to science and education, e.g. either to school teachers (We’ll Live Till Monday, 
1968),502 or to geologists (Letters Never Sent, 1960),503 or to physicists (Nine Days in One 
Year, 1962).504 Many of these films won prestigious international awards, like the last one – 
The Crystal Globe award in 1962. 
 
The immense high status of the polytechnic education in conjunction with those difficulties 
of the exams and studying to obtain a polytechnic degree was reflected in the popularity of a 
romantic short movie Navazhdenie (Strange Impression) of a slapstick comedy film, titled 
Operation ‘Y’ and Shurik's Other Adventures.505 It became the absolute leader of the 
distribution in 1965 and was viewed by 69.6 million viewers.506 
 
It is important to stress out that all of the magazines were established or gained the second 
life in the late 1920s or mostly in the early 1930s, in relation to the state policy for 
industrialisation. Subscriptions to some of those magazines sometimes were even limited 
and hard to obtain. This indicated that level of the national aspiration for knowledge which 
had been prospering in the Soviet Union from the first to the last day of the country’s 
existence. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Scientist, TV Host Sergei Kapitsa Dies, 14 August 2012, The Moscow Times; retrieved on 03.05.2017 from 
the Web, https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/scientist-tv-host-sergei-kapitsa-dies-17016.  
502 We’ll Live Till Monday, 1968, IMDb; retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0062907/.  
503 Letters Never Sent, 1960, IMDb; retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0053106/.  
504 Nine Days in One Year, 1962, IMDb; retrieved on 04.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0054803/.  
505 Operatsia ‘Y’ i drugyie prikluchenia Shurika, 1965, (Operation ‘Y’ and Shurik's Other Adventures), IMDb; 
retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0059550/, the film itself is retrieved on 
11.06.2017 from the Mosfilm’s Web Site, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JZ-bjMWuBt4.  
506 Operatsia ‘Y’ i drugyie prikluchenia Shurika, SSSR, (Operation ‘Y’ and Shurik's Other Adventures, USSR), 
KinoExpert; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, http://www.kinoexpert.ru/index.asp?comm=4&num=291.  
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This national aspiration was supported in Soviet policy by various measures. Thus, the 
Znanie (Knowledge) Society was established in 1947, explained as ‘The Society for the 
Spread of Political and Scientific Knowledge.’ Although being formally autonomous, it was 
controlled by the Central Committee of the Communist Party for propaganda and, more 
importantly, for distribution of scientific knowledge through a network of museums, 
planetaria, a publishing house, and public lecture service. 507  In the table below the 
enormous figures of the lectures’ attendance are given. Although these numbers were 
criticised in Western literature for being exaggerated,508 they nevertheless could not help 
impressing the reader, e.g. in 1975 23 million lectures were read to 1.19 billion of the 
attendees. 
 
Table 5            Figures of Attendance at Znanie Society509  
                         (all figures in millions) 
 
Znanie Society 1950 1960 1970 1975 
Lectures 0.9 9.9 18.2 23.0 
Auditors 89.0 631 951 1,190.0 
 
As seen from above in this section, the certain societal conditions had been established in 
the Soviet society due to vigorous pursuit of the policy for the development of education 
and research. According to Nigmatulin in chapter 3, one of the pioneering Soviet 
achievements was the global recognition that science and social development could be 
directly interconnected and developed through a policy. According to Cocks and Graham in 
the literature review, this resulted in science becoming a ‘natural resource’ which can be 
cultivated. Altogether this, in turn, identifies and confirms the role of the Marxist social 
factors as the drivers of Soviet development in addressing the second and third approaches 
as shown at the beginning of this chapter.  
 
However, it requires to look over the development of the Soviet science policy in more 
detail. This also could help better highlight this interconnection mentioned by Nigmatulin 
above between science and social development. It is particularly important as many of the 
various Soviet policies, as analysed above, were directed at the development of the human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 Matthews, 192. 
508 Ibid., 192-3. 
509 Extracted from Table 6.4, Mass Indoctrination Systems, Ibid., 191. 
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capital in which science was viewed as both an apex and an instrument for the overall 
Soviet and global progress.  
 
4.3                            Soviet Science Policy   
 
By 1940, while the resources were limited and successes hard earned, Soviet policy of 
investing in education and improving literacy across the Soviet Union had already begun to 
bear fruit, as has been shown in the examples of Kazakhstan above. In general, this policy 
provided a productive return from the extensive investments in the creation of the social and 
cultural environment as an ecosystem for nourishing human capital in close coercion of the 
interaction of the state, industry, academia, and culture.    
 
The case of Kazakhstan is chosen for this thesis as one of the most evident examples of the 
Soviet cultural, social and industrial transformation in the process of the nation-building and 
development. Prior the 1917 October Revolution this second largest after Russia terrain of 
the Russian Empire was inhibited by the nomadic people whose indigenous name was even 
unknown outside510 and whose vast territory was ‘divided in administrative sense into two 
parts. One was controlled from Orenburg in Siberia, the other from Tashkent in Central 
Asia.’511 In 1920 it was formed as an autonomous republic within the RSFSR with the 
capital in Orenburg, and in 1936, as emphasised by Zhukov in section 3, it became the 
Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic with the capital in Alma-Ata (former Verny)512 which is 
the Republic of Kazakhstan now.  
 
In the republic, whose level of literacy was around two per cent or so and where the overall 
number of the ethnic Kazakh engineers and scientists was counted as 14 in 1915,513 without 
higher education institutions at all and a decent library, the industrial demand for specialists 
grew in such quantities and became so much more sophisticated in quality and variety, that 
a single university out of dozens of those higher education entities established the in 1930s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
510 ‘The Russians originally called the Kazakhs 'Kirgiz' and later Kirghiz-Kaisak to distinguish them from the 
Kyrgyzs properly. In the 17th century, Russian convention seeking to distinguish the Qazaqs of the steppes from 
the Cossacks of the Imperial Russian Army suggested spelling the final consonant with "kh" instead of "q" or 
"k", which was officially adopted by the USSR in 1936,’ The Kazakhs, Wikipedia; retrieved on 20.08.2018 from 
the Web, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kazakhs; 
- Postanovlenie TsIK KazASSR i SNK KazASSR ot 5 fevralia 1936 goda 'O russkom proiznoshenii i pis'mennom 
oboznachenii slova 'kazak' (Resolution of the TsiK KazASSR and SNK KazASSR of February 5, 1936 'On 
Russian pronunciation and the written designation of the word 'Kazak'), February 6, 1936, Kazakhstanskaya 
Pravda.  
511 Laumulin, Chokan; Laumulin, Murat, 2009, The Kazakhs, Children of the Steppes, Global Oriental, 95. 
512 Ibid. 
513 Section 3.2. 
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in two decades found possible to announce a competition for such specialties as general 
physics, higher algebra, physical chemistry, geology, optics and spectroscopy, higher 
geometry, and others, as evident from the announcement of the Kazakh State University in 
section 3.2. As seen from the statistical data in section 3.2 as well, the number of 
researchers grew up rapidly from dozens to hundreds, and eventually to thousands to be 
engaged with R&D at dozens of the research and higher education entities, including the 
local Academy of Sciences. It was established in 1932 and notably expanded in the 1930s 
and 40s. As a result, according to Cocks in chapter 2, in Kazakhstan, the ratio of the number 
of the researchers to the population size was among the highest ones in the USSR. It 
indicated the magnitude of the social and industrial change occurred to this nomadic 
society. 
 
In 1967 the well-paid and highly socially positioned stratum of the Soviet scientists 
reached the number of 69,200 people in the system of the SAS, i.e. in fundamental 
science, out of a total of 770,000 scientists. It constituted 8.9 per cent of the overall 
population, or 10-12 per cent combined with the number of the universities’ researchers, 
which became approximately equal to the overall number of the researchers in the USA in 
the same period514 and kept increasing to overrun the US by the 1980s (Spearman).  
 
The development of science and research can be identified as the apex of the overall 
national Soviet development, as extensively evident from the data on the massive and 
increasingly growing allocations of the state funds for the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It 
conducted the broadest spectrum of fundamental research515 from the geological studies, 
like in Kazakhstan (as confirmed by Keldysh, Jackson and Saxena), and the activity of the 
sun in astrophysics (as confirmed by Chitre) to specific notions in physics, like 
superfluidity discovered by Kapitsa, or underwater acoustics (Nigmatulin) among many 
others.  
 
The policy was particularly accelerated during WWII when many of the republican and 
other branches of the SAS were established, as detailed by Cocks. It should be particularly 
emphasised that science, as driven by curiosity pursuit to grasp the nature’s laws, is 
described by Lonzarich, Saxena, Tsironis, Chitre, Vasiliev, Nigmatulin and others. 
Furthermore, while looking over the Nobel Prize speeches, one can find out that many of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Khanin II, 220-1, citing from Narodnoye khoziastvo SSSR v 1967 godu (The People's Economy of the USSR 
in 1967), 1968, Moscow, 810–811. 
515 Ibid. 
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the laureates in various scientific fields from different times, countries and cultures named 
curiosity as the driving force of their discoveries contributing to global development.516  
 
In supporting research and establishing the research infrastructure, the Soviet state 
encouraged scientists’ curiosity even during the harsh war conditions as seen from Basov 
who conducted research on centimetre waves leading to the fundamental discovery of laser 
(section 3.2). This policy directly connects the Soviet development to that of the rest of the 
civilised nations whose characteristics were defined by John Stuart Mill in 1848. 517 
Moreover, this barely tangible and important connection between scientists’ curiosity as 
their immaterial aspiration to learn the nature’s laws, on the one hand, and technology and 
industry, on the other, is what underpins the successes of the modern technological and 
industrial development of the OECD countries. Their significant contemporary allocations 
for R&D in relation to their GDPs518 cannot still reach the 1980 Soviet record of 5 per cent 
and more of the GNP (Cocks, chapter 2).  
 
At this point it is required to draw out the differences between two very interconnected but 
distinct concepts of knowledge in science and technology, as propositional (‘knowledge of 
what’) and prescriptive knowledge (‘the knowledge that prescribes certain actions that 
constitute the manipulation of natural phenomena for human material needs’ or ‘production’) 
respectively.519 According to Joel Mokyr, ‘[a]n increase in the set of prescriptive knowledge, 
allowing society to produce cheaper and better products is at the heart of the economic growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 Appendix K. 
517 ‘Of the features which characterise this progressive economical movement of civilised nations, that which 
first excites attention, through its intimate connection with the phenomena of Production, is the perpetual, and so 
far as human foresight can extend, the unlimited, growth of man's power over nature. Our knowledge of the 
properties and laws of physical objects shows no sign of approaching its ultimate boundaries: it is advancing 
more rapidly, and in a greater number of directions at once, than in any previous age or generation, and affording 
such frequent glimpses of unexplored fields beyond, as to justify the belief that our acquaintance with nature is 
still almost in its infancy. This increasing physical knowledge is now, too, more rapidly than at any former 
period, converted, by practical ingenuity, into physical power’; Mill, John Stuart, 1848, General Characteristics 
of a Progressive State of Wealth, Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social 
Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 7th Edition, 1988, 66. 
518 In absolute numbers, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) 
2015 Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard: Innovation for Growth and Society Report, in 2013 the US 
spent $433 billion on R&D which only constitutes 2.7 per cent of GDP putting the US on the 10th position in 
world ranking and lagging behind the following countries: Israel (4.2 per cent), South Korea (4.1 per cent), 
Japan (3.5 per cent), Finland (3.3 per cent), Sweden (3.3 per cent), Denmark (3.1 per cent), Switzerland (3 per 
cent), Austria (3 per cent) and Germany (2.9 per cent); Harrington, Rebecca, 2016, These 9 Countries Spend a 
Greater Share of Money on Science than the United States, Business Insider UK, May 1; retrieved on 01.05.2017 
from the Web, http://uk.businessinsider.com/american-science-funding-statistics-vs-world-2016-
2?r=US&IR=T/#9-germany-29-of-its-gdp-1; hereafter referred to as OECD. 
519 Mokyr, Joel, 2002, The Knowledge Society: Theoretical and Historical Underpinnings, Northwestern 
University, Presented to the Ad Hoc Expert Group on Knowledge Systems, United Nations, New York, Sept. 
4-5, 2; retrieved on 15.09.2017 from the Web, 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan011602.pdf.  
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process.’ 520  Unlike in the current economic methodology not delineating between the 
allocations for fundamental and industrial research within the overall expenditures on R&D, 
in the Soviet approach, the massive funding of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, as 
shown in the introduction, clearly and primarily aimed at the development of fundamental 
science. 
 
As a more detailed example of an early Soviet scientific discovery and its further 
development, pivotal for technology and both Soviet and global industry, it could be the 
invention of synthetic rubber mentioned by both Sutton and Kurakov in the literature 
review. This example is indicative in terms of both how an initial Tsarist time’s research 
was successfully developed in the USSR and how it contributed to the Soviet import 
substitution programme during industrialisation and beyond. 
 
In 1910 at St. Petersburg Imperial University,521 while ‘researching processes by which small 
molecules combine to form large ones, Lebed[y]ev produced an elastic rubber from 
butadiene.’522 The initial flawed method although tried by both Russia and Germany in WWI 
was abandoned by both sides in favour of natural rubber whose supply, however,  from the 
British colonies was restricted. After founding the Laboratory for Petroleum Refining in 
1925, Lebedyev  (who became director of the Laboratory of Synthetic Rubber in Leningrad 
[1928–30] and academician of the SAS in 1932) developed his process of obtaining butadiene 
from ethyl alcohol which was used not only by the Soviet, but also the German, rubber 
industry.523 As a result, ‘by 1940 the Soviet Union had the largest synthetic rubber industry in 
the world, producing more than 50,000 tons per year.’524 
 
After WWII and based on Lebedyev’s research, the Soviet Union developed another method 
of the synthetic rubber production from divinyl. As explained by Kurakov: 
 
Divinyl is the basic intermediate product (monomer) in the production of 
general purpose synthetic rubber. Divinyl is used as raw material for the 
production of the most current rubber sorts for the tyre industry and other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 Ibid., 3. 
521 Leningrad State University (LSU) in 1924-91 and St. Petersburg State University (SPBU) now; retrieved on 
22.05.2019 from the Web, http://english.spbu.ru/. 
522 Lebedev. 
523 Ibid. 
524 The Rise of Synthetic Rubber Industry; The Encyclopaedia Britannica; retrieved on 22.05.2019 from the 
Web, https://www.britannica.com/science/rubber-chemical-compound/The-rise-of-synthetic-rubber. 
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branches of industry. Special polymerization methods can be used to 
produce, on the basis of divinyl, SKD rubber of regular structure with 
valuable properties.525  
 
At first, divinyl was produced from alcohol made from foodstuffs, and later, from synthetic 
alcohol obtained from oil gas ethylene, as outlined by Kurakov.526 A more promising 
method of producing divinyl from butane was developed and, at the beginning of 1960, at 
the Sumgait synthetic rubber plan in Azerbaijan, the first industrial plant to produce divinyl 
from butane by a double-stage process was founded.527 This technology was consequently 
used in other synthetic rubber plants constructed.528 Meanwhile, as continued by Kurakov:  
 
Acetaldehyde is an important intermediate product in the production of 
several synthetic materials. It is used primarily in synthetic rubber plants as 
an obligatory addition to the alcohol mixture in the production of divinyl by 
the Lebedyev method. Acetic acid, used to produce acetate silk, and several 
plastic solvents and plasticizers can also be derived from acetaldehyde. At 
present acetaldehyde is manufactured from acetylene, which is in its turn 
produced from carbide.529  
 
Research was carried out in the Lomonosov Institute of Light Chemical Technology in 
Moscow530 and ‘in the Synthetic Alcohol Research Institute ha[d] shown that when a 
palladium catalyser [wa]s used, acetaldehyde can be obtained through direct oxidation of 
ethylene, which [wa]s a considerably cheaper product than acetylene.’531  
 
In another example, in 1936 Ioffe claimed that his ‘Physicotechnical Institute of 1918 had 
become a network of fourteen institutes and three higher technical schools, with 1,000 
scientific workers of whom about one hundred could be considered major independent 
scientists.’532 They, in turn, made the following, according to Ioffe, contributions to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Kurakov. 
526 Ibid. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Ibid. 
529 Ibid. 
530 It is now Moscow State University of Fine Chemical Technologies named after M.V. Lomonosov (traditional 
abbreviation MITHT); retrieved on 18.05.2019 from the Web, https://english.mirea.ru/. 
531 Kurakov, 96. 
532 Holloway, David, 1994, Stalin and the bomb, The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy 1939 – 1956, Yale 
University Press, New Haven & London (Kindle Edition), 16-7; hereafter refereed to as Holloway; citing from 
Izvestia Akademii Nauk SSSR, Seria fizicheskaia, 1936, no. 1-2, 24-6. 
	   140	  
Soviet economy: ‘[A]n acoustic method for measuring stresses; new methods for studying 
the structure of steel and alloys; the invention of new insulating materials; the protection of 
electric lines and high-voltage transformers; works on polymers and artificial rubber; and 
new method of biological measurement.’533 
 
Thus, the examples above are illustrative in terms of the following: i) how basic research 
driven by scientist’s curiosity to understand how small molecules can combine to form large 
ones in Lebedyev’s case, could lead to the emergence of technology and Soviet and global 
industry significantly affecting war, politics and economy; ii) as a demonstration of both 
consistency and progression of the Soviet industrial policy largely supportive of the 
development of basic research as its integral part; iii) and how the policy of developing 
basic research can relatively quickly lead to some tangible engineering, technological and 
industrial results.  
 
It should be emphasised that such a specific Soviet approach which proved its efficiency 
within a concise period of time could not have emerged as a result of the market forces. As 
seen from the data, the USSR if continued developing within the New Economic Policy as 
‘the state capitalism’ (Lenin), could not perform industrialisation at the scale and terms 
occurred. It required a massive concentration of the capital and resources to be socialised, 
according to Marx, and distributed to the strategic areas of development. The latter included 
not only the purchase of the equipment, plants or expertise from outside but above all 
implied the deployment of the significant social programmes including education and 
research.  
 
The philosophy of the new policy in the words of Felix Dzerzhinsky, who established the 
VChK (as the predecessor of the KGB) and who was the chairman of the Supreme Council 
of the National Economy, was formulated in 1926 as follows: 
 
Therefore, when it is said that because of the shortage of resources we 
should halt our investment projects, or reduce them to a certain level, then I 
assert that, I, as chairman of the Supreme Council of the National Economy, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
533 Ibid., 17, citing from Ibid., 21. 
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will struggle against such an opinion to the end because it is fundamentally 
incorrect.534 
 
As seen from the data on the Arteli in section 3.2, semi-private SME’s were notably present 
in the Soviet economy until 1960 but did not play a significant role in either the heavy 
industrialisation or the development of science and technology or education. Moreover, as 
implied by Michel in chapter 1, if not for industrialisation, the Soviet Union could have 
hardly won over The Third Reich and Japan in WWII. Meanwhile, Tsarist Russia which had 
been unindustrialised was defeated by Germany in 1918 and Japan in 1905 in its two 
previous wars respectively. 
 
The Soviet model of the interaction of the state, industry, and academia was underpinned by 
the development of social welfare for the formation of human capital. It was put in such 
forefront in the overall policy including the industrial one that the Soviet Union called itself 
as a ‘socialist country,’ unlike the Western terminology in which it was regarded as a 
communist one. Meanwhile, socialism with its focus on social development and socialisation 
of property was considered, according to the Marxist political theory, as a transitional phase 
to communism, i.e. a money-, property- and classless society, in which knowledge production 
would take the central place, as outlined by Buzgalin. This prioritised science and technology 
in development and preparation of human capital through social policy, including education, 
healthcare, and others as well as could explain the role the ideological platform played in the 
Soviet science policy. 
 
Thus, the Marxist policy and Marxist drivers of development should be considered as very 
critical factors for Soviet industrialisation. In this sense, technology transfer was a technical 
factor chosen as the most effective means for industrialisation in which the institutional 
ability established via the comprehensive social and education programmes to assimilate 
and develop technology was crucial. 
 
On the other hand, although Marx defined the role of technical progress in production as 
crucial, he did not elaborate on the origin of technology in detail, as confirmed by Buzgalin. 
Most economic theories, including Marxism, could not explain the phenomenon of Soviet 
development in full missing the connection, on the one hand, between science, engineering, 
technology and innovation, and social development and science, on the other. While some 	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of them, like the Triple Helix Systems of Innovation,535 can be used as an analytical tool for 
Soviet development from the position of the unity of governmental, industrial and academic 
policy in designing a national industry of discovery (Sumner Slichter), 536  crucial for 
innovation and development, these theories do not consider the USSR as a full case study as 
followed from the dichotomy in scholars’ views of both sides in the literature review.  
 
With the establishment of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the development of science 
in the Soviet Union was an important application of the Marxist socialised surplus value in 
order to increase overall productivity and amplify the surplus value. A more in-depth look at 
the Soviet industrial policy reveals that without the contribution of science, the Soviet 
Union would have been unable to industrialise and develop as rapidly as it did.  
 
The state-funded Soviet academia was tightly involved in socio-economic development in the 
form of providing knowledge, expertise, skills and the human capital for the overall system 
and coevolving with its other elements, including the state governance at different levels of 
the industrial development, to improve the overall national functionality. From industrial and 
social perspective, science, apart from its direct purpose of discovery, was employed to 
establish the Soviet industrial (GOSTs), healthcare and other various state standards as the 
unified system of certification.537  
 
According to Nigmatulin and Paltashev, the Soviet academia was established in regions 
without a higher education capacity making the very integrated environment for academia 
technology transfer and performing relocation of the human capital to stimulate 
arts/technology-based economic development as also evident from the example of Kazakhstan 
above and the other republics as seen from the literature review. The process implied bringing 
together all sets of intellectual activities into the societal consensus process for a knowledge-
based regime and was characterised with the provision of the access to the resources required 
to implement a project, including the various infrastructure for the development of education 
and research as well as the cultural development. This also provided solutions to conflict or 
crisis situations as seen from the Paltashev’s example of Chernobyl. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
535 Ranga, Maria, and Etzkowitz, Henry, 2013, Triple Helix Systems: An Analytical Framework for Innovation 
Policy and Practice in the Knowledge Society, Stanford University; retrieved on 15.09.2017 from the Web, 
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Soviet industrialisation launched initially on the exogenous technology transfer could rely on 
the academic base which was instituted in the 1930s and eventually provided domestic 
national expertise, knowledge, skilled labour and proximity to sources of knowledge and 
expertise. Meanwhile, it was important, according to Berliner, that ‘[t]he effect of central 
financing of R & D [wa]s that a major input required for innovation [wa]s available to the 
user at a price of zero.’538   
 
The Soviet state was the engine for the production of human capital. On the national level, the 
endogenous base of research replaced the exogenous expertise in the Soviet import 
substitution programme during industrialisation. On the regional levels, a similar strategy was 
deployed by the Communist Party sending specialists from Moscow, Leningrad or Kiev to 
Kazakhstan and the other Soviet national republics to foster knowledge creation to be later 
supplemented by the local indigenous academia, as noted by Paltashev. In other words, the 
use of expertise from ‘outside’ in order to spur local knowledge production was a part of the 
Soviet policy and can be viewed as a development paradigm in the region(s). 
 
Meanwhile, widely known is Stalin’s support of the academician and biologist Trofim 
Lysenko539 and his interference in genetics which as well as cybernetics, both were named 
as ‘bourgeois sciences,’ as mentioned by Tsironis and Nigmatulin in chapter 3. Genetics as 
a new scientific discipline, most likely, suffered due to its close association with the race 
theory of Nazi Germany and due to this reason was strongly opposed by the official 
Bolsheviks’ ideologists in 1935 in the book edited and published by Nikolay Bukharin.540   
 
Cybernetics, as a discipline, was gradually rehabilitated from 1947 and even became so 
developed in later years that a few different programmes, from 1958 to 1964, were 
combined to the programme of the academician Viktor Glushkov of 
Obshchegosudarstvennaya Avtomatizirovannaya Systema Ucheta i Obrabotki Informazii 
(All-State Automated System of Accounting and Processing of Information, i.e. 
Administration of Economy), or the OGAS, which, if implemented and finished by 1990, 
as initially planned, could have become a Soviet version of the digital Web.541  	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Genetics suffered more and could become restored as a scientific research discipline of 
biology and medicine only after the Stalin’s death. However, it should be noted that if 
development of cybernetics was underpinned by the advanced and globally acknowledged 
school of Soviet mathematics, genetics was not that theoretically advanced and was not 
possessing a large-scale research base, although it was supported and developed by a 
prominent botanist Nikolay Vavilov and some others. He dedicated his life and activity to 
study and improvement of wheat, corn, and other cereal crops as well as the creation of 
Leningrad’s seed bank, and was arrested in 1940 to die in prison three years later.542 
Meanwhile, an important aspect, while considering the Soviet science policy, is that all the 
subjects of modern sciences in all their research varieties were represented throughout the 
vast network of the SAS. 
 
Concerning the sharashkas mentioned in section 3.2, their existence was promoted and 
quite largely exploited in pop- and mass media culture, including the film industry, or such 
novel by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as The First Circle543 due to, likely, the importance of 
the aviation and rocket industry during the Cold War. However, the overall number of 
these specific laboratories as shown in section 3.2 was limited to five in 1949. This, if 
compared to the total number of the various Soviet research, engineering design and 
construction entities of 1,700 in 1945,544 it can be regarded as not significant. It should be 
rather understood from the position of the secrecy and security issues, surrounding the 
aviation and rocket industry, or the Soviet Atom Bomb project whose strategic importance 
for the national security was specified by Paltashev in chapter 3.  
 
Meanwhile, in his interview, Littlewood at that moment being head of the US Argonne 
National Laboratory, home of nuclear technology as a part of the Manhattan Project (as 
mentioned in chapter 1), frankly outlined the following. In the US, the research which 
propelled the early days of Silicon Valley was special research in communications 
technologies and, in particular, in radar and microwave. It came out of the WWII effort and 
was very much associated with military preparedness to bomb the Soviet Union.545 He 
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continued that there was a lot of investment in what became the hardware of IT that came 
from the military side, connected to companies, which had military contracts in the US.546  
 
In general, Littlewood thinks it is the myth actually how the US economy works. In his view, 
‘the mechanisms were somehow different however the US was far from being a free market, 
and there was a lot of directed economic development in the US, driven by either large 
corporations or by the government in a way which is rather different from the view that there 
is kind of a free market which is pulling everything.’547 This explains the similarities between 
both American and Soviet industrial development driven by science and technology, as noted 
by him in chapter 3548 and evident in both Bush’s and Kapitsa’s almost identical policy 
recommendations.549  
 
It is interesting to emphasise that the SAS was a unique entity within the Soviet system 
due to not being an element of the planning as well as the principle of its governance. In 
May 1917,550 a notable geologist Alexander Karpinsky551 mentioned in section 3.2 was 
elected in secret ballot as President of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) to be 
transformed into the SAS in 1925. This democratic procedure never changed during the 
existence of the SAS (the RAN again from 1991), until quite recently, 2017. As Gavriil 
Khromov, a Soviet-Russian astronomer and a historian of science wrote:  
 
In 1925, despite the ambiguous attitude towards the Academy from the 
public and even prominent bureaucrats of the Narkompros [the People’s 
Commissariat of Education], its 200th anniversary was solemnly 
celebrated. By that date a new academic chapter was adopted. It secured 
both the right of the academicians to elect independently their own 
president and the new name – the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.  […] 
High specialists were few and they were highly valued.552  
 
Karpinsky was elected two more times as the president of the SAS until his death in 1936. 
As an evidence of the high status, science held in the Soviet establishment, his funeral was 	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organised as the high national honour ceremony to be attended by the political leadership, 
including Stalin, and the body was buried in the Kremlin Wall Necropolis among the 
national heroes553 to become the eldest representative there by birth and despite the fact 
that the official ideology was very reluctant in glorifying of the representatives of the old 
Tsarist regime. 
 
Additionally, in the opinion of Pyotr Kapitsa, a central intellectual figure of this thesis, the 
Academy played a vital role of moral authority in the Soviet society.554 In the Soviet 
development of science, as mentioned by Paltashev in chapter 3, two figures of Soviet 
physics stand out, i.e. Abram Ioffe and his former student Pyotr Kapitsa, who are known for 
their scientific discoveries as well as for their influence on policy-making. Ioffe is 
considered as ‘the father of Soviet physics,’ whereas Kapitsa influenced generations of 
Soviet leaders in informing on the connection between science and modern industry for the 
formation of the national institution of science. 
 
The Soviet industrial policy was developed not only within the realms of Marxism-
Leninism but was also formed under influence of such international scientists and engineers 
as Abram Ioffe, Pyotr Kapitsa and others. This is corroborated in the US as well where 
Vannevar Bush and other international scientists explained the role of science in a modern 
progressing industrial society at the time. Both Bush and Kapitsa emphasised the role of 
science as the primary source of knowledge and the starting point of growth for engineering, 
technology (including technology transfer) and innovation, hence development, in almost 
identical expressions. Their policy recommendations to the political leadership of their 
respective nations are given in a comparative consideration in Appendix M as a factual 
addition to the formation of Soviet development as being universal and integrated with that of 
the world, and the US, in particular, with some details of Pyotr Kapitsa’s life and legacy 
(Appendix L) to enrich this research. 
 
Indeed Soviet development can be observed through the prism of those Ioffe’s words of 
1927 about a very close relationship between physics and industry in which ‘all forms of 
industry are nothing but various sections of physics or chemistry applied and exploited on a 
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large scale.’555 In his other article of 1951, one can find a continuation of this approach 
explaining the following: ‘Physics is a foundation of technical progress, physics is a 
reservoir from which new technical ideas and new technology are drawn. At a given stage 
of development, research in physics transmits into important technical achievements.’556 It 
would not be an exaggeration to emphasise here that this theoretical understanding was the 
foundation stone of the Soviet industrial policy.  
 
It is important to note that Ioffe was not alone in thinking this, this approach was equally 
appreciated and well understood abroad and was accepted by foreign scientists as seen from 
Bush’s report. In addition, in Korol’s account, in 1954 this Ioffe’s article prompted a vibrant 
dialogue and discussions in the USA, where Nathaniel H. Frank, head of the Physics 
Department at MIT, emphasised the dual role of physics, which, on the one hand, was 
viewed in its connection with engineering, and on the other, as a purely scientific discipline. 
According to him, it is ‘one of the greatest intellectual achievements of mankind, and the 
impact of the growth of science on social and political ideas has been such that a proper 
understanding of our present day culture and problems is difficult to attain without an 
adequate scientific background.’557 This philosophy reflecting the unity of science across 
the borders laid in the foundation of the Soviet science and education policy as a genuine 
driving force of the industrial and socio-economic development as analysed above. 
 
The policy implementation can be illustrated by the following interesting example which is 
connected to the scientific figures of both Abram Ioffe and Pyotr Kapitsa. During the 
Russian Civil War, in 1921 the delegation of Soviet physicists including Ioffe as the head 
and Kapitsa visited Cambridge. The visit happened, despite Soviet Russia not being 
officially recognised by Britain, and became possible due to the solidarity of the scientists 
of both sides. While initiating the proposal to renew the international connections and 
anticipating an albeit unknown although a desirably positive outcome for Soviet 
development, Lenin’s government found resources to fund Ioffe’s trip as well as the 
purchase of a series of expensive equipment along with Kapitsa’s extended stay abroad in 
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the continuing hardships of the Civil War.558 It demonstrated, therefore, policy-makers’ 
sufficient level of an adequate scientific understanding mentioned above by Frank. 
 
Returns from these investments were significant, both nationally and globally. The Ioffe 
Institute in Petrograd received much of the laboratory equipment that was later used to 
establish other scientific institutions.559 And more importantly, in Cambridge, the scientific 
figure of Pyotr Kapitsa was finally formed whose theoretical, technological and industrial 
legacy for Soviet and global development is highlighted throughout the thesis. The 
circumstances of his not entirely voluntary decision to stay in the USSR in 1934 are 
provided in Appendix L to illustrate that importance the Soviet policy-makers including 
Stalin gave to both the national development of science and the role science played in 
industrialisation. Meanwhile, Kapitsa’s policy-advising activity played a particular role in 
the formation of Soviet policy which is analysed in this thesis.  
 
4.4                            Conclusion 
 
The core of the Soviet policy implemented which underpinned of the technological, 
industrial and economic development was a comprehensive development of all fields of 
science delivered in the form of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. Whatever interpretation 
may be put on the motivation and humanitarian aspects the policy-makers had been 
pursuing in teaching and applying science as good opportunities in the doctrinal ‘scientific-
atheistic upbringing’ of the Soviet nationals, those policy-makers, according to Korol, were 
‘clear and realistic in assessing the role of physics [science in general] as the base for 
technical progress.’560 Science as a driving force of productivity had a central place in the 
socialist way of production on the road to the communist society, following the Marxist 
economic theory.  
 
However, the policy implementation in practice exceeded the theoretical framework of 
Marxism and was not dogmatic. According to Cocks in the literature review, in the 1920s the 
Soviet Union became the pioneer in formulating policy towards science and technology as a 
whole. As a result, the Academy of Sciences became a unique Soviet entity functioning 	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largely independently from political control and being economically autonomously from the 
central planning committee of the USSR. 
  
This implied in-depth and sophisticated scientific understanding of the universal connection 
between fundamental research and development including economy by the policy-makers. 
The universality of this concept in the modern technological development was shown 
above. 
 
Thus, one can conclude that Soviet industrialisation was indeed based on technology 
transfer from outside, however, its success was nonetheless defined by the high level of the 
Soviet managerial and engineering expertise. This became doable due to the following five 
critical and interconnected factors.  
 
Firstly, it is the development of the Soviet education system, especially for science and 
technology, which prepared specialists of different levels to run and develop technology. 
Secondly, education was an integral part in the deployment of the comprehensive set of the 
various social policies. Thirdly, the development of science as a universal and irreplaceable 
reservoir of knowledge, expertise and human capital derived from and was underpinned by 
the Soviet socio-ecological system of the human capital development resultant from the 
social policies analysed above. Fourthly, the establishment of such an integral and 
substantial policy within a short span of history could not have become possible in the free 
market conditions implying an evolutionary development. The Soviet state which used the 
theory of Marxism for socialising national resources could have distributed them into 
strategic directions which enabled the Soviet Union to meet the most difficult challenges. 
Last but not least, in implementing its policies, Soviet policy-makers and scientists revealed 
the unity in their same vision of science as the driving force of modern technological 
development that was not enhanced by Marxism. 
 
It is particularly interesting that all of the international scientists and engineers interviewed 
or those considered in the literature review (Spearman, Keldysh) and here (Ioffe, Kapitsa, 
Bush and Frank) shared the same vision despite sometimes being actively involved into the 
appropriate policy-making in their home countries. This had to imply standing on the 
different ideological positions. Instead all the scientists and engineers, the physicists, in 
particular, have been demonstrating internationalism and their adherence to those, according 
to the founder of quantum physics, Max Planck, in 1916, ‘domains of intellectual and moral 
	   150	  
life that lie beyond the struggles of nations, and that honourable cooperation in the 
cultivation of these international cultural values and, not less, personal respect for citizens 
of enemy states [that] are indeed compatible with ardent love and energetic work for one’s 
own country.’561 This citation reveals the philosophical universality and integrity of Soviet 
development with the approach spread among scientists across time and borders in which 
science is viewed as the domain beyond the traditional economic imperatives as well as the 
basis of modern global development.  
 
Furthermore, the successes of Soviet science which defined the Soviet industrial and other 
development would have been impossible without an unprecedented and the most extended 
social programme which included various aspects from the development of healthcare to 
education above all aiming at the human capital development, as analysed above. The 
Soviet approach combined both science and social policy for the human capital 
development as the driving force for the rapid modernisation and industrialisation of the 
country. This addresses the research question and concludes this chapter. 
 
Chapter 5 is to inform the reader better on the particular contributions of the Soviet science 
and technology to global development to highlight the universal character of science in 
general, and to emphasise the connection of Soviet development with the world. 
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Chapter 5         Soviet Science and Global Development 
 
This chapter connects Soviet development with the global development of science and 
technology in more detail and consists of three sections. The first one is dedicated to the 
unity of Soviet and global science evident through Soviet-international scientific 
cooperation and publishing. The examples of some Soviet scientific and technological 
contributions to global development are shown in the second section and detailed with some 
modern developments. In particular, one is that of the high technology industry and the 
other one of consumer goods. The third section analyses Soviet development in the post-
WWII period as resultant from the set of the policies considered previously in the thesis.  
 
Science can develop only if the industry of discovery is established as a national institution 
in the interaction of the state, industry, and academia as disclosed in the previous chapter. 
The certain societal conditions to meet due to which the Soviet industry of discovery 
became operational were considered there as well. Meanwhile, science, according to Bush 
and Kapitsa,562 if secluded in a solely national paradigm cannot develop making the 
international collaboration and exchange of knowledge one of the most significant 
ingredients of the scientific development within the overall global unity of science which is 
the subject of the next section.  
 
5.1                           Soviet-International Scientific Cooperation and Publishing  
 
The concept and understanding of the unity of science at a global scale can help explain that 
high level of the international scientific cooperation, the Soviet Union had been actively 
involved in, as evident from the interviews.563 In their public activity, scientists emphasise 
the philosophical unity and universalism of science as based on the most fundamental 
intrinsic human values. Meanwhile, science in their vision is viewed and applied as a 
natural platform for a productive dialogue among communities, nations, and people 
separated by conflicts or ideologies. History knows some fruitful examples of such 
cooperation between the USSR, on the one hand, and Great Britain or the US, on the other. 
Pyotr Kapitsa’s discoveries, who happened to be both Cambridge and Soviet physicist, or 
the Soviet-American mutual space programme Soyuz-Apollo during the times of Détente in 
the 1970s were the examples.  	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History of the Soviet Union revealed some other examples of such international cooperation 
mentioned above. The Soviet doctrine of the science development implied the full 
integration of the Soviet science into the increasing process of globalisation with the 
understanding of the impossibility to resolve the increasing challenges of the global 
problems in terms of the environment, nuclear energy, space, and oceanic exploration, food 
crises, and global decease control without ‘a rational application of the international 
cooperation in science and technology.’564  
 
It should be particularly emphasised that this doctrine clearly envisaged that central role 
science played in global political development: ‘The most important significance of the 
international scientific relations also lies in the fact that they have an ever increasing 
influence on political relationships between states, promoting international security, 
creating an atmosphere of trust and mutual understanding among peoples.’565 The Soviet 
Union was a member of 600 various international organisations, out of which 320 were in 
S&T, apart from its participation in most of the S&T programmes of the global 
organisations such as UN, UNESCO, UNIDO, ISO, WHO, IES and many others, including 
multiple forms of direct cooperation between scientists and research entities.566 Thus, the 
Soviet Union had been implementing the concept of science as soft power567 considered as 
the most effective instrument of global influence and collaboration. As Pyotr Kapitsa fairly 
noted: ‘The history invariably demonstrates that those countries with a significant 
international influence have, in the first place, a profound science.’568  
 
After being implemented at the national level, the Soviet space programme became 
increasingly international to involve other nations into the process. The first cosmonauts of 
Afghanistan, Austria, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,569 France, Germany (the German 
Democratic Republic), Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and Syria travelled in 
space through the Soviet programme. This was driven by understanding that the 	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involvement of these nations into the sophisticated technological development of the space 
programme can help them in their developmental paths to boost and expand their national 
policies of development in S&T, culture, education, and economy. 
 
The Soviet Union played a key role in the founding and development of the scientific, 
research and education, as well as industrial base in China.570 The volume of the Soviet aid 
to China was so large that even after the Sino-Soviet split in 1956, according to Christopher 
Howe, ‘[d]uring the 1960s, the [Chinese] economy was still completing and absorbing the 
Soviet projects started between 1953 and 1959 and there were few resources for new 
developments.’ 571  In addition, the Soviet aid to China’s cultural and human capital 
development was significant and took an important place in Chinese development.572  
 
For instance, as a result of an extensive and intense programme of the scientific cooperation 
in high technologies between the two countries in the 1950s573 and after 10 years after its 
establishment, the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) launched the Institute of Computing 
Technology on 17 May 1959:574 
 
Overall, the Soviet Union played a very important role in transferring 
computing technology that the Chinese could not develop on their own. The 
Soviet Union provided all technical drawings and data, as well as key 
electronic components, and parts for the early computers. In addition, Soviet 
experts guided test modeling and the establishment of the Chinese research 
institute.575 
 
 As also acknowledged in this Chinese research:  
 
Soviet experts helped the CAS to establish more than 40 labs or research 
groups and made important contribution in such fields as atomic energy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
570 Zhang, 122-44. 
571 Howe, Christopher, 1978, China's Economy, A Basic Guide, New York, Basic Books Inc. Publishers, 64; 
hereafter referred as Howe. 
572 Insun, Zhao, 2003, Ekonomicheskaya pomoshch Sovietskogo Souyza Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublike v 1949-
1959 gg (Economic Aid of the Soviet Union to People's Republic of China in 1949-1959), PhD dissertation in 
History, Moscow Automobile and Road Construction State Technical University, (MADI); retrieved on 
05.06.2018 from the Web, http://www.dissercat.com/content/ekonomicheskaya-pomoshch-sovetskogo-soyuza-
kitaiskoi-narodnoi-respublike-v-1949-1959-gg. 
573 Zhang, 131-4. 
574 Ibid., 134. 
575 Ibid. 
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physics, computing technology and mathematics, and chemistry and applied 
chemistry. Lanthanon and other rare elements, electronics, precision optical 
instruments, mechanics research, oceanography, and comprehensive survey 
equipment also were supplied by the Soviet government. To varying degrees, 
specialists from the USSR provided aid to other fields such as astronomy, 
automation, electrotechnology, and organic chemistry.576 
 
According to Howe, the SAS instructed the CAS in 1953 that they allocated 2/3rds of the 
resources to applied projects and 1/3rd - to basic research.577  The applied projects were 
mainly requests from the ministries.578 Overall, the Soviet contribution to China was first in 
establishing the system followed by the concrete aid in science planning, and then education 
and training, including access to Dubna, etc.579 The Chinese were also very impressed by the 
Gagarin’s feat which as ‘an impact by example,’ spurred them on, as emphasised by Howe.580 
 
Thus, the current scientific and technological successes of the People’s Republic of China 
are in many institutional ways grounded in the Soviet assistance of the 1950s. Furthermore, 
in developing its current The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which involves an 
unprecedented and growing number of the countries, China follows the Soviet example in 
placing research as an essential piece of its international cooperation.581   
 
In the universe of science, in the realm of unbounded discussions and free exchange of 
ideas, academic freedom and travelling are essential. In contrast to the political and social 
environment, Soviet scientists were enjoying the benefits of freedom of speech and were 
allowed to travel abroad to a much greater extent than their ordinary compatriots. In the 
library and on the bookshelves of the Cavendish laboratory in Cambridge one can find out 
plenty of the scientific publications which unconditionally demonstrate that the Iron Curtain 
was not an obstacle for both foreign and Soviet scientists to write and publish the articles in 
journals across both sides of the Iron Curtain as well as to travel for work and conferences 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
576 Ibid., 142. 
577 Howe, 2019. 
578 Ibid. 
579 Ibid. 
580 Ibid. 
581 ‘The University Alliance of the Silk Road (UASR) [was] established in 2015 and now [is] claiming to involve 
150 universities across 38 countries,’ Baker, Simon, 2019, Is China’s Belt and Road Initiative Boosting 
Academic Links?, 14 May, The Times Higher Education; retrieved on 14.05.2019 from the Web, 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-boosting-academic-
links?utm_source=THE+Website+Users&utm_campaign=6aa32c4b8c-
EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_05_13_01_59&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_daa7e51487-6aa32c4b8c-
62116905. 
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from the West to the Soviet Union, and vice versa. Many of the articles were not only 
published but also written by scientists while being physically abroad.582  
 
One can trace these various personal interactions in any field of science of that time and 
beyond in multiple journals’ articles, book, and interviews, including those chosen for this 
thesis. This phenomenon could even find its reflection as a separate subject of academic 
literature.583 Thus, in the reality of the Iron Curtain, the existence of the restrictions was not 
a crucial factor in the free exchange of information and, more importantly, new knowledge. 
 
The fall of the Iron Curtain revealed that most of those around not less than 150,000 Soviet 
and post-Soviet scientists584 emigrated in the period from 1991 to hitherto have been 
extremely adoptive to working in the foreign environment in terms of the content of their 
research after having overcome certain difficulties of cognitive, methodological and social 
character.585 It also revealed that the Iron Curtain had been erected from its both sides. It 
often occurred that ‘[…] many of the results published in Russian were repeatedly 
‘rediscovered’ abroad without the references to the Russian publications mostly not 
intentionally but due to ignorance.’586 Nonetheless, the significant number of the Soviet 
scientists in immigration demonstrated that the Soviet science and education base was in 
unity with the global development, like Khmelnitskii, mentioned in the methodology section, 
or Paltashev.  
 
This unity is underpinned by education. Without studying fundamental disciplines, the 
development of S&T is impossible which makes education, in particular in high school, a 
critical element of modern development. As outlined by Paltashev,  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
582 Joffe, Abram, 1956, Heat Transfer in Semiconductors, Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Electron Transport in Metal and Solids, Canadian Journal of Physics, 1342; 
    Shoenberg, David, 1938, Superconductivity, Cambridge University Press, the preface is written in February 
1938 at the Institute for Physical Problems, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow, X;  
    Landau, Lev and Lifshitz, Efim, 1958, Institute of Physical Problems, USSR Academy of Sciences, Quantum 
Mechanics: Non-relativistic Theory, Pergamon Press, London  - Paris; 
     2nd General Conference, 1972, European Physical Society, Taylor & Francis Ltd; 
     Shoenberg, David, 1986, Magnitnye Ostsylliatsyi v Metallakh (Magnetic Oscillations in Metals), Mir, 
Moscow. 
583 Byrnes, Robert F., 1976, Soviet-American Academic Exchanges, 1958-1975, Indiana University Press. 
584 Prostakov, Sergey, 2013, S nachala 1990-ikh iz Rossii uekhalo 150 tychiach uchenykh (Since the Beginning 
of the 1990s 150 Thousand of Scientists Have Left Russia), 16 August, Russkaya Planeta; retrieved on 
13.06.2017 from the Web, http://rusplt.ru/fact/s-nachala-1990h-iz-rossii-uehalo-150-tyisyach-uchenyih.html.  
585 Zukerman, A., M., 1998, Integratsia rossiyskikh uchenykh v mirovuu nauku, ikh adaptatsia k usloviam raboty 
v SShA, 1990-e gody (Integration of Russian Scientists into the Global Science, Their Adaptation to Working 
Conditions in the USA, the 1990s, IIET RAN, Godichnaya nauchnaya konferentsia 1998, IIET RAN 1999, 259-
62; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, http://www.ihst.ru/projects/sohist/papers/tsuk98i.htm.  
586 Ibid., 259. 
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The knowledge in science and technology is required in global industry, and 
that is why post-Soviet specialists are still demanded there as, unlike for 
instance in India and China before, the fundamental disciplines, to begin with, 
were studied in Soviet high school properly. Watching the destruction of this 
kind of education in the post-Soviet space including Russia and Kazakhstan is 
sad, however, in the today’s Russia, they have tried to reverse the process.587 
 
According to Paltashev, physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology, mechanics and other 
fundamental disciplines are going, at any rate, to underpin global development in the large 
hierarchically structured pyramid of human knowledge making, in his view, the current 
debate around the development of education groundless. This defined the easiness with which 
Soviet scientists integrated abroad and which can be additionally illustrated at the two 
following examples out of so many more available.  
 
Firstly, it is the Google, Inc., an Internet giant, ranked as the 4th biggest company by market 
capitalisation by the Financial Times Global 500 Index (2015).588 One of the Google’s 
founders, Sergey Brin, and his parents (who were mathematicians and influenced him a lot) 
were émigré from the Soviet Union. Moreover, the parents, graduates of the MSU Faculty 
of Mechanics and Mathematics, independently on their attitude towards the Soviet 
Union, brought him up as ‘a successful American by the canons of the Soviet Scientific 
school.’589  
 
Secondly, it is the success of Israel as a global leader in terms of its GDP allocations on 
R&D (Chapter 4). Israel’s S&T achievements would have been impossible if not for 1.03 
million590 of the émigré from the USSR, as recognised in an official Israeli report: ‘We can 
therefore conclude that the ‘technological revolution’ of the 1990s, the rapid growth of the 
GDP and the impressive expansion of the hi-tech industry, resulting in Israel’s emergence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587 Paltashev. 
FT 500, 2015, The Financial Times; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, https://www.ft.com/ft500.   
589 Birger, Pyotr, 2014, 10 Samykh Vliatel’nykh Biznesmenov Kremnievoi Doliny Rodom iz SSSR (10 of the Most 
Influential Businessmen of the Silicon Valley Have Been Originally from the USSR), 26 February, Slon 
Magazine; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, https://republic.ru/biz/1062129/.     
590 Maltz, Judy, 2015, How the Russians Changed Israel, One, Two, Three, Four – We Opened Up the Iron 
Door, The Haaretz; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.haaretz.com/st/c/prod/eng/25yrs_russ_img/.  
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as a developed, post industrial country by the end of the decade, is definitively identified by 
many Israelis as the result of the ‘aliyah wave’ of that same decade.’591    
 
Although in its foundation Soviet science was organised as a universal phenomenon, it 
nonetheless revealed some cultural specifics related to Soviet social life. According to 
Alexander Migdal, a Soviet and American theoretical physicist: 
 
When I moved here [the US], my productivity has grown up. However, I 
know that a majority of the ideas, which I keep developing here, were born 
there, in ‘food queues’ [of the USSR].592 All, what we, theoreticians, need is 
a pencil and a bit of paper plus an opportunity to discuss own ideas with 
colleagues. We used to have it all in the Landau Institute: indeed I have 
never seen a better place to work than our institute in the early 70s.593 
   
Alexander Migdal is known for his contributions to the theory of critical phenomena, 
quantum chromodynamics and conformal field theory; he was head of computer physics 
laboratory at the SAS, who moved from the Landau Institute of Theoretical Physics in 
Moscow to Princeton University in the late 1980s.  
 
The unity of the scientific world beyond the Iron Curtain was best expressed in scientific 
publishing as shown in subsection 4.2.3 above. 
 
Cross-publishing with foreign authors was not an unusual thing, and the Soviet journals 
occupied their solid and tangible niche in the global scientific network. It was primarily the 
case for those publications of those Soviet breakthroughs which had a serious worldwide 
impact for the development of science and technology. For example, it is the invention of 
laser, initially published in Russian in an article under the title in English of Application of 
Molecular Beams for Radiospectroscopic Study of Molecular Rotational Spectra by N.G. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
591 Khanin, Vladimir (Ze’ev), 2010, Aliyah from the Former Soviet Union, Contribution to the National Security 
Balance, Position paper, presented on the behalf of the Israeli Ministry of Immigrant Absorptions to the 10th 
Annual Herzliya, Conference Balance of Israeli National Security, February, Jerusalem, 10, the emphasis is as 
stated in the original; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.herzliyaconference.org/_Uploads/3046Aliyah.pdf.  
592 It is worth noting that food queues returned in Moscow in the middle of Perestroika campaign in 1988-9 
whereas food rationing in the USSR was abandoned in 1947, and in Britain, for example, in 1954. 
593 Pravda, 19 December 1993, cited from Mendkovich, Nikita, 2007, Nauka v SSSR i Rossii (Science in the 
USSR and Russia), 04.09, Poliarnaya Zvezda; retrieved on 19.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://zvezda.ru/economics/2007/09/04/nauka_ross.htm#9. 
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Basov and A.M. Prokhorov, at the ZhETF in 1954.594 It was translated into English by 
Morris D. Friedman, Inc. for NASA as Use of Molecular Beams for the Radio-
Spectroscopic Study of the Rotational Spectra of Molecules.595 One can further, using the 
Google scholar online service, search both titles of the article to find out 188 citations for 
this first Soviet translation by the JETP, 596  and 119 for a slightly different NASA 
translation.597 A simple Google search produces 1,370,000 results.598  Among the citations, 
there is a plenty of research up-to-date in various disciplines such as physics,599 medicine,600 
as well as engineering601 and others.  At the same time, a Google scholar search for the 
names of Basov and Prokhorov names together produces in terms of the citations 3,310 
results.602  
 
An identical search on the name of Alferov produces 18,800 results,603 and his various 
articles on semiconductor heterostructures, for whose discovery Zhores Alferov received 
the Nobel Prize in Physics in 2000,604 produces 6,500 results605 with hundreds of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594 Basov, N. G. and Prokhorov A. M., 1954, Primenenie Molekuliarnykh Puchkov Dlia 
Radiospektroskopicheskogo Izuchenia Vrashchatel'nykh Spektrov Molekul (Application of Molecular Beams for 
Radiospectroscopic Study of Molecular Rotational Spectra), v.27, no. 4 (10), ZhETF, 431-8.  
595 Translation Number B105, Morris D. Friedman, Inc, NASA Library; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://ia600302.us.archive.org/9/items/nasa_techdoc_19880069071/19880069071.pdf.  
596 A Google Scholar search; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
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597 A Google Scholar search; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
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Spectroscopic+Study+of+the+Rotational+Spectra+of+Molecules&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5.  
598 A Google search; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
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599 Slighter, Charles P., 1996, Principles of Magnetic Resonance, Corrected 3d Printing, Springer; retrieved on 
11.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=jF3xCAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA2&ots=nYlR9PoezT&sig=
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600 (Ed.) Bogdan Allemann I., Goldberg D.J., 2011, Basics in Dermatological Laser Applications, Basel, Karger 
AG; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, https://www.karger.com/Book/Toc/255134.  
601 Gambling, W., A., 1975, Laser and Optical Electronics, Radio and Electronic Engineer, Vol. 45, Issue 10, 
October, 537-42; retrieved on 11.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/5269116/?reload=true.  
602 A Google Scholar Search; retrieved on 12.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?as_sdt=1,5&q=basov+prokhorov&hl=en.  
603 A Google Scholar Search; retrieved on 12.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=alferov+&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=1%2C5.  
604 Alferov. 
605 A Google Scholar Search; retrieved on 14.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=alferov+semiconductor+heterostructure+&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=1%2C
5.  
	   159	  
citations in many disciplines, such as applied physics,606 chemistry,607 electronics,608 and 
others. 
 
The same is relevant for many other Soviet advances. This illustrates the unity of the world 
science in which the Soviet publications keep holding a significant and well-deserved 
position.  
   
Overall, publishing of scientific and popular-science literature in the Soviet Union reached 
the record of the 2,451 titles with the total numbers of 83,2 million copies in 1981, after 
having grown consistently through all the Soviet period to reach, for example, 13 million 
copies in 1940 and 70 million copies annually in 1970-5.609 All this printing was highly 
demanded and purchased by Soviet citizens mostly through subscription.  
 
By the mid-1980s the Soviet Union was replaced from being the second global scientific 
contributor in terms of journal publications to hold the fourth global position behind the US, 
the UK and Germany with 774,700, 184,800 and 170,700 respectively with the number of 
publications on science reached 164,200.610 It was followed by the sharp decrease to 
137,400 by the early 1990s.611 One can see how the Perestroika campaign of Mikhail 
Gorbachev was accompanied by this significant decline in the numbers of research and 
publications.  
 
As mentioned above, in the hierarchical pyramid of knowledge in science and technology, 
the development is achieved through a sequential accumulation of knowledge. This would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606 Mimura,Takashi, Hiyamizu, Satoshi, Fujii, Toshio, and  Nanbu, Kazuo, 1980, A New Field-Effect Transistor 
with Selectively Doped GaAs/n-AlxGa1-xAs Heterojunctions, Vol. 19, Number 5, Japanese Journal of Applied 
Physics; retrieved on 14.06.2017 from the Web, http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1143/JJAP.19.L225/meta.  
607 Zhang, Jinshui, Zhang, Mingwen, Sun, Rui-Qing, and Wang, Xinchen, 2012, A Facile Band Alignment of 
Polymeric Carbon Nitride Semiconductors to Construct Isotype Heterojunctions, Angwendte Chemie, 7 Sept., 
Volume 124, Issue 40, 10292–6; retrieved on 14.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/ange.201205333/full.  
608 Grundmann, Marius (Ed.), 2002, Nano-Optoelectronics: Concepts, Physics and Devices, Springer, Berlin; 
retrieved on 14.06.2017 from the Web, https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=o-
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609 Vaganov, A., 2007, Nuzhna li Nauka dlya Populiarizatsii Nauki (Whether Science is Needed for 
Popularisation of Science), 7, Nauka i Zhizn’; retrieved on 13.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.nkj.ru/archive/articles/11016/; hereafter referred to as NKJ.   
610  Marshakova-Shaikevich, I., 1995, Vklad Rossii v razvitie nauki (The Russian Contribution to Development of 
Science), Yanus, Moscow, 77-8; retrieved on 19.06.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.rfbr.ru/rffi/ru/books/o_62063#19.  
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be analysed in the next section at some examples of Soviet contribution to the world’s 
development.  
 
5.2                           Soviet Contribution to Global Science and Technology  
 
Modern global development is driven by science-induced technology, which has been 
transforming human lives at an unprecedented rate. The semiconductor industry is a stark 
example of science-induced technology.  It shows, on the one hand, how research driven by 
curiosity transforms global life, and on the other, it illustrates the Soviet contribution to this 
kind of transformation.  
 
Firstly, according to the statistics of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), 
‘representing US leadership in semiconductor manufacturing, design, and research,’612 in 
2015 global semiconductor industry sales totalled USD335.2 billion.613  
 
Secondly, something for which there was no apparent or obvious demand in economic 
terms as outlined by Saxena,  
 
was discovered purely due to inherent curiosity for how electrons behaved 
in semiconducting materials. This is made tangible in the form of a 
transistor, which is a semiconductor device and is the fundamental building 
block of all modern electronics. In this particular example, the 
understanding of the principles of electrical conductivity unveiled the 
foundations of the electronic components and systems which are now 
pervasive in all forms of human activity.  This means, for instance, that the 
global capitalisation of the Internet and digital industry would have been 
unachievable if not for some particular advances in science and engineering, 
which are, meanwhile, perceived as granted or imminent today.614  
 
Meanwhile, some Soviet scientific and technological advances contributed significantly to 
the development of this industry. Thus, the discovery of laser technology by Nikolay 	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Basov615 and Aleksandr Prokhorov616 in the Soviet Union and Charles Townes617 in the US 
in the 1950s, stressed out by Tsironis in chapter 3, as well as the invention of semiconductor 
junctions in 1927 by Oleg Losev618 in the Soviet Union (25 years prior to the invention of 
the transistor), determined the development of the telecommunications and computer 
industry of today. The introduction of semiconductors created a lateral dimension in the 
industrial economy of scale after 1960 and replaced the industrial application of the 
previous cumbersome computer and expensive prototypes based on vacuum tubes.  
 
The Soviet Union won nine Nobel prizes in Physics, in areas such as the discovery of lasers 
or semiconductor heterostructures which underpin the basis of the global modern economic 
growth and wellbeing. The Nobel Prize is a blunt instrument to evaluate the successes of 
science and it does not fully comprehend the richness of scientific research, however, it is 
nonetheless indicative. As Hermann Grimmeiss of the Royal Swedish Academy of 
Sciences, which awards Nobel prizes, said about Soviet contribution of the discovery of the 
hetero-structures by Zhores Alferov:619 ‘Without Alferov, it would not be possible to 
transfer all the information from satellites down to the Earth or to have so many telephone 
lines between cities.’620   
 
According to Paltashev, the modern industry of the mobile telecommunications and devices 
as a part of the global business and social revolution is the development of the Hz 
transmission devices of the early 1960s used for military and satellite purposes. The basic 
research and discovery of semiconductor heterostructures by Zhores Alferov in the USSR of 
the 1960s,621 followed by the development of technology in decreasing the sizes of the 
devices in parallel to the application of the high-frequency range, established the foundation 
which allowed the boom of the mobile telecommunications industry from the 1990s.622 
Meanwhile, as outlined by Kaul in chapter 3, Alferov’s research among some others define 
the SuperOx superconducting cable technology as well. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
615 Basov. 
616 Prokhorov. 
617 Townes.    
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Moreover, today’s global functioning of the telecommunications industry would be 
impossible without Soviet advances in other areas of science. Many of the elements and 
materials that are produced from the land of Russia and Kazakhstan due to the research of 
Soviet geology are critical for the world’s development: firstly, in terms of only for global 
energy supply as, for instance, in oil and gas industry; and, secondly, as inseparable parts of 
the global technological supply chains. According to Saxena in chapter 3, materials 
invented in the Soviet Union, including Kazakhstan, constitute an integral part of the 
modern global electronics industry. For instance, the example of the element erbium, 
produced in Kazakhstan, is indicative as its small volumes are especially important for 
optical fibre communications apart from being used in medical laser and other 
technologies.623  
 
Such broad-ranging input into global production is closely linked to the Soviet scientific, 
technical and educational development, and the development of the Soviet geology and 
mining industry, which required preparation of specialists, development of the scientific 
method of prospecting and beneficiating ores and then refining these to the level required 
for use in technical products.  Prior to the Soviet era, those advances of the mineral 
resources in Central Asia and Siberia were either unknown or weakly exploited mainly as 
raw commodities. This input into technological production is not likely to be noticed by the 
end consumer and thus remains uncelebrated, while a radio or TV set containing these 
components is what is recognised as a technological triumph. 
 
To continue the list, the scientists interviewed for the thesis emphasised the following 
contributions of the Soviet science and technology in their fields and beyond. 
 
Vasiliev outlined the three following kinds of the Soviet contributions, e.g. on the largest 
scale they were the first humans in space and the first industrial reactor in nuclear energy; on 
a smaller scale – being nevertheless very important – the discoveries of superfluidity, laser, 
gravitational waves, a range of new elements, like dubnium named after Dubna [an academic 
city]; and that of metamaterials by [Viktor] Veselago,624 still alive,625 whose breakthrough is 
very underrated (as mentioned by Tsironis below as well). Regarding the discoveries of the 	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624 Veselago, Victor G., 1967, The Electrodynamics of Substances with Simultaneously Negative Values of ε 
and µ, Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk (Advances of Physical Sciences), July, Volume 92, Number 3. Retrieved on 
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lower levels, Vasiliev outlined superconductivity in metallic hydrogen under the room 
temperatures and high pressure applied which was predicted a long time ago, and which was 
discovered by [Mikhail] Eremets [and Alexander Drozdov]626 recently. This opens a room for 
a large filed of practical applications in the energy transportation and is what [Andrey] Kaul is 
busy with, as pointed out by Vasiliev. Meanwhile, he concluded with the statement that, in his 
view, the Soviet Union was an important element of the global balance required for 
development.627 
 
Among the Soviet contributions to global technological development, Kaul emphasised 
Kapitsa's superfluidity of helium, Basov's laser, Alferov's diodes, and electrochemical 
microplasma oxidation at the example of SuperOx. He noted that many Soviet and Russian 
discoveries were developed in the West, and very often the results were used and patented 
abroad by someone else, like in the examples of a method of obtaining electrochemical 
coatings under very high voltage, called microplasma coating, and of the technology of 
Atomic Layer Deposition (ALD) which was later developed in Finland. However, many more 
could not develop at all due to the lack of the publications in foreign journals and, more 
importantly, due to ‘the Achilles’ heel of the Soviet/Russian science’ which was the poor 
instrumentation provision, rooted in the weak instrumentation construction industry, outlined 
the chemist.628 
 
Tsironis has had an affiliation with MISIS629 for a few last years and collaborated with a 
strong experimental group there that focuses on low-temperature physics and applications 
and has discovered a new metamaterial for an ultra-efficient laser.630 He emphasised the 
basic concept of metamaterials in optics with the negative index of refraction which was 
first formulated by Viktor Veselago631 in 1967-8. By 2000 it was developed by Sir John 
Pendry632 of the Imperial College633 in London, continued Tsironis. This opens up room for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
626 Eremets, Mikhail, and Drozdov, Alex, 2015, Superconductivity for Siberia, 24 December, Nautilus; retrieved 
on 14.06.2018 from the Web, http://nautil.us/issue/31/stress/superconductivity-for-siberia. 
627 Vasiliev. 
628 Kaul. 
629 MISIS. 
630 Shramkova, O.V., Tsironis G.P., 2017, Nonreciprocal nonlinear wave scattering by loss compensated active 
hyperbolic structures, Scientific Reports, Nature, 22.02.; retrieved on 13.03.2017 from the Web: 
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep42919.epdf?author_access_token=Gxb3YCSGOItjzUvX-
mrMu9RgN0jAjWel9jnR3ZoTv0P5wSocOROzqHnczSe9mibdDhk6ainEMhW8hGNd7q7v2zvCTXQKTH1t0B
p0ORadQaond1L_eVRrGLALdtA3jqjs; hereafter referred to as Shramkova/Tsironis.  
631 Veselago, Victor G., 1967, The Electrodynamics of Substances with Simultaneously Negative Values of ε 
and µ, Uspekhi Fizicheskikh Nauk (Advances of Physical Sciences), July, Volume 92, Number 3. Retrieved on 
28.02.2017 from the Web: http://ufn.ru/ufn67/ufn67_7/Russian/r677e.pdf.  
632 Pendry, John, 2000, Negative Refraction Makes a Perfect Lens, Physical Review Letters, 85 (18). 
	   164	  
the future development of optics and beyond as metamaterials are materials engineered to 
have properties that have not yet been found in nature, and they are an integral part of the 
current modern industrial revolution.634 
 
According to him, Veselago proposed the specific way of how this happened, and David 
Smith showed it was possible.635 This field skyrocketed in the 2000s when many of the 
problems and many of engineering aspects were solved. Nowadays, this field is being 
driven to a smaller scale when these metamaterials would also have quantum properties. As 
outlined by Tsironis, the whole field is in the quantum realm now. In his view, this idea will 
determine new types of approaches and will possibly lead to new quantum forms of engines 
and, definitely, quantum computers and, perhaps – down the line – to new quantum 
equipment.636  
 
Meanwhile, if this technology works, it has a potential to affect the technology world 
significantly, assumed the scientist. He outlined that many of these basic techniques for 
cooling and refrigeration associated with this development came from Cambridge starting 
also with Kapitsa. Veselago’s concept of metamaterials is a vivid example of how one 
intellectual idea, belonging to a Soviet scientist in this particular case, may form a new 
technological and, in future, industrial reality. This idea once it first appeared, was just a 
theory, however, in 30 years, it was proved, as envisaged by Tsironis.637  
 
In Chitre’s field, the Soviet Union created advanced schools which influenced the 
development of astronomy, especially from the 1960s onward with such names as Zel’dovich 
mentioned in chapter 3 and [Victor] Ambartsumian638 among some others. According to 
Chitre, he is a great admirer of Zel’dovich who developed some fundamental thoughts:  
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Essentially the concept is that the energy source of the celestial object, like 
of a sun. Sun at the centre is the huge temperature of 15 million degrees, so 
thermal energy is there. Nuclear energy is there. Sun is rotating. The 
rotational energy is there. Sun has magnetic fields, so magnetic energy is 
there. They are huge objects, so the energy contained is large. These are all 
intrinsic energies.639 
 
As outlined by Chitre, Zel’dovich and his school brought the idea that in a compact object 
like a neutron star, its gravitational potential is very deep. It attracts matter from outside, so 
when that matter falls into this deep gravitational potential web, it is an extreme link in the 
resource. It is not internal to the body, but neutron star is there. It provides the gravitational 
potential, and the matter falling gets heated, concluded the astrophysicist.640 
 
Littlewood worked closely with Soviet scientists over a long period and emphasised that ‘the 
quality of Soviet science in [his] field was absolutely unparalleled.’ According to him, they 
were world-leading in many areas, and one of the reasons they were very good at that was that 
they were being bankrolled for particular purposes broadly to support Soviet technology 
efforts. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union could never make a consumer product, in his view. The 
problem always seemed to him at least is that the flexibility of the market economy means 
that people can find markets for technologies which are unexpected that drive things.641  
 
According to Littlewood, in terms of innovation, a very close connexion between the market, 
between products and other things is desirable, e.g. in a well-defined product like a TV set or 
a tank.642 In the Soviet Union, technology was clearly there and was clearly strong. In his 
view, the problems of the Soviet economy were political and not scientific.643 Meanwhile, 
assessing the Soviet science and technology contribution to global technological 
development, Littlewood commented as follows:  
 
I think if you go back to the very fundamentals, taking my own field, 
condensed matter physics, probably a huge fraction of leading scientists who 
invented that field were Soviet scientists working off one of the very 	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fundamental levels. [Apart from] Kapitsa there were many others, Landau, of 
course, and many of them who later moved to the West, Kartsov, Gor’kov, 
people like Keldysh, and so all of that generation beginning in the 30s and 
going through to the 50s and 60s provided some of the founding principles of 
modern science in that area.644 
 
Their breakthroughs did not necessarily drive the technology development. Littlewood thinks 
that much of what is done in science is to develop tools and the tools are used for something 
else, and things build on top of each other. Meanwhile, in terms of building on the ideas about 
how materials work, the methods that one could use, the mathematics one could do, the whole 
idea of topics which connected to radio electronics and radio engineering, fundamental 
understanding of process at that level, and of course, all of them play into semiconductor 
technology and play into superconductors, optics and many things, outlined the scientist.645 
 
Thus, nanoscience, materials science, in Littlewood’s account, did not exist in 1920.646 There 
were times when scientific communication between the West and the Soviet Union was rather 
weak, and there were places where actually developments were happening in the Soviet 
Union ahead of where they were happening in the West, but the lack of communication meant 
actually that often Western scientists did not know what was going on and discovered about it 
later, in his view: ‘This was not research which was necessarily secret, it was just that in a day 
without the Internet. Journals were published in Russian. It took six months for them to get 
translated into English, so [that] communities would be separated.’647 Littlewood remembered 
that in the early 80s at Bell Lab, where there were groups of Soviet scientists coming and 
visiting the West, ‘and the opportunity for [him] to talk to some of these giants was 
tremendous.’648 For instance, there were powerful both the Landau and St. Petersburg schools 
in the Soviet Union which were important for global science, as he concluded.649  
 
Meanwhile, the scientific figure of Paltashev represents this St. Petersburg’s school. In his 
account, three main Soviet S&T contributions in global development are as follows:  
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Firstly, it is nuclear physics and nuclear energy technology, including 
nuclear synthesis technology, and available globally only in two regions, 
Europe and Russia, with the dominance of the latter. Secondly, it is missile 
technology and rocket construction which have defined the development of 
the overall world’s rocket missile technics and fuel. Thirdly, it is a 
technology of new material design and new materials which both remain 
mostly unknown globally so far due to the military character of the 
technology.650  
 
Paltashev provided an example of the interconnection of the modern technology chains 
involving Soviet/Russian research. In Saint Petersburg a Polytech University’s start-up, 
CML (CompMechLab),651 he is involved with, is modelling and re-designing car-makes, 
and car-crashing testing for many global car giants, including most of those of the German 
car industry, Porsche in particular, as well as Tesla and some other companies in the US. 
Using the technology of ‘the digital twin,’ they are able both to model a car with all the 
components virtually and to plan its further production digitally. It is the Industry 4.0 
concept. This engineering is made at the university’s department of the applied mathematics 
and is undoable without fundamental science, i.e. mathematics and physics of materials in 
this case. There they have developed their mathematical algorithms and instruments which 
once conjured with all the traditional car making engineering allows a digital reproduction 
of the full project design, modelling and production cycle. This is unique for the industry.  
Unlike in the electronic industry which was digitalised in the 1990s, this is how 
digitalisation works in chemistry and other industries up to date, according to Paltashev.652   
 
Some other examples below out of many can also demonstrate the contribution of the Soviet 
scientists to the global social, technological and industrial development. 
 
The continuing expansion of the modern digital reality in all its countless applications of the 
technological solutions is based on the rocket and satellite industry, pioneered and 
developed in the USSR, as a constituent technological foundation for the development of 
computing and telecommunications. This was named by Lonzarich as ‘a monumental 
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contribution not only to the history of civilization, but that of life on earth itself’653 and 
explained by him as follows:  
 
The Soviet Union will be remembered for millennia for pioneering this area, 
long after the world has forgotten the political and economic history of the 
period. No nation will ever win the space race, since it is endless, but one 
Nation will be remembered for having started it.654	   
 
In terms of economy of scale, this industry forms not only the industrial sector of the 
various productions but also the post-industrial sectors of the global, regional and local 
service economies, including banking, tourism, trade, shipping or many others. These 
Soviet scientific and technological breakthroughs massively underpin the contemporary 
global cultural dimension of the Internet, the television industry, cinema, popular music, 
mass media, and social networks. In an increasingly enlarging diapason, the digital 
development affects such important basic interconnected human activities as research, 
education, and healthcare. 
 
While either driving a car, a train, a ship or a plane, or making telephone calls, or traveling, 
or ordering food, or booking a Holiday, or studying, or even being sick almost every woman 
and man on Earth becomes progressively dependent in nearly any activity of her/his on 
various devices or gadgets. Computers and telecommunications fulfil many of people’s 
needs as well as serve as the foundation of the modern technological development in the era 
of the communication revolution.  
 
The current American leadership in space exploration is literally driven by the particular 
Soviet achievement in the form of the rocket engine RD-180, ‘which powers the first stage 
of the Atlas V, [and] has enjoyed outstanding technical performance since its introduction in 
the short-lived Atlas III line in 2000. No domestic rocket engine that uses liquid oxygen 
(LOX) and kerosene propellants has anywhere near the same performance,’655 as written in 
The Space Review. This engine is the development of the RD-170 which was used in the 
launch of the Buran (Snowstorm, or Blizzard) Soviet reusable spacecraft shuttle in 1988 in 
the expendable Energiya (Energy) rocket, a class of super-heavy launch vehicle.  	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654 Lonzarich, Gilbert, 2019, Chokan’s Thesis – Suggestions from Gil [Lonzarich], 9 May, University of 
Cambridge. 
655 Foust, Jeff, 2014, Replacing the RD-180, May 12, The Space Review; retrieved on 03.08.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2512/1.  
	   169	  
 
Brian Harvey wrote, that ‘[t]he last Soviet deep space mission had been stunning. Two 
spaceships had been sent to Venus, where probes had already landed on the planet, drilling 
and analyzing its rocks, while other probes had made radars maps,’656 and that ‘the launch 
of the most powerful rocket in the world, the Energiya’657 was so impressive that ‘[a] CIA 
briefing conceded that the Soviet Union now had the means to send people to Mars.’658 By 
the end of the 1980s, the Soviet leadership in the space race was recognised by the US in the 
1986 Jane’s Spaceflight Directory 453-page report on the development of the space 
programmes in both nations.659 According to its editor Reginald Turnill, ‘The Soviets are so 
far ahead of the US in space experience that they are almost out of sight.’660 
 
Meanwhile, the advances of the Soviet S&T in the field of nuclear energy, mentioned by 
Paltashev, contributes to the global balance of energy, which so notably defines the realm of 
the world’s economy and geopolitics. The innovation and technology of the production of 
commercial electricity, a market commodity, from nuclear power, became possible with the 
construction of the first grid-connected nuclear power station in Obninsk, the USSR, in 
1954. 661  An application of this technology in the form of the first nuclear-powered 
icebreaking surface ship in the USSR, The Lenin,662 in 1957-9 opened the Arctic for year-
around naval navigation on the Northeast Passage and made exploration of the significant 
regional reserves of natural resources possible for future global development. 
 
Another example is the US, which is the world’s largest producer of commercial nuclear 
power to generate more 30 per cent of the total global nuclear energy.663 In 2012 more than 
28 per cent of the uranium supply came from the post-Soviet countries of Russia (13%), 
Kazakhstan (11%), Uzbekistan (4%) and Ukraine (included into the category of four 
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countries of 3%),664 where this industry was developed in the Soviet time. Combined, the 
supply from these four post-Soviet countries was the largest source of uranium for the US. 
 
The growing importance of the achievements of Soviet geology mentioned above is visible 
through the prism of the current industrial revolution in all its aspects. For instance, a 
number of metals are crucial components of various high-tech technologies, including the 
production of batteries. Today half of the global demand for cobalt is coming from the 
production of the electric vehicles, including Tesla, and it is estimated of 103,500 tonnes 
with the supply of 104,000 tonnes in 2016, with Congo being a major supplier.665 This 
situation promises to bring a deficit for cobalt and restricts the growing expansion of the 
battery usages. Meanwhile, Russia and Kazakhstan produce 6,000666 and 300 tonnes667 of 
cobalt per annum respectively for their industry and have a serious potential to increase the 
production from the reserves discovered due to development of Soviet geology. This 
indicates the lasting contribution and a future possible impact of one of the fields of Soviet 
science, geology, on the pace of the energy revolution, as both of the countries have all the 
periodic table in their bowels of the earth.  
 
Rare earth metals, which are abundant in both Russia and Kazakhstan,668 become of the 
increasingly growing significance, as they are the most crucial parts of the new high-tech 
industries. The BBC report states the following:  
 
[The] rare earth metals along with minor metals such as lithium and 
tantalum are now just as important as the traditional base metals and 
precious metals. ‘The colour red on a MacBook Pro screen is made from 
europium; the colour green is because of a metal called terbium; touch 
screen technology relies on indium,’ explains David Abraham, author of a 
book called The Elements of Power. ‘A lot of these metals have only been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
664 The US relies on foreign uranium, enrichment services to fuel its nuclear power plant, 2013, 28 August, US 
Energy Information Administration; retrieved on 01.08.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12731.  
665 Hardy, Ian, 2017, Could You Cope with Smartphone Rationing?, BBC News, 13 June; retrieved on 
20.06.2017 from the Web, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-40248405; hereafter referred to as The Cobalt 
Report.  
666 Cobalt, World Mine Production, by the Country, Index Mundi; retrieved on 20.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/en/commodities/minerals/cobalt/cobalt_t8.html.  
667 Kazakhstan Cobalt Production By Year, United States Geological Survey (USGS) Minerals Resources 
Program, Index Mundi; retrieved on 21.06.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.indexmundi.com/minerals/?country=kz&product=cobalt&graph=production.  
668 Laumulin, Turar Muratbekovich, 1977, Redkometallonosnye struktury v geotektonogenakh Kazakhstana 
(Rare-Metalliferous Structures in Geotectonogens of Kazakhstan), The Institute of Geological Sciences, AN 
KazSSR, Alma-Ata, Nauka. 
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discovered in the past 100 years. We've had a long time to play with copper 
and iron. But we are just beginning to understand the power of these newer 
materials.’669 
 
An example of what role rare earth metal play in the energy revolution, defining such a 
field, among many, as superconductivity and how it is intertwined with the Soviet 
development is illustrated below in more detail at the example of a Russian company 
SuperOx, described in the joint Kaul’s and Molodyk’s interview in chapter 3. It will be 
followed by an example of the latest development in the Samsung TV set production by 
which would not be possible without Soviet fundamental research. 
  
5.2.1                             Two Examples of Soviet Scientific Contribution to Global  
                                     High-Technology Chains 
 
As pointed out by Molodyk in chapter 3, the SuperOx technology allows transportation of 
high volumes of energy within short and critical distances in aircraft, advanced high-tech 
connections and those parts of the electrical grids, which can be in proximity of residential 
arrays, as the technology is harmless and environmentally safe. As evident from the list of 
the clientele there, the technology is increasingly used in the global high-tech sector.   
 
A possible economic effect from the usage of this technology for preventing blackouts is 
difficult to overestimate. For instance, among multiple examples one can recall the blackout 
in India in 2012, which affected more than 600 million people670 and the Northeast blackout 
in the North America in 2003 with more than 50 million people affected,671 causing colossal 
economic losses in infrastructure, communications, power generation, water supply, 
transportation, healthcare and other various industries. Spreading of this technology has a 
potential to end industrial power outages and create a significant global economic effect.  
 
As seen from the interview’s data in chapter 3, the SuperOx technological development has 
occurred in the full accordance with the basic operational principles of science and 
engineering as envisaged by Bush, Kapitsa and the other scientists in this thesis. Firstly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
669 The Cobalt report. 
670 BBC News, 2012, Hundreds of Millions Without Power in India, BBC News, 12 July; retrieved on 
21.04.2017 from the Web http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-19060279.  
671 CBC, 2003, 2003: The Great North America Blackout, 14 August, The National, CBC Digital Archive; 
retrieved on 21.04.2017 from the Web http://www.cbc.ca/archives/entry/2003-the-great-north-america-blackout.  
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fundamental research and education at the MSU Faculty of Chemistry is the foundation and 
integral part of the process. Secondly, the latter is based in its primary functions on the 
indigenous scientific and engineering advances. Thirdly, the exogenous equipment and 
technology are not critical. Fourthly, the patent regime is not used in the production. Fifthly, 
the development of the technology occurred in Soviet non-market conditions whereas 
market conditions contributed to its emergence as an innovation. 
 
Although the example of SuperOx is unique, it should be viewed somewhat as a 
confirmation of a typical pattern, rather than an exemption, of how a scientific and 
technological core for new global supply chains is being formed, especially in the light of 
its criticality for both development and functionality of the energy sector. Meanwhile, the 
latter becomes a central, crucial element of the new industrial revolution. This company is 
an example of the relationship between educational and social policy to texture the 
appropriate environment for the development of human capital for scientific and 
engineering breakthroughs, leading to technology and innovations to form critical 
determinants of a new economy.   
 
Another example of the Soviet scientific contribution to global technology and innovation 
as mentioned above can be found in a market of consumer goods. In 2016 Samsung Corp. 
presented a TV’s technology of Quantum Dots (QD), which revolutionised TV image at a 
new level and which, in terms of technological leaps could be compared with the previous 
advances from CRT TVs (cathode ray tube) in black and white into coloured transmissions, 
and within the latter a transition from CRT, LCD (liquid crystal display), LED (light 
emitting diode), HD (high definition), 3D (three dimensions) to QD display technology. 
According to a BBC report, ‘… [q]uantum dots were officially discovered by Russian 
physicist Alexei Ekimov in the early 1980s and American chemist Louis E. Brus in 
1982.’672 Here is how the report describes the essence of the discovery: 
 
The two scientists found that breaking a material with semiconductor 
properties into nano-sized particles, particles that are slightly bigger than 
water molecules, brings out an entirely new property within the material. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
672 Three Quantum Dot Secrets That Have Kept Us Entertained for Centuries, 2016, BBC StoryWorks, 16 
December; retrieved on 10.01.2017 from the Web, http://www.bbc.com/storyworks/future/samsung-tvs-
quantum-leap/futuristic-solutions. While in the UK, the report can be retrieved from the Samsung Web Site as 
well, http://www.samsung.com/global/tv/news/Three-Quantum-Dot-Secrets.html.  
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They discovered the colour of the light emitted by each particle varied 
according to their sizes, making them capable of replicating all of the 
colours in the prism range. What caused this phenomenon was the change in 
the band gap energy, one of the most important properties of a 
semiconductor. 
 
This means, if the size of a quantum dot can be minutely adjusted, quantum 
dots can be used to create all the colours of the rainbow, perfectly.673 
 
The QD technology is an explicit example that development of high-tech, including that of 
consumer goods, is driven by scientific advances. Both of the scientists, whose discovery 
defines this product, back in the 1980s could not think of Samsung Electronics (which came 
into existence for such an industry only in 1990) to launch a new generation of TV sets on 
the market in 2016, and they could not anticipate such a discourse.  
 
It is especially true for Alexei Ekimov of the USSR, which was a planned economy and was 
so far away from free market conditions. It, nonetheless, has had a lasting effect on the 
global technology development through its scientific base.  Also, this discovery is quite a 
notable example out of millions of how satisfaction of a basic human quality, ‘the holy 
curiosity’ (Einstein),674 to grasp nature’s perfect functioning turns out to become of service 
for future generations of people worldwide, and for the global modern entertainment 
industry in this particular case.  
 
Thus, it is also crucial to note that these discoveries were born out of the pure pursuit of 
understanding natural phenomena and that they were not driven by a particular practical 
demand and were made possible by the science and social policy engineered in the Soviet 
Union. These examples illustrated, firstly, the contributions of Soviet science and innovation 
to the development of global S&T today, and secondly, the connection between science and 
industry where economic mechanisms do not drive scientific development. 
 
5.3                           Soviet Post-War Development 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673 Ibid. 
674 Appendix K. 
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According to this thesis, in the Soviet system, the state social policy played an important 
role in connecting the society with the academia and industry and making rotate all the 
centres including the state itself. As specified there as well, science policy was an integral 
part of the overall social development.  
 
As well, as outlined by Buzgalin, in practice, the establishment of the science cities and 
university centres like Novosibirsk’s Akademgorodok, Pushchino, Dubna in the Soviet Union 
became a certain mould of a new social organisation with some elements of the material and 
technical base of communism actually created. The government funded it at large-scale with a 
relatively soft control over the expenditure of the funds run by the scientists in the conditions 
of the relative autonomy of the centres. The management under the Party’s control was 
performed through the Party’s committees which were consisted mostly of the same 
scientists, noted the economist. Altogether with guaranteed employment and wages, 2-3 times 
higher than on the average in the country, it created a new social atmosphere of the creative 
activity. The creative work was the basic idea for this post-industrial production and provided 
the following: i) self-motivation; ii) the elimination of the boundary between free and 
working time; and iii) the transition of the social relations in the category of the non-alienated 
ones, as he emphasised.675 
 
Meanwhile, Kaul believed that the particular atmosphere of the open-minded culture and 
moral climate knowledge shared among scientists was a distinguishing feature of Soviet 
science driven by scientists’ enthusiasm and a specific scientific romantic passion for an 
adventure and curiosity as the primary force. In his and Tsironis’ view, although funding is 
essential in science, placing materialistic motivation or overpaying the personnel could 
seriously damage the process.676 It found its reflection in the overall Soviet science and social 
policy being tightly juxtaposed into each other. 
 
The multi-angled social policy included the socio-cultural aspects analysed in chapter 4 and 
being melted with the Soviet science policy it can be identified as the innovation core of 
Soviet development. Sergey Kapitsa, mentioned in chapters 3 and 4, illustrated the 
interconnection of the elements of the innovation system in the time framework in the 
following diagram: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 Buzgalin. 
676 Kaul; Tsironis. 
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Diagram 3        Science, Society, Education, and Innovation 
 
SCIENCE AND SOCIETY 
        EDUCATION                                 >>>                                      INNOVATION 
                  ^                                              |                                                        | 
Fundamental Science        >         Applied Science          >          Production and Economy 
TIMING:    100 years                           10 years                                             1 year      
MONEY:        1                                       10                                                     100  
MOTIVATION:  Cognition                  Benefit                             Development and Profit  
  
‘Interaction of Science, Education, and Industry in the modern world. The arrows ^ indicate 
at flows of information.’677 It should be emphasised that the information can also circulate 
in all the directions among all the elements of both the sequence and the drawings. 
 
This diagram is not that different from the other scientists’ models of innovation and 
development. In particular, in his interview, Saxena placed the relations between science, 
engineering, and technology into the dependence on society, education and culture, leading 
altogether to the emergence of innovation in the establishment of modern industry, economy, 
and finance, and summed their functions up in the brackets in the following sequence: 
 
Ecosystem (social and education development) ---> Science (grasping 
principles of the nature) and Culture (a distinct form of human intellectual 
activity) ---> Engineering  (application of science) ---> Technology and 
Innovation (making engineering useful for public good and/or commercial 
gain) ---> Industry, Economy and Finance (contribution to development).678  
  
In these models, education is an important link in development usually providing with the 
innovation results in 100 years. In the case of space exploration, the Soviet Union, however, 
could squeeze this term through its social policy into 40 years which lied between the 
beginning of Lenin’s policy on ‘enlightenment of the masses’ in October 1917 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
677 Kapitsa, Sergey, 2010, Sub’ektivnye zametki ob innovatsyi (Subjective Notes on Innovation), Ekonomicheskie 
strategii (Economic Strategies); retrieved on 10.11.2014 from the Web, http://www.inesnet.ru/wp-
content/mag_archive/2010_04/ES2010-04-
kapitsa.pdf?fbclid=IwAR1pRLtmMV14lSN8R3ciKjJKM1toRU8ni5vg7xxf3haxvMH0Lcof_p9aA8A.  
678 Saxena; the sequence was elaborated together with Chokan Laumulin. This linear sequence is chosen to 
indicate a general dependence as in reality meanwhile the process does not exclude both reverse influence and 
flows of information. 
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Sputnik’s launch in October 1957 whose global importance was expressed by Lonzarich 
(chapters 3 and 5).  
 
According to Paltashev, like in the US, the Soviet rocket design construction was rooted in 
German technology received through reparations, and at a later stage, it developed from as a 
missile anti-air bombing system (like that of around Moscow with nuclear technology) into 
Sputnik.679 He emphasised that for the USSR it was a question of the nation’s survival 
which was indicated by Littlewood as well in chapter 4.  
 
As a result from the shock of the realisation for the Americans that a satellite can be a 
nuclear rocket able to achieve the territory of the US, the systems of the US education and 
S&T development were reformed to respond the Soviet challenge, as confirmed by 
Paltashev and Chitre.680 Both of them emphasised that the US funding attracted was 
colossal which resulted in the Apollo moon landing mission of 1969. Thus, the space race 
gave impetus to modern science and technology.681 
 
Meanwhile, after the mid-1960s among the flaws of the Soviet development in S&T 
Paltashev identified the following. Firstly, it was a division between fundamental and 
applied sciences in practice despite the massive Soviet efforts to connect them through the 
establishment of the diverse engineering landscape of the various design bureaus, labs, 
associations and other institutions around and inside the SAS. Secondly, in the seven levels 
of engineering,682 the first two levels of the consequential applied science and experimental 
engineering were in many ways substituted with reverse engineering for copying samples of 
technology transfer (both of legal or illegal character). Thirdly, on the level 6 of low- and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
679 Paltashev. 
680 Paltashev; Chitre. 
681 Ibid. 
682 ' Fundamental science is similar to a God mounting over the surrounding engineering of the following seven 
levels in the vertical system of science and engineering:  
1. Fundamental Science  (Basic Research) provides applied science and engineering with the scientific 
apparatus, theoretical and experimental solutions.    
2. Applied Science (Engineering, or Industrial Research) finds ways and designs models for solving pressing 
problems, understandable to engineers. 
3. Experimental Engineering develops experimental samples, models, and prototypes of products on the basis 
of achievements of applied science or the inventor's ideas.    
4. Production Engineering develops a production version of the product and production technology for 
guaranteed reproduction of the properties of the products in mass production (also known as know-how). 
5. Adaptive and Optimization Engineering tunes technology up for the configuration of the particular 
manufacturing plant and optimizes production costs. 
6. Low- and Large-Scale and Mass Production Engineering reproduces products with the properties guaranteed 
and the quality controlled in one or several plants. 
7. Service Engineering develops and reproduces service models, special equipment and materials supporting 
the long life cycle and the safe operation of technologically sophisticated products;’ Paltashev. 
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large-scale, and mass production engineering the philosophy of producing cheap and poor 
quality products became dominant. The reverse engineering going top-down in combination 
with the country’s autarchy revealed as the dead end for the electronic industry in the USSR. 
In general, reverse engineering for modern ultra-large integral schemes is extremely difficult 
or impossible, in Paltashev’s account.683 
 
From the micro-electronics industry, Paltashev provided an example of how fundamental 
science and engineering can be intertwined and juxtaposed into each other, making their 
separation almost impossible.684 In 1987 TSMC685 was established as a 50/50 JV with 
Philips Semiconductors.686 They founded a plant in Taiwan. The company started designing 
chips on the base of that era’s machine languages. The Taiwanese side learned the 
production and in the 1990s bought the Philips’ share in the company. Nowadays TSMS 
technology is superior to that of Intel as 7 nanometres technology vs. 10 nanometres base 
node size technology respectively, and TSMS is investing USD14 billions in R&D 
including basic research in particular. 687  The latter is explained by their production 
processes which are now developing on the level of fundamental science as the effects 
emerging are completely unknown in spheres of material science, chemistry, physics and 
other disciplines. For instance, many processes of semiconductors’ behaviour can be 
modelled - however on the level of 5 nanometres something new begins. This is also an 
example of how the development of engineering drives science. Overall, progress in the 
semiconductor industry is impossible without fundamental science.  
 
For the purpose of the objectivity, it should be mentioned that not all engineers share 
Bush’s or both Kapitsas’ vision on the primacy of fundamental science across the 
innovation chain based on the assumption of the corporate R&D units and industrial 
research to be the central birthplace of a new technological knowledge due an enormous 
complexity of the technology chains. For example, this assumption corresponds with the 
visions of such American scholars as Donald Stokes in his Pasteur's Quadrant. Basic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
683 Paltashev. 
684 Ibid. 
685 Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company, Limited also known as Taiwan Semiconductor, is the 
world's largest dedicated independent (pure-play) semiconductor foundry; retrieved on 07.06.2018 from the 
Web, http://www.tsmc.com/english/default.htm. 
686 Now NXP semiconductors; retrieved on 07.06.2018 from the Web, https://eu.mouser.com/philips-
semiconductors/. 
687 2018, TSMC to invest $14 billion in R&D at Hsinchu facility, April 27, Reuters; retrieved on 07.06.2018 
from the Web  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-tech-tsmc/tsmc-to-invest-14-billion-in-rd-at-
hsinchu-facility-idUSKBN1HY0HH. 
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Science and Technological Innovation,688 or very recently - in Cycles of Invention and 
Discovery: Rethinking the Endless Frontier 689  by Venkatesh Narayanamurti and 
Toluwalogo Odumosu of Harvard University. These academics challenge Vannevar 
Bush’s vision of priority of basic research across the entire science-engineering-
technology chain, insisting on the priority of engineering in the chain and claiming that, 
since the post-war period, described by Bush, the chain’s methods have changed. 
However, both Bush and Kapitsa were also very prominent innovative engineers and 
founders of many global high-tech industries and institutions690 so their united vision is 
perceived as fundamental for this research. 
  
Unfortunately, the general success stories of the USSR in science and technology is ignored 
widely in the current policy-making in the vast space of the former Soviet Union which 
makes a striking contrast to the actual state of these affairs in the USSR itself, according to 
Saxena, Nigmatulin, and Paltashev.691  
 
To conclude this chapter, it is important to emphasise that in the policy developing science 
in the Soviet Union as the core for the industrial growth the policy-makers followed the 
philosophy which was beyond the ideologies and which manifested its everlasting 
universality and integrity. As outlined by Graham considered in the literature review, the 
specific characteristics of scientific development in general, and in the Soviet Union in 
particular, cannot be understood on the ground of the economic foundations of the societies, 
and innovations are not necessarily products of ‘pressing material necessity.’ 692  The 
evidence presented above indicates that this philosophy was well-understood by the Soviet 
policy-makers on different levels and this could explain the three following things, i.e. that 
pragmatism in the science policy, the distinct status the Academy of Sciences and scientists 
possessed in the Soviet Union as well as the persistence of the policy in the time 
framework.  
 
Thus, after developing the modern methodology of the scientific organisation first and 
establishing the global record in funding research, the Soviet Union became a leading 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
688 Stokes, Donald E., 1997, Pasteur's Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Innovation, Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington D.C. 
689 Narayanamurti, Venkatesh, and Odumosu, Toluwalogo, 2016, Cycles of Invention and Discovery: Rethinking 
the Endless Frontier, Harvard University Press.  
690 Appendices L and M. 
691 Saxena; Nigmatulin; Paltashev. 
692 Graham, 194. 
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country whose science and technology achievements keep contributing to global 
development. The Soviet human capital and industrial development resulted from the 
science, education and social policy which became the crucial factor of Soviet 
modernisation and the reason for the Soviet success on the international arena as 
summarised in the next, concluding chapter.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   180	  
Chapter 6            Conclusion  
 
This concluding chapter aims at combining the research results by elaborating on the 
theoretical findings of the thesis in order to finalise addressing the research question. This 
would be followed by a consideration of particular theoretical and practical implications. 
Also, the chapter would discuss the validity of the propositions and highlight possible 
prospects of future research.  
 
The language and images of the Cold War have affected social research on Soviet 
development on both sides. In many ways, the Soviet studies fell victim to propagandistic 
approaches preventing the researcher from an unbiased study of the pre- and during WWII 
period when the configurations of the political actors on global arena had been dramatically 
different. Meanwhile, this period was crucial in terms of establishing the Soviet Union’s 
social, educational, industrial and research base which allowed the nation to meet the 
challenges, to play catch up with the developed countries, to lead in some areas of 
development and even to provide various aid to the newly emerged Third World after WWII.  
 
The Soviet Union formed its multi-dimensional and pioneering policy in the conditions of 
the scarce resources of the mainly agricultural economy of the Russian Empire, whose vast 
territories represented an almost medieval way of life (from a social perspective) after the 
defeat in WWI, caused by the backwardness of the country. The massive Soviet campaigns 
for eradication of illiteracy as well as the establishment of education and research 
throughout the largest country, performed under the umbrella of the newly born Soviet 
identity, aimed to transform and unite the society, various in its religions and indigenous 
ethnic origins, through development, as evident at the example of Kazakhstan in the thesis.  
 
The industrial development was initiated through the implementation of the GOELRO 
energy plan, followed by the system of the five-year plans. Following Marxism, the 
centralisation of the resources socialised was a logical action dictated by the need to 
accumulate them in one place for further distributions into the most strategic directions, 
chosen as the locomotives of development. 
 
During the Cold War, scholars’ views on the reasons of the Soviet successes varied widely, 
e.g. from Sutton almost totally denying any Soviet endogenous technological achievements to 
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Gvishiani solely praising them and using a vague methodology to justify ‘economic effects’ 
from the patents.  
 
Both sides were ideologically motivated in ignoring different angles. Sutton as the most 
profound case did so in basing his judgement entirely on the economic market point of view, 
considering Soviet development exclusively as technology transfer driven and missing the 
importance of the research, education and social policy for the development of technology. 
Meanwhile, many of the Soviet scholars emphasising the Marxist non-economic and social 
factors avoided, on the other hand, discussions of the exogenous impact during Soviet 
industrialisation and instead concentrated on the class struggle and the dogmatic postulates of 
the inevitability of ‘the victory of the socialist productive forces’ to explain the modern 
‘relations of production’ (Marx).  
 
The arguments could reach the level of absurdity as it took place with Sutton who rejected 
acknowledging the lion’s share of the Soviet scientific advances (including Nikolay 
Semyonov, the 1956 Nobel laureate in Chemistry,693 the discipline in which, according to 
Sutton, no significant Soviet figure emerged);694 almost ignored the Soviet space programme, 
and placed Sputnik and aircraft (with thousands of their technologies of many military and 
civil types, and around 100 of various types of Soviet civil aircrafts produced annually during 
the Cold War695) in the same innovation category as electro-drill on the unconditional ground 
of the improbability of the Soviet planning system for innovation due to the intrinsic flaws. 
Meanwhile, in his Cold War language, the words ‘West’ and ‘Western’ were widely used 
and applied to the period of the 1920s and 30s, and, in particular, to the period of WWII of 
1939-45 when the USSR, Great Britain and the US used to be the allies at war against 
Germany, Japan, Italy, and other ‘Western’ countries.  
 
More importantly, Sutton viewed any technological development in general as 
fundamentally driven by the particular economic factors, i.e. the free market forces. In this 
approach, entrepreneurship was viewed as the driving force for innovation in seeking 
profitable and practical solutions as chosen from the various technologies available and 
pushing, therefore, science and technology forward. His view on science being about the 
development of theory to be tested in laboratories and technology as ‘the selective 	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application of scientific findings to industrial production’696 was questioned by both the 
fundamental and applied physicists interviewed for this thesis, who clarified that science is 
about the development of understanding of basic principles tested 
and parameterised by conducting experiments.697  
 
As well, in attributing, for instance, the Soviet Atomic Project solely to the exogenous impact, 
Sutton completely ignored the Soviet school of physics created by Ioffe almost from 
scratch.698 It had been conducting thorough nuclear research, both of experimental and 
theoretical character, since the 1920s and especially in the 1930s when nuclear physics had 
purely theoretical value.699  
 
Meanwhile, the fact that in the post-war period the Soviet Union boasted breakthroughs in 
space exploration, nuclear energy, and some other extraordinarily innovative and 
specialised high-tech industries required another explanation for Soviet development 
beyond the technology transfer and the market or class struggle factors. After more than 25 
years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an impartial re-evaluation of Soviet 
development was required and the research question for this thesis became formulated as 
follows: How in a quarter of a century could such a backward country as the Soviet Union 
advance in its human capital and industrial development to an approximate level of the major 
powers of the era? 
 
In addressing it, what emerged as substantial is that, in Marx’ language, the industrial ‘basis’ 
defining the ‘relations of production’ as ‘superstructure’ was identical for both ‘capitalism’ 
and ‘socialism,’ although it was viewed in both systems as the opposite to each other as being 
driven by either the market forces or planning respectively. It placed the identification of that 
industrial driving force, likely, equal for both systems, as a pivotal approach for this study.  
 
Meanwhile, the dichotomy from social scholars’ opinions began disappearing while reading 
the literature by the scientists and engineers. They looked united in their evaluations of the 
drivers of the modern industrial development including the Soviet Union. The drivers were 
science and education.  
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Indeed while studying the literature further, it was identified that the Academy of Sciences of 
the USSR as the source of knowledge possessed a unique and privileged status in the Soviet 
system. It was not a part of the planning mechanism and represented a democratic institution 
whose leadership was elected in secret ballot by the academicians.  
 
Furthermore, as became evident, the Soviet Union was the pioneer in elaborating the modern 
scientific methodology in the 1920s and the global leader in the budget allocations for R&D 
which, while gradually and persistently growing, exceeded 5 per cent of the GNP by 1980 to 
remain the global record up to date. It is essential to highlight that although science was 
officially recognised as distinct from the Marxist theory,700 within the SAS it had been 
developing in harmonisation, although not without problems, with the humanities and social 
sciences. For example, the academician Sergey Oldenburg (Ol’denburg), who was permanent 
secretary of the SAS and mastered the Soviet pioneering methodological approach of the 
scientific organisation,701 was an orientalist, an indologist, by his education and research 
specialisation.702 As well, this fact, on the one hand, illustrates a possible important role, 
social scientists can play in science, and, on other, responds to the challenge of the author 
being a non-scientist as described in the methodology section.    
 
The Academy’s expansion throughout the vast territory of the USSR included all 15 republics 
of the nation, covered all the spectrum of research, attracted the most talented youth and 
turned the Soviet Union into the second leading scientific country in the world after the US. 
Unlike there, science in the USSR, however, was set up against the planning economy and 
society in contrast to the US market economy and pluralist politics, being, nonetheless, the 
universal phenomenon. Evidently, the development of science and education in the USSR 
became ‘the strategic investment object’703 of the socialised national product for the overall 
development. 
 
In addressing the research question further to highlight the propositions on the connection 
between science and industry, on the one hand, and the establishment and interaction of the 
Soviet science, education and various social policies juxtaposed in the whole integral set, on 
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the other, it required studying new data. They were obtained from two kinds of the primary 
sources, i.e. the interviews and various documents related to the era.  
 
The data revealed that the Soviet Academy of Sciences’ main focus of the research was 
fundamental science which was universally driven in its development by scientists’ curiosity 
and had no direct connection to practical applications. In relation to the Soviet school of 
nuclear physics, Holloway described it as follows: 
 
What drew Soviet physicists to nuclear research in 1932 was not the promise 
of practical results but the prospects of interesting physics. They may have 
hoped that their work would prove useful, but they thought that practical 
applications, if they ever resulted, were far in the future.704 
 
The expansion of the Academy which began after the 1917 October Revolution and received 
a particular drive in the 1930s after formulating the science policy methodology mentioned 
above, was not slowed down in the 1940s in the hard conditions of WWII. In this sense, the 
example of Basov’s research was particularly indicative. It began during the war being driven 
by scientist’s curiosity to explore the properties of the cm waves ‘without any connection 
with military investigations. […] One didn’t feel any war spirit in the laboratory.’705 
However, this led to the discovery of laser without which the modern technology is 
unimaginable, and undoubtedly contributed to the post-war status and the military might 
(Abilsiitov’s both research and career) of the Soviet Union and so did, of course, Soviet 
nuclear research mentioned just above.   
 
During the 1930s, the exogenous technology transfer was implemented as the most effective 
in those conditions means to industrialise the Soviet nation through the income accumulated 
in the centralisation and redistributed for the strategic directions. Meanwhile, generous 
funds reaching 27 per cent of the Soviet GNP by 1980 were allocated on a revolving basis 
for the development of the indigenous education, culture, primary health care and, more 
importantly, fundamental science and varied research which established the successful 
import substitution programme through the development of the endogenous human capital.  
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In the USSR, fundamental science was the source of expertise and the reservoir of knowledge 
for the development of engineering and technology including that one obtained through the 
transfer. Following those Ioffe’s words of 1927 in chapter 4, all forms of Soviet industry 
were founded as ‘various sections of physics or chemistry applied and exploited on a large 
scale.’ Also, science became employed in founding the vast Soviet education base as well as 
the primary health care system and other social programmes which altogether contributed to 
the development of the national human capital. The latter, in turn, was acquired by industry, 
culture, science, and elsewhere. In particular, the scientific and technological training was 
mastered for preparing the Soviet management and governance.  
 
The investment in education and technology was directly relevant to the rapid Soviet 
development in the early years, whereas the investment in basic research was essential in the 
longer run.  Therefore, the value of this investment in fundamental research in the first years 
was primarily in drawing in talent in the field of science that could then potentially be 
channelled into the technological, managerial and governing sectors, on the one hand. On the 
other, non-material dividends of boosting morale, self-confidence and pride in the emerging 
nation to become the most progressive and civilised one as well as to tangibly contribute to 
global development and lead the mankind’s progress one should not be equally excluded. As 
well, after WWII, a driving factor was scientists’ motivation to retain the world’s balance of 
power and prevent another even more destructive war.   
 
The establishment of such a science policy implied policy-makers’ high educational level and 
the data confirmed it. Furthermore, in the 1930s, the establishment of the polytechnisation as 
the leading approach for the Soviet education, management, governance, lifestyle, and culture 
was accompanied by the intense political debates and power struggle before and during 
industrialisation. As a result, the massive exogenous technology transfer was successfully 
assimilated and developed turning the Soviet Union into the modern technological nation. 
 
The vast system of education to enhance all modern aspects of human knowledge was 
established in the Soviet Union to reach its most ultimate territory. As mentioned above, the 
priority was given to the polytechnic instruction whereas the education was free, 706 
universal, profound and accessible for all the strata of the Soviet society despite gender, 
social707 or ethnic origin.  	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This was accompanied by the establishment of the effective system of the primary health 
care which allowed the Soviet Union by 1965 to reach the level of the developed countries 
in terms of life longevity and the other indicators related and which is still praised at WHO. 
By the same period, the quality and living standards of the Soviet citizens reached the 
indicators which were closer to those of the developed rather than those of the developing 
countries.  As a result, this policy led to the establishment of concept of Three Worlds in 
global development in which the word ‘westernization’ was replaced by ‘modernization’ in 
the 1950s, as argued in the introduction.  
 
All of this mentioned above would have been impossible if not for science. The pursuit of 
this policy with science in its centre remained its intact and distinct quality which had been 
constantly, closely and relentlessly monitored and nurtured by the Communist Party through 
any unfavourable conditions.  
 
Regarding technology transfer, it has been a standard industrial practice after British 
industrialisation. The analysis revealed that the most important indicator to evaluate a 
possible success of any technology transfer would be an importing side’s ability to adopt, 
sustain and develop further the technology received which is impossible without an equally 
developed research and engineering base in place. The latter, meanwhile, occurred in the 
Soviet Union due to the development of the extensive social programmes introduced in the 
1930s as the platform for human capital development.  
 
According to the concept of the Triple Helix Systems of Innovation mentioned in subchapter 
4.3, in the Soviet ‘statist’ regime, the overall system’s development can be achieved through 
the rotational interaction of the two overlapping centres of the helices of the industry and 
academia being both inscribed in the dominant centre of the helix of the state policy.708 This 
thesis argues for the science and social policies being juxtaposed into the whole set is one of 
the most significant components of the Soviet developmental policy.  This distinct Soviet 
innovation model allowed the country not only to perform industrialisation in the record 
time but also to escape from the trap of technology transfer which has been widely used in 
the struggles of nations as an effective means of control and subordination. This is the case 
of Soviet industrialisation. 
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Thus, in its foundation, Soviet development was resultant from the establishment of 
research and education across the whole range of the scientific disciplines at a large scale, 
as well as the extensive national social and educational policy to include the development of 
culture, education, various social institutes, and effective primary health care. Altogether 
they were forming the appropriate ecosystem, or environment, for nurturing the valuable 
scientific human capital as the apex of the entire process. The latter was reflected in that 
exceptionally high status of science and scientists in the Soviet society. The status was built 
up by various measures which received a particular impetus in the period from the 1930s to 
50s.   
 
This thesis studies science as the inception point of the modern industry and technology 
basing on the case of the USSR as well as tries to connect the phenomenon of science across 
innovation chain to non-economic factors in the context of both the Soviet policy and the 
unity of global development. This approach, to the researcher’s knowledge, is not present in 
most of the economic analyses and social research on the Soviet Union published up to date. 
Whereas various aspects of the Soviet industrial, science or social policies are considered in 
the Western academic literature, there is no source which would combine them in one 
analysis which, possibly, defines a theoretical contribution and a novelty of the thesis.  
 
Meanwhile, a thorough analysis of Soviet development from this perspective could help 
consider the evidence on the lasting and profound contribution of Soviet science and 
technology to global progress in premising capitalisation of many international companies, 
industries, and markets.  
 
The institutionalisation of the industry of discovery, in which satisfaction of scientific 
curiosity is pivotal for the key OECD countries in their R&D allocations, endorses the fact 
that this is a process valuable for national wellbeing. Meanwhile, these OECD countries are 
mostly the nations leading in their expenditures on R&D, with the US being foremost in the 
absolute number of allocations as it similarly took place in the Soviet Union. In proportional 
relation to their GDP’s expenditures, most of the OECD and some developing countries, 
South Korea and China, in particular, have been increasingly doing this kind of the 
investments aspiring to outperform the Soviet record.709 
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More importantly, the current economic methodology does not delineate between science and 
technology in the term of research and development (R&D) whereas in the development of 
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the priority was given to fundamental science (or 
basic research), as the precursor and necessary prerequisite, in Marxist language, for applied 
science (industrial research, or engineering), technology, and innovation as the core of the 
modern industry and overall development. In paraphrasing Graham’s words, not only no 
previous but also subsequent government in history has ever been so openly and energetically 
in favour of science so far.710   
 
Indeed, science was regarded in the Soviet Union as a natural resource, an irreplaceable 
instrument of the country’s modernisation and a key to the international relationship.  
 
It is also important to note that in the interaction of the state, industry, and academia many of 
the most developed countries fall in practice into the category of a laissez-faire innovation 
regime, ‘characterised by limited state intervention in the economy (e.g. the US, some 
Western Europe countries), [in which] industry is the driving force, with the other two spheres 
as ancillary support structures and limited roles in innovation: university acting mainly as a 
provider of skilled human capital, and government mainly as a regulator of social and 
economic mechanisms.’711   
 
This regime has evolved through ‘natural and historical conditions,’ whereas developing 
nations in the XX and XXI Centuries have had to play catch up in their pursuit of rapid 
development of academia and industry. As Peter Nolan emphasised, ‘[I]n 2009, after three 
decades of capitalist globalization, firms from developing countries were almost entirely 
absent from the list of the world’s top 1,000 firms in terms of R&D spending.’712 This status-
quo compels developing countries to adopt the ‘statist’ Soviet innovation model mentioned 
above in which the governmental policy is the driving force, even despite possible ‘errors on a 
scale impossible in economies organized by less centralized and interventionist means,’ 
according to Howe.713 
 
Therefore, the example of the Soviet Union is particularly significant for many developing 
nations. Its ‘proven ability to carry backward countries speedily through the crisis of 	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modernization and industrialization,’714 as worded by the White House National Security 
Council of the US, was appealing for them and affected global development to a large extent, 
as argued above and also evident from the modern successes of China.  
 
For the nations of Eurasia and worldwide, modernisation still implies organisation of 
fundamental research as a vital and comprehensive strategic paradigm to embrace the 
challenges and find new places in the formation of the new technological and industrial age. 
As mentioned in the introduction, in their models of development, developing countries 
including those rich in natural resources become highly dependent on global fluctuations or 
exogenous technology which limit their progress and restrict overall development. In this 
sense, this research can possibly help elaborate on an approach to accommodate local realities 
and global demands and should be continued by the author.  
 
A modern system of science as the industry of discovery emerged in the territory of the 
USSR during the Soviet period. The Soviet experience gave the world the first examples of 
the particular policy over the processes of the creation and implementation of the national 
‘scientific and technical potential,’ as worded in the Soviet terminology when this approach 
was not yet even formed in the rest of the world. This policy allowed the nation to go 
through the enormous challenge of WWII as well as to establish the new world post-
colonial order, in which the independent development of India and China, among others, 
become possible and which, as well, could be a part of the author’s further research.  
 
The Chinese system, as shown in chapters 1 and 5, was industrially institutionalised after 
the Soviet model with the research and education base at its centre to have recently become 
the second largest global economy. Following the Soviet industrial model in consequently 
expanding and developing its research (that reached 2.129 per cent of the GDP in 2017),715 
the nation reached a globally leading position in many disciplines and outperformed the US 
in the number of the scientific publications in the same year.716   
 
The Soviet successes considered in this thesis would have been impossible without the 
creation of the indigenous social and educational base and the introduction of science-
induced multiple technologies in the economy, national and global life to reach new levels 
of prosperity and development. However, by no means, the development of science and 	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research should be viewed as a panacea in development without embracing other 
challenges.717 Perestroika of the USSR is a vivid statement for this. Even the Soviet 
leadership in such most technological human endeavour as the space exploration with the 
developed education, science, and technology base in place could not prevent the collapse 
of the country from happening. It makes the question of designing a more comprehensive 
and flexible set of new policies for developing countries even more acute which, in turn, is 
not doable without employment of science and research.  
 
As argued in Soviet research (chapter 2), in the modern world, ‘[t]he slightest stagnation in 
science is immediately reflected in national economic development, reducing the rate of 
increase in the national income.’718 This is the advice which is not to be ignored in any 
economy, in particular considering that science could be perceived as a key, although not 
fully visible instantly, driving force of a modern society. Overall, a particular nation is 
developed to the extent its both culture and intellectual knowledge are developed. 
  
Nowadays, at the time of the new industrial age, science becomes increasingly important as 
the only human instrument with which it might be feasible to meet new challenges emerging. 
In this sense, a relatively short, although dramatic, history of the Soviet Union and its 
interconnected and multi-faceted policies driven by research and social development could 
contribute to the formation of unprecedented future solutions, as science is the very human 
instrument, which by its cognitive nature is determined to explore, explain and deal with the 
unknown.  
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Academy of Sciences (the RAS); the interview was recorded on 03.04.2017 in Moscow. 
  
Abstract. A system, which brought together science, technology, industry, education and 
social policy, played a fundamental role in the emergence of the USSR in the global arena 
after WWII as an advanced industrial and technological actor. A key goal of this research is 
to operationalize academic insights, related to the relationship between science, 
engineering, technology, and innovation in conjunction with educational and social policy, 
into practical frameworks, as evident in the success of the Soviet industrial policy. Unlike a 
conventional consideration of innovation tools, as emerging from the economic 
mechanisms, this paper tries to establish and understand the connection from Science (as 
grasping principles of nature) to Engineering  (application of Science) and 
to Technology and Innovation (making Engineering useful for public good and/or 
commercial gain) in the Soviet import substitution policy. Development of science, 
education and social policy is considered here as a game-changing factor as it replaced the 
practice of the technology transfer prevalent during and after industrialisation drive of the 
1930s. A new high technological reality of microelectronics, nuclear energy, space 
exploration programme and other phenomena which emerged as a result of the sophisticated 
intertwining of science and technology as well as social policy. The thesis aims to 
understand how these various policies were developed independently and brought together 
to achieve specific aims of the Soviet national development. 
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1. Often these days, in both mass media and conventional economic thought, the role of 
fundamental science is not viewed in connection with economic development. As a scientist, 
do you have an opinion on this?  
2. In your view, do fundamental science and engineering relate to each other?  
3. In my abstract above I conjecture that science drives the process of industrial 
development.  In your opinion, how do discoveries in fundamental science lead to disruptive 
and marketable technologies? 
4. Would you agree or disagree that the main process that leads to the sustainable technological 
development of large developed countries (or companies) is clearly linked to a strong 
fundamental science research base? 
5. Today economic planners and management schools strongly believe in (and teach) the notion 
that science is a product of the Market and discoveries in science are driven by market 
demand (search for practical and profitable solutions). In other words, scientific discoveries 
result mainly from the pursuit of profit and efficiency. To what degree would agree or 
disagree with this notion?  
6. Do you think that today’s digital informational revolution has speeded up the process? 
7. The following questions are dedicated to the Soviet industrial development, and the first one I 
would like to ask you, if possible, is as follows: to what extent was the Soviet technological 
development different to those of other developed countries, if true? Were there any 
substantial differences to the US, Western European, Japanese or any other approaches in 
dealing with the S&T development?  
8. In your opinion, how crucial was technology transfer for the Soviet industrial development?  
9. What is a Soviet science and technology contribution to global technological development? 
10. In terms of any country’s technological development, what do you think of the idea to rely 
solely on technology transfer without developing its own science and technology base?  
11. Another question is when talking about technological development about an opinion which is 
getting more widespread, especially in the countries, which are not so developed. Policy-
makers often defend the idea of technology transfer – ‘Why would we need to fund this 
development, it requires structural reforms, both educational and social when it would be 
simpler to achieve economic success through technology transfer?’ What would you say?  
12. In my research, the figure of Pyotr Kapitza occupies a central place. What do you think of his 
contribution to global science and technology?  
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Appendix B 
 
Table 6             Ten-Year School Curriculum, 1952-1953720 
                          Total Hours of Instruction by Subject 
                          For the First Seven Grades, Hours per Week, Total Hours for Grade VIII 
                          Through X, and Total for Grades I through X, in class hours of 45    
                          Minutes Each and in Per Cent 
 
Subject Hours 
I-VII 
        Hours per   
        week721 
       Total Hours and Per Cent 
         VIII-X            I-X 
        
VII 
     
  IX 
     
   X 
Hours Per 
Cent 
Hours Per 
Cent 
Russian 
Language and 
Literature 
 
 
 2,508  
 
 
  5.5 
 
 
   6 
 
 
    5 
 
 
 544.5 
 
 
  16.8 
 
 
3,052.5 
 
 
31.6 
Mathematics722  1,518   6    6     6   594   18.4 2,112 21.8 
History  3,135   4    4     4   396   12.3 709.5   7.3 
USSR 
Constitution 
 
 66 
 
  … 
 
  … 
 
  … 
 
    … 
 
   … 
 
 66 
 
  0.7 
Geography  346.5   3  2.5   …  181.5    5.6  528   5.5 
Biology  313.5   2  2   …   132    4.1  445.5   4.6 
Physics  165   3  2  4.5  313.5    9.7  478.5   5.0 
Astronomy    …    …   …    1    33    1.0     33   0.3 
Chemistry   82.5     2   2  3.5  247.5    7.7   330   3.4 
Psychology    …    …   2   …    66    2.0     66   0.7 
Logic    …    …   …     2    66    2.0     66   0.7 
Foreign 
Language723 
 
   363 
 
  3.5 
 
 3.5 
 
    4 
 
   363 
 
  11.2 
 
   726 
 
 7.5 
Physical 
Culture 
 
   396 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
    2 
 
   198 
 
   6.1 
 
   594 
 
  6.1 
Drawing (Art)    198    … …   …     …    …    198 2.0 
Drafting 
(Engnrg.) 
    
     33 
 
   1 
 
    1 
 
    1 
 
    99 
 
    3.1 
 
   132 
 
  1.4 
Singing    132    …   …   …     …     …    132   1.4 
Manual 
Training 
 
    … 
 
   … 
 
  … 
 
  … 
 
    … 
 
    … 
 
    … 
 
   … 
Shop Work     …    …   …   …     …     …     …   … 
Total  6,435    32   33   33  3,234 100.0  9,669 100.
0 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
720 Korol, Table 12, 58, citing from E.N. Medinskii, Narodnoye obrazovaniye v SSSR, 74 and 86, and table 10. 
721 Classes are held 6 days a week, 33 weeks a year. 
722 Algebra and Geometry, grades VI through X; Trigonometry, grades IX and X. 
723 English, German, or French, depending on availability of teachers. 
   Note: Fractional figures show the average of two semesters. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 7             Ten-Year School Curriculum, 1955-1956724 
                          Total Hours of Instruction by Subject 
                          For the First Seven Grades, Hours per Week, Total Hours for Grade VIII 
                          Through X, and Total for Grades I through X, in class hours of 45    
                          Minutes Each and in Per Cent 
 
Subject Hours 
I-VII 
       Hours per         
        week725 
       Total Hours and Per Cent 
         VIII-X            I-X 
        
VII 
     
  IX 
     
   X 
Hours Per 
Cent 
Hours Per 
Cent 
Russian 
Language and 
Literature 
 
 
 2,343  
 
 
  5.5 
 
 
    4 
 
 
    4 
 
 
 445.5 
 
 
  13.6 
 
 
2,788.5 
 
 
 28.8 
Mathematics726  1,386   6     6     6   594   18.2 1,980  20.5 
History    264   4     4     4   396   12.1    660   6.8 
USSR 
Constitution 
 
   … 
 
  … 
 
  … 
 
    1 
 
    33 
 
   1.0 
 
   33 
 
  0.3 
Geography   297   2.5    3    …  181.5    5.6  478.5   5.0 
Biology   297   2    1    …     99    3.0   396   4.1 
Physics  165   3    4   4.5  379.5   11.6  544.5   5.6 
Astronomy    …    …   …    1    33    1.0     33   0.3 
Chemistry    66     2    3   3.5  280.5    8.6   346.5   3.6 
Psychology    …    …   …    1    33    1.0     33   0.3 
Logic    …    …   …    …    …     …     …     … 
Foreign 
Language727 
 
   363 
 
   3 
 
   3 
 
    3 
 
   297 
 
   9.1 
 
   660 
 
  6.8 
Physical 
Culture 
 
   462 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
    2 
 
   198 
 
   6.1 
 
   660 
 
  6.8 
Drawing (Art)    198   …   …    …     …     …    198   2.1 
Drafting 
(Engnrg.) 
    
     33 
 
   1 
 
    1 
 
    1 
 
    99 
 
    3.1 
 
   132 
 
  1.4 
Singing    198    …   …    …     …     …    198   2.1 
Manual 
Training 
 
    330 
 
   … 
 
  … 
 
    
 
    … 
 
    … 
 
    330 
 
  3.4 
Shop Work     …     2     2     2     198     6.1     198   2.1 
Total  6,402    33   33    33  3,267 100.0  9,669 100.
0 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
724 Ibid., Table 11, 57, citing from Narodnoye obrazovaniye, No.7, July 1955, 4, and Table 9. 
725 Classes are held 6 days a week, 33 weeks a year. 
726 Algebra and Geometry, grades VI through X; Trigonometry, grades IX and X. 
727 English, German, or French, depending on availability of teachers. 
   Note: Fractional figures show the average of two semesters. 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 8              Curriculum by 1984728 
                           Completed secondary school. – The standard curriculum for completed     
                           secondary school is: 
 
Subject                                             Hours per week by grade 
    1     2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9 10 
Native 
tongue 
 
  12 
 
  10 
 
  10 
 
   6 
 
   6 
 
   3 
 
   3 
 
   2 
  
Literature                   2    2    2    2    3    4   5 
Mathematics    6    6    6    6    6    6    6    6    5   5 
History       2    2    2    2    3    4   3 
Natural 
History 
 
 
 
    2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
      
Geography        2    3    2    2    2  
Biology         2    3    2    2    2  
Physics         2    2    3    4   5 
Foreign 
Language 
     
   4 
 
   3 
 
   3 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
  2 
Chemistry          2    2    3   3 
Physical 
training 
 
   2 
 
  2 
 
   2 
 
  2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
  2 
Manual 
training 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
   2 
 
  2 
Music    1    1    1    1    1    1    1    
Fine Arts    1    1    1    1    1    1     
Drafting         1    1    1   
Astronomy            1 
Social 
Science  
          
  2 
Optional          2    4    6   6 
Total   24   24   24   24   30   30   32   34   36 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
728 Spearman, 6. 
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Appendix E 
 
Table 9            Number of Institutions of Higher Education Listed by Categories         
                         and Type of Instruction, USSR, January 1955 
  
Column E gives the number of residence schools which also have an 
evening department. Column C gives the number of resident schools 
which also have a department for instruction by correspondence.729 
 
Categories and Subcategories Total Number of Schools by Types 
Resident Even-
ing 
only 
Corres-
ondenc
e only 
Total E C 
I. Universities 
          
33 33 2 27 … … 
                                   
Institutes: 
      
II.  Polytechnic and industrial  23     
      1. Polytechnic  20  15 6 … 1 
      2. Industrial 5  4 2 … 1 
III. Power, Electrotechnical, 
Radiotechnical, and 
Physiotechnical 
  
 
7 
    
       1. Power 3  1 … … 1 
       2. Electrotechnical 2 … 2 … … … 
       3. Radiotechnical 2 … 2 … … … 
       4. Physiotechnical 1  … … … … 
IV. Machine construction, 
Shipbuilding, Aviation, 
Polygraphic, and Motion 
Picture Engineering  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       1. Machine construction; 
machine tools and tools; 
mechanical; and automotive 
 
 
16 
  
 
12 
 
 
… 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
       2. Shipbuilding 2  2 … … … 
       3. Aviation 7  7 … … … 
       4. Polygraphic 3  1 … … 1 
       5. Motion Picture 
Engineering 
 
1 
  
… 
 
1 
 
… 
 
… 
V. Geologic, Mining, Oil, 
Peat, and Metallurgical 
 
 
 
24 
    
       1. Geologic; mining oil; 
and peat 
 
15 
  
8 
 
2 
 
… 
 
… 
       2. Metallurgical and 
mining metallurgical 
  
24 
    
VI. Chemical technology 9 9 6 1 … … 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
729 Korol, 137-8. 
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VII. Food and Fishing 
Industries 
  
11 
    
       1. Food industries 9  5 2 … 1 
       2. Fishing industries  4  … … … 1 
VIII. Light Industries  7     
       1. Light industries 3  2 1 … 1 
       2. Textile 5  5 … … … 
IX. Engineering-Construction, 
Geodetic, and Automotive 
Highways  
  
 
25 
    
       1. Engineering-
construction 
 
19 
 
 
 
10 
 
8 
 
… 
 
1 
       2. Geodetic  2  … 1 … … 
       3. Automotive highway 6  4 2 … 1 
X. Hydrometerological 2 2 … 1 … … 
XI. Transport and 
communication 
  
25 
    
       1. Railroad transport 13  11 … … 1 
       2. Water transport 4  1 4 … … 
       3. Marine and navigation 4  … 3 … … 
       4. Civil air fleet 1  … 1 … … 
       5. Communications 5  2 3 … 1 
XXII. Agriculture and 
Forestry 
 106     
       1. Agricultural 63  … 52 … 1 
       2. Zootechnical, 730  milk 
and veterinary 
 
21 
  
… 
 
7 
 
… 
 
… 
       3. Mechanization and 
electrification of agriculture  
 
7 
  
1 
 
5 
 
… 
 
… 
       4. Hydromelioration and 
land management 
 
6 
  
… 
 
4 
 
… 
 
… 
       5. Forest and forest 
technology 
 
11 
  
6 
 
8 
 
… 
 
1 
XIII. Economics  22     
       1. Economics 8  7 … … 1 
       2. Finance Economics 9  6 … … 1 
       3. Trade Economics 3  3 1 … … 
 
       4. Engineering economics  3  3 1 … … 
XIV. Law 6 5 … 5 … 1731 
XV. Art  46     
       1. Architecture and 
industrial art 
 
3 
  
… 
 
… 
 
… 
 
… 
       2. Visual arts  9  … 1 … … 
       3. Music conservatories 21  7 2 … … 
       4. Theatre and motion 
pictures 
 
13 
  
… 
 
1 
 
… 
 
… 
XVI. Medical   75     	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
730 Ibid. Soviet term for animal husbandry.  
731 Ibid. Has 14 affiliated branch institutes. 
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         1. Medical  65  … … … … 
         2. Stomatological 2  … … … … 
         3. Pharmaceutical  8  … 4 … … 
XVII. Physical Culture 13 13  9 … … 
XVIII. Pedagogical, Historical 
Archives, and Library 
  
278 
    
         1. Pedagogical 206  31 173 … 4 
         2. Pedagogical, foreign 
languages  
 
19 
  
1 
 
14 
 
… 
 
… 
         3. Library, literature, 
historical archives 
 
5 
  
3 
 
4 
 
… 
 
… 
        4. Teachers 732  (two-year 
course)  
 
52 
  
… 
 
17 
 
… 
 
… 
Total 762 737 17
5 
376 3 22 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
732 Ibid., of these in addition to the evening regular course, six also have an affiliated (filial) evening school in a 
different location. 
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Appendix F 
 
Table 10           Number of Faculties and Number of ‘Specialties’ Taught in Each of    
                          the Thirty-Three State Universities, USSR, 1955733 
 
Ref. 
No. Name [location] Faculties ‘Specialties’ 
1. Azerbaidzhan [Baku] 
2. Byelorussian [Minsk] 
3. Vil’nyus  
4. Voronezh 
5. Gor’ki 
6. Dnepropetrovsk 
7. Erevan 
8. Irkutsk 
9. Kazan’ 
10. Kazakh [Alma-Ata] 
11. Karelo-Finish [Petrozavodsk] 
12. Kiev 
13. Kirgiz [Frunze] 
14. Kishinev 
15. Latvia [Riga] 
16. Leningrad  
17. L’vov 
18. Molotov 
19. Moscow 
20. Odessa 
21. Rostov-na-Donu 
22. Saratov 
23. Central Asia [Tashkent] 
24. Tadzhik 
25. Tartu [Estonia] 
26. Tbilisi 
27. Tomsk 
28. Turkmen [Ashkhabad] 
29. Uzhgorod 
30. Uzbek [Samarkand] 
31. Ural [Sverdlovsk] 
32. Kharkov 
33. Chernovtsy 
 
7 
7 
7 
6 
4 
4 
8 
7 
7 
7 
5 
12 
7 
6 
8 
12 
11 
7 
12 
6 
5 
8 
8 
5 
5 
10 
7 
5 
5 
4 
6 
8 
6 
20 
13 
18 
13 
8 
8 
20 
14 
17 
18 
9 
22 
14 
13 
24 
41 
22 
14 
36 
10 
13 
13 
19 
11 
18 
26 
14 
11 
9 
7 
13 
15 
11 
                Total number in 33 universities 
                       Average per faculty 
                       Average per university 
232 
… 
7 
534 
2.3 
16 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733 Ibid.,, 156, compiled from 1955, Spravochnik dlya postupayushchikh v vysshiye uchebnye zavedeniya v 1955 
godu, Moscow, Sovetskaya Nauka; all the names of the geographical locations are given as in the original. 
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Appendix G 
 
Table 11           List and Number of All Faculties within the Thirty-Three State           
                          Universities, 1955734 
 
Faculty 
 
Number 
1. Physics 
2. Physics-Mathematics 
3. Mechanics-Mathematics 
4. Natural Sciences-Mathematics 
5. Natural Sciences 
6. Chemistry 
7. Biology 
8. Biology-Chemistry 
9. Biology-Soil 
10. Geology 
11. Geological exploration 
12. Geology-Geography 
13. Geography 
14. Medical 
15. Agricultural 
16. Engineering Construction 
17. Forestry Engineering 
18. Mechanical 
19. Technical 
20. Economic 
21. Journalism 
22. History 
23. History-Law 
24. History-Philology 
25. Law 
26. Philology 
27. Philosophy 
28. Oriental 
29. Foreign Languages 
30. Foreign Languages and Literature 
    Total number of resident facilities 
     Evening faculties 
     Correspondence (zaochnye) faculties 
 
7 
25 
7 
1 
2 
27 
14 
1 
14 
15 
1 
8 
15 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
12 
3 
16 
1 
15 
14 
18 
3 
2 
2 
1 
232 
2 
27 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
734 Ibid., 157. 
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Appendix H 
 
Table 12           The USSR, Union Republic and Branch Academies of Sciences  
                           (at the end of 1976)735  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
735 Cocks, 51-3, citing Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR za 60 let; yubileyniy statistichesky ezhegodnik (The 
National Economy of the USSR for 60 years; Jubilee Statistical Yearbook), 1977, Moscow, 144; the 
transcriptions of the titles are given as in the original. 
736 'The Academy was opened in 1725,’ Ibid., 51. 
Academy 
Year 
Found
ed 
Number of 
full and 
correspon
ding 
members 
Number 
of 
Scientifi
c 
Instituti
ons 
Numbe
r of 
full-
time 
scienti
sts 
With Advanced 
Degrees 
Doct
ors of 
Scien
ces 
Candid
ates of 
Scienc
es 
USSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 172736 733 244 42,951 3,943 18,785 
Ukrainian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1919 300 70 12,250 904 5,753 
Belorussia
n SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1928 126 32 4,736 187 1,336 
Uzbek 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1943 92 30 3,545 189 1,509 
Kazakh 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1945 129 31 3,736 183 1,541 
Georgian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1941 106 38 5,356 344 1,778 
Azerbaydz
han SSR 
Academy 1945 102 28 4,242 249 1,704 
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of 
Sciences 
Lithuanian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1941 49 11 1,555 60 724 
Moldavian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1961 41 19 895 59 521 
Latvian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1946 51 16 1,688 76 744 
Kirgiz 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1954 44 18 1,460 68 515 
Tadzhik 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1951 46 17 1,262 51 512 
Armenian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1943 88 31 2,898 182 933 
Turkmen 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1951 46 14 883 40 410 
Estonian 
SSR 
Academy 
of 
Sciences 1946 42 13 952 63 532 
USSR 
Academy 
of Arts 1947 127 4 349 16 131 
All-Union 
Academy 
of 
Agricultur
al 
Sciences 
imeni 1929 203 169 11,315 497 5,660 
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Lenin 
USSR 
Academy 
of Medical 
Sciences 1944 254 42 5,488 929 3,262 
USSR 
Academy 
of 
Pedagogic
al 
Sciences 1943 127 14 1,687 128 809 
RSFSR 
Academy 
of 
Communa
l 
Economic
s 1931 -- 5 428 10 206 
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Appendix I 
Figure 2             Photograph of SuperOx Superconducting Cable from Inside 
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Appendix J 
Figure 3           Photograph of Layers of Different Materials of SuperOx                            
                         Superconducting Cable from Inside  
 
 
The black layer is the superconducting rare earth compound. 
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Appendix K        Curiosity in Science  
 
• ‘I have no special talents. I am only passionately curious,’737 as well as 
 
• ‘The important thing is not to stop questioning; curiosity has its own reason for 
existing. One cannot help but be in awe when contemplating the mysteries of 
eternity, of life, of the marvelous structure of reality. It is enough if one tries merely 
to comprehend a little of the mystery every day. The important thing is not to stop 
questioning; never lose a holy curiosity’738 by Albert Einstein,739 a developer of the 
theory of relativity, which is a one of two pillars of modern physics (the other one is 
quantum mechanics), and the 1921 Nobel Prize Laureate for ‘his services to 
Theoretical Physics, and especially for his discovery of the law of the photoelectric 
effect;’740 
 
• ‘He doesn't care about whether it will lead to something useful, whether a 
breakthrough can be expected, whether it will lead to more funding. He just follows 
his curiosity’ 741  by Hitoshi Nakatogawa, a biologist at the Tokyo Institute of 
Technology, on the 2016 Nobel Laureate in Physiology or Medicine Yoshinori 
Ohsumi for his discoveries that ‘opened the path to understanding the fundamental 
importance of autophagy in many physiological processes, such as in the adaptation 
to starvation or response to infection;’742 
 
• ‘Our backgrounds, and the experience that has shaped us as scientists, are very 
different. We were born, and we grew up, on opposite sides of the globe. What we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
737 Einstein, Albert, 1952, To Carl Seelig, his biographer, March 11, Einstein Archive 39-013. A similar 
sentiment was expressed in a letter to Hans Muehsam, March 4, 1953. Einstein Archive 38-424, collected and 
edited by Calaprice, Alice, with a foreword by Freeman Dyson, 2000, The Expanded Quotable Einstein, 
Princeton University Press; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Princeton University Press Web Site, 
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have in common is a lifelong curiosity about the shapes, and changes in shape, of 
entities […] and a lifelong conviction that this curiosity will lead us closer to the 
truth of chemical processes, including the processes of life’743 by John Cornforth, the 
1975 Nobel Prize Laureate in Chemistry ‘for his work on the stereochemistry of 
enzyme-catalyzed reactions’744 on himself and his co-laureate, Vladimir Prelog; 
 
• ‘Innovation, driven by curiosity, the desire to find out something new, is one of the 
fundamental attributes of mankind. We did not go to the Moon because of wisdom, 
but because of curiosity. This is part of human instinct, it is true for all civilizations, 
and is unavoidable’745 by Carlo Rubbia, The 1984 Nobel Laureate in Physics for the 
‘decisive contributions to the large project, which led to the discovery of the field 
particles W and Z, communicators of weak interaction’ in the field of experimental 
particle physics;746 
 
• ‘I think a very big curiosity [drove me into science]. I'm very curious and I like to 
understand things and not only science but also other things where I just try to find 
out why things work or how things work. Science and nature caught my attention’747 
by Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, The 1995 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
for the ‘discoveries concerning the genetic control of early embryonic 
development;’748 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
743 Nobel Prizes and Laureates, John Cornforth's speech at the Nobel Banquet, December 10, 1975, 
Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1975/cornforth-speech.html.  
744 The Nobel Prize in Chemistry 1975, John Cornforth, Vladimir Prelog, John Cornforth – Facts, 
Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/1975/cornforth-facts.html.  
745 Catapano, Paola, 2014, Carlo Rubbia: A Passion for Physics and A Craving for New Ideas, 23 September, 
CERN Courier; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, http://cerncourier.com/cws/article/cern/58540.  
746 The Nobel Prize in Physics 1984 Carlo Rubbia, Simon van der Meer, Carlo Rubbia - Facts, Nobelprize.org; 
retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1984/rubbia-
facts.html.  
747 The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1995, Edward B. Lewis, Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, Eric F. 
Wieschaus, 2003, Transcript from an interview with Professor Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, Nobel Laureate 
Physiology or Medicine 1995, at the 53rd meeting of Nobel Laureates in Lindau, Germany, 30 June-4 July 2003. 
Interviewer is freelance journalist Marika Griehsel, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1995/nusslein-volhard-interview-transcript.html, 
hereafter referred to as Nüsslein-Volhard. 
748 The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1995, Edward B. Lewis, Christiane Nüsslein-Volhard, Eric F. 
Wieschaus, Nobelprize.org; retrieved on 25.05.2017 from the Web, 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1995/.  
	   236	  
• ‘People go into science out of curiosity, not to win an award’749 by Venkatraman 
Ramakrishnan, President of the Royal Society, Fellow of Trinity College, 
Cambridge, and the 2009 Nobel Prize Laureate in Chemistry for ‘for studies of the 
structure and function of the ribosome.’750 
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Appendix L      Life and Legacy of Pyotr Kapitsa 
 
Pyotr Kapitsa was a Soviet and Cambridge physicist and an engineer, the 1978 Nobel 
laureate in Physics ‘for his basic inventions and discoveries in the area of low-temperature 
physics.’751 In the 1930s-70s, Kapitsa wrote his letters to the Kremlin, around 50 out of 
which were addressed to Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and 250 to other policy-makers 
and some of Kapitsa’s international colleagues. The most significant of them were 
published in 1989 in Russian752 and a year later in English.753 Possibly due to the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, these letters, which influenced the Soviet political leadership, have not 
yet been addressed considerably in academic literature. Kapitsa was also a widely known 
public figure for his speeches and public lectures for a general audience.  
 
As mentioned in chapter 4, Kapitsa arrived in Cambridge in 1921 as a member of an official 
Soviet delegation in the time when Russia was in the end of the Civil War. Despite the 
scarcity of the funds available, the Bolsheviks were very keen in the execution of their 
policy of the development of science and education.  
 
Afterwards, Kapitsa travelled annually between England and the USSR until he was 
detained in Moscow to work for his country in 1934. The rapid change of his lifetime and 
traveling plans was interpreted in British and international newspapers as forceful. 
However, studying Kapitsa’s correspondence754 with his mother as well as with his superior 
and the head of the Cavendish laboratory, Professor Ernest Rutherford, allowed stating that 
Kapitsa was intending to do this at a certain stage of his life. He rather possibly objected the 
manner, in which the detention had been performed, than the decision itself.  
 
According to A Hundred and Forty Talks with Molotov: from Chuev’s Diaries, Vyacheslav 
Molotov recalled that it was one who initiated the process to detain Kapitsa in the USSR 
which was accepted by Kapitsa with neither enthusiasm nor dissatisfaction. What is curious 
in this story is that the idea, according to Molotov, came to him from the academician and 
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physiologist Ivan Pavlov, the 1904 Nobel laureate in Physiology or Medicine,755 who was 
known for his anti-Soviet position but who managed to place the strategic national interests 
above his hostility towards the ruling regime.756  The final decision was made by Josef 
Stalin, after a special meeting of the Politburo on Kapitsa. Stalin gave an order by a 
telegram from Sochi on 21 September 1934 to detain Kapitsa in the Soviet Union.757 
 
Meanwhile, the best indicator of Kapitsa’s real intention to return to his home country could 
be the fact that even after living in England for 13 years and becoming a Fellow of the 
Royal Society, he had retained, against all the odds, his Soviet citizenship. Although in his 
wife Anna’s recollections, she stated the opposite about Kapitsa’s personal feeling of his 
forceful return to the USSR, one could assume that he was rather unhappy about the 
particular manner in which his return happened than, perhaps, the true nature of the event 
itself. Here is how Anna Kapitsa described their family’s difficulties concerning the Soviet 
citizenship: 
 
I knew Pyotr Leonidovich’ [Kapitsa’s] true feeling and knew that he could 
never stay in England forever, tearing away from his motherland. The fact 
that during all the years in England he remained a Soviet citizen was 
strongly troubling for everything, starting from the London Royal Society 
and including all our life in Cambridge. They approached him for a 
countless number of times, saying that it was inconvenient. And for 
Rutherford it was an act of bravery to have, support in any way and promote 
the Soviet citizen.758 
  
While in Cambridge, for his research Kapitsa had designed and launched The Mond Lab, 
opened with pomp by Stanley Baldwin, a former (and the next) British Prime-Minister,759 in 
February 1933, which was purchased by the Soviet Government after Kapitsa’s return in 
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1934.760 In 1936 it was already delivered and assembled at the Institute for Physical 
Problems, especially established earlier in Moscow in 1934 for Kapitsa to run and to 
become what is now the P.L. Kapitza Institute for Physical Problems.761 The fact of the 
purchase of this high-tech lab as well as the speed with which this process happened 
evidently indicated that during ‘the irreconcilable struggle between socialism and 
imperialism’ (Stalin) the leadership of two nations was driven by more pragmatic needs 
than the ideological rhetoric.  
 
According to Chitre, Lord Adrian, the 1932 Nobel Prize recipient in Physiology,762 stated in 
his later lectures at Cambridge that he had been actively involved in the lab’s transfer.763 
Pyotr Kapitsa mentioned Adrian's involvement in his letter to Anna. Adrian was in 
Leningrad and Moscow, taking part in the XV International Congress of physiologists 
(1,500 scientists from 37 countries, August 1935) and brought a message from Kapitsa to 
Cambridge.764 The fact of the Congress is also worth highlighting in the light of the unity of 
Soviet science with global development and the main principles of science able to develop 
in open academic exchange. 
 
Regarding Kapitsa’s return in the USSR and the transfer of the Mond lab from Cambridge to 
Moscow in the 1930s, Littlewood pointed out that there was a very stressful situation 
associated with Kapitsa:  
 
In Cambridge and with Cavendish he was obviously a brilliant scientist and 
innovated enormously in Cambridge. When he went back to the Soviet Union 
under pretty complicated circumstances, there was even an understanding that 
his colleagues in Cambridge should not publish things ahead of him. There 
are these famous stories about helium which he clearly had worked on, 
understood superfluid helium and really made major discoveries there, which 
were brilliant but was unable to publish that work in a hurry and his British 
colleagues stepped back from publishing their own results to allow him to get 
credit. As a personal character, he was a very major one as an individual, in 
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fact, in establishing this new field. It has often been individual Soviet 
scientists who occupied sort of a very strong place in building these bridges 
one way or the other.765  
 
According to Littlewood, there were contacts all of the time, and it was recognised by those 
people who were smart on both sides that having the scientific connexions would have built 
fabric which would enable collaborations to come in better times politically. 
 
As outlined by him, superfluidity and superconductivity are not very visible in terms of 
technology, however, every MRI magnet has superconducting coils in it. Some of these 
technologies are hidden behind all of this. Littlewood thinks that the biggest impact of all of 
that stuff is conceptual. He is looking forward to another generation to start to build 
technologies out of magnetism and quantum systems. He has reasons to believe, that this is 
beginning to emerge in an unknown yet way. However, the flow from understanding 
superfluidity to the understanding of superconductivity to Bose condensation of cold atoms to 
lasers to eventually to the manipulation of quantum mechanics is an unbroken thread. 
 
According to Littlewood, at the CERN magnet, this circle, a tube, operates on Bose 
superconductivity and [Kapitsa] superfluidity. They need superfluid helium to cool as well. 
Superfluidity in many ways is an extraordinary concept, which opens a scientific mind to the 
possibility of collective phenomena and thinking about collective phenomena in a very 
different way than one would have done. The big idea, which comes out of something like 
superconductivity is that of emergence. Superfluidity is that atoms are put together, and 
collectively the sum is qualitatively different from the parts.  
 
Upon Kapitsa’s return, in parallel to his academic activity, Nikolay Gorbunov, who was in 
charge of the SAS’ administrative affairs, appointed Kapitsa to be responsible for the 
technical provision for the SAS, having immediately identified his managerial ability. In 
addition, the appointment was needed by Kapitsa to be accommodated in the new Soviet 
working environment among his colleagues, who were, sometimes, not very friendly to the 
newcomer. Gorbunov was a prominent hereditary engineer, and, more importantly, a former 
secretary to Lenin, as described by Pavel Rubinin, a long-term secretary to Kapitsa.766 
Gorbunov’s position as the Secretary to the SAS is another evidence of that high role which 	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was given to science in Soviet policy-making considering the overall weight anything 
related to Lenin’s figure had had. 
 
Regarding Kapitsa’s correspondence, it would be interesting to note about the direct 
feedback Kapitsa received from Stalin which was mentioned by Eremenko in chapter 3. 
Kapitsa was sent two letters from Stalin, acknowledging the receipt of all the 
correspondence and encouraging him to continue it.  In a telephone conversation, 
Malenkov, the Communist Party’s secretary, summoned the academician for more letters to 
be written for Stalin and the Government. In one of his letters Stalin says:  
 
From Stalin. Moscow 4 April 1946.  
Comrade Kapitza, I have received all your letters. There is much that is 
instructive in them and I should like to meet you at some time to have a 
chat.767 
    
It should be added that, during the campaign of the political purges in 1937-8, Kapitsa 
revealed a high level of personal courage in communicating directly with Stalin and 
Molotov to save from prison both physicist Lev Landau,768 a future laureate of the 1962 
Nobel Prize in Physics ‘for his pioneering theories for condensed matter, especially liquid 
helium,’769 and physicist Vladimir Foсk,770 who eventually became known ‘for his seminal 
contributions in quantum mechanics and the general theory of relativity.’771  
 
Also, some of Kapitsa’s letters helped resolve particular problems and apply the 
administrative resources for this.772 
 
In particular, in a long letter to Molotov,773 which described the process of the creation of 
liquid oxygen, the method discovered by Kapitsa himself, he stressed the rise of 
productivity to be achieved in all the factories, in which turbines could be used, with the 	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new machine designed for oxygenation. This machine was two times cheaper than its 
German analogue.  Although Kapitsa believed that patents did not contribute to 
development, he emphasised the need to patent this particular technology. This letter gave a 
start to an intensive correspondence on this subject with Stalin and others, which lasted for 
years. As a result of this first single letter, a special workshop was designed at a plant in 
Moscow by Molotov’s order to test the technology,774 and the patent work began. In later 
years this move brought a stream of patent revenues from abroad.775  
 
What is more significant, this method of oxygenation was used industrially in WWII and 
saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of wounded Red Army soldiers in war hospitals, 
when Kapitsa was head of an official body, Glavkislorod (Department of Oxygen Industry), 
practically in the rank of minister.776  
 
According to Lonzarich, he had ‘the great pleasure of interacting with Kapitsa on the latter’s 
occasional visits to Cambridge and ‘ha[s] heard a great deal about him from [his] mentor 
David Shoenberg, who was one of Kapitsa’s first students.  Kapitsa will be forever known for 
his fundamental discovery of superfluidity in liquid helium, but this was only a part of his 
overall outstanding contributions to science and technology, which has been widely reported 
and celebrated in the literature.’777  
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Appendix M             Science Policy Advising by Bush and Kapitsa 
 
Vannevar Bush was an electrical engineering Professor from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT), in addition to being in different years the first scientific advisor to the 
American President, F.D. Roosevelt, the chairman of the Office of Scientific Research and 
Development (OSRD), the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC), the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), which would be in later years transformed 
into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), as well as a coordinator 
and initiator of the Manhattan Project, who prepared in 1945 his report to the American 
President, Science, The Endless Frontier,778 mentioned by Tsironis in chapter 3.  
 
Bush articulated the vitality of basic research, also-called pure, or fundamental research, for 
a nation in the following famous statement: 
 
Basic research leads to new knowledge. It provides scientific capital. It 
creates the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be 
drawn. New products and new processes do not appear full-grown. They are 
founded on new principles and new conceptions, which in turn are 
painstakingly developed by research in the purest realms of science. Today, 
it is truer than ever that basic research is the pacemaker of technological 
progress. [...] A nation which depends upon others for its new basic 
scientific knowledge will be slow in its industrial progress and weak in its 
competitive position in world trade, regardless of its mechanical skill.779 
 
For example, if comparing Bush’s statement from above on the significance of science, with 
one from Kapitsa’s letter to a Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, with whom Kapitsa 
continues the succession of the correspondence with Stalin, one can read the following: 
‘Really advanced science, by studying the laws governing the natural world around us, will 
search for and create fundamentally new avenues for the material and spiritual development 
of society.’780 The same idea, in another statement by Bush, is formulated as follows: 
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Pure research is research without specific practical ends. It results in general 
knowledge and understanding of nature and its laws. This general 
knowledge provides the means of answering a large number of important 
practical problems, though it may not give a specific solution to any one of 
them. The pure scientist may not be at all interested in the practical 
applications of his work; yet the development of important new industries 
depends primarily on a continuing progress of pure science. One of the 
peculiarities of pure science is the variety of paths which lead to productive 
advance.781  
 
Both of them propagated the primacy of fundamental research in modern technological 
development as the only way to new knowledge and the provision of scientific capital as 
‘the fund from which the practical applications of knowledge must be drawn’ (Bush) which 
‘studying the laws governing the natural world around us, will search for and create 
fundamentally new avenues for the material and spiritual development of society’ (Kapitsa) 
citing from their statements above. 
 
According to them, pure research is the basis of technological progress which provides the 
nation ‘its competitive position in world trade, regardless of its mechanical skill’ (Bush). In 
this process, the nation benefits from scientific activity studying nature’s laws with no quest 
for any practical and immediate solutions.  
 
The scientists’ unity in their views can be outlined in the following principles vital to the 
development of science. Firstly, it is the importance of the international contacts needed for 
the scientific development as well as that of the reduction of both the secrecy and 
dependency on international patenting to a minimal level, as expressed in a letter from 
Kapitsa to Niels Bohr.782 Similarly Bush expressed the importance of internationalism for 
scientific development in the following: ‘The Government should take an active role in 
promoting the international flow of scientific information.’783 He relentlessly called for 
revising the policy on the secrecy in the post-war reality as well as for re-establishing 
international contacts, above all, with the Soviet Union784 in order ‘to secure a high level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
781 Bush, 81. 
782 Kapitsa I, 236. Although the letter is addressed to Niels Bohr, a fellow Danish physicist, it is well-worth to 
remember that this correspondence was not only read but also approved by the top officials of the USSR as one 
related to the creation of the Soviet Atomic Bomb.  
783 Bush, 22. 
784 Ibid., xiv. 
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employment, to maintain a position of world leadership – the flow of new scientific 
knowledge must be both continuous and substantial.’785 
 
Secondly, it is the exclusion of the national industrial development from the dependence on 
foreign technology as seen from Bush’s statement on the nation’s mechanical skills above. 
This idea was expressed by Kapitsa in the correspondence with Malenkov,786 Molotov, and 
Stalin. It would be interesting to note that the latter read the letter to Molotov prior to 
receiving it separately and he as evident forced Molotov behind the scene to continue the 
interaction with the scientist, which would become very fruitful. Meanwhile, Kapitsa wrote 
to Stalin in December 1936 regarding the trap of the technology transfer: ‘All our industrial 
development is based on the takeover of the foreign experience. […] I should say directly, 
that with regard to the progress of science and technology we are the full colony of the 
West.’787  
 
The scientist emphasised the importance of the development of the indigenous school of 
science and technology in order to reduce dependence on the ‘capitalistic countries,’ to have 
an ability to progress, and illustrated this with the example of a large, albeit unnamed, 
British company he used to consult and which used to receive equipment from the USA. He 
explained how a team of researchers and engineers was put together to understand the new 
technology in order for the company to have the freedom to develop. Thus, Kapitsa 
explained, once the technology was transferred, if properly understood, it could be 
developed without further dependence on the transfer. Otherwise, according to him, the 
situation would resemble a high school in which the students were taught to swot up on the 
subject having their ability to think and innovate suppressed.    
 
One can compare these statements with the two following and similar citations of Bush’s 
report, the one at the beginning of this piece above and this one:  
 
First, the intellectual banks of continental Europe, from which we formerly 
borrowed, have become bankrupt through the ravages of war. No longer can 
we count upon those sources for fundamental science. Second, in this 
modern age, more than ever before, pure research is the pace-maker of 
technological progress. […] In the next generation, technological advance 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
785 Ibid., 10. 
786 A letter to Malenkov, 26 June 1946, Kapitsa I, 268. 
787  Kapitsa I, 121. 
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and basic scientific discovery will be inseparable; a nation which borrows 
its basic knowledge will be hopelessly handicapped in the race for 
innovation.788 
 
Thirdly, it is the reliance of the local cadres and the national technology in development in 
order to become a truly advanced country, as addressed by Kapitsa in letters to both Stalin 
and Molotov,789 and in Bush’s report on the deficit of the local human capital and able 
students.790 
 
Fourthly, it is the application of the efforts from the state for the promotion of the 
importance of science for the whole process of the development for the masses to 
understand and take part in the process. Kapitsa wrote to Stalin in 1937, aiming at the state 
to undertake the following actions: i) similar to the policy, existing in Britain, to launch the 
organisation of museums and exhibition of science; ii) to promote science and progress 
through the film industry; iii) to organise an appropriate popular literature and scientific 
lecturing; iv) to encourage and develop scientific journalism; v) to popularise science in 
high school.791 All the large funds allocated for this purpose, according to Kapitsa, ‘would 
be repaid in ten or fifteen years by a rise in a whole level of science in the Soviet Union.’792   
 
Bush also emphasised the importance of promotion of science for the nation793 in multiple 
statements throughout his report, including this one: ‘The general public is still far from a 
true understanding of the nature of basic research and of the fundamental difference 
between science and technology,’794  
 
or the following one: 
 
We therefore urge that the Federal Government take a more active interest 
in promoting scientific research, and in assuring that the Nation gain there – 
from the benefits of increased security and increased welfare. We are 
convinced that the most effective way for the Federal Government to serve 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788 Bush, 78-9. 
789  A letter to Stalin, 25 Nov 1945, Kapitsa I, 239, and A Letter to Molotov, 6 April 1943, Kapitsa I, 118. 
790 Just two indications out of many others, Bush, 26, 74. 
791 A Letter to Stalin, 10 July 1937, Kapitsa I, 135-43. 
792 Kapitsa II, 342. 
793 Bush, 26, 74 and throughout the report. 
794 Waterman, Alan T., 1960, Introduction, Reissue, Bush, Vannevar, 1945, Science, the Endless Frontier, 
National Science Foundation, Washington DC, ix; hereafter referred to as Waterman. 
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these purposes is to provide to our educational institutions and research 
institutes support for basic research and training for research. By so doing, 
the Government will increase the flow of new knowledge and the supply of 
young scientists trained in research. It is on this new knowledge that applied 
science must build, and it is from the ranks of those trained in research that 
the leaders in applied science must come.795 
 
It would be interesting to observe that Bush pointed out, unlike the state of affairs in the 
Soviet Union, the lack of an American  
 
national policy for science. The Government has only begun to utilize 
science in the Nation's welfare. There is no body within the Government 
charged with formulating or executing a national science policy. There are 
no standing committees of the Congress devoted to this important subject. 
Science has been in the wings. It should be brought to the center of the 
stage—for in it lies much of our hope for the future.796 
 
Fifthly, Kapitsa relentlessly stressed the importance of both the creation of special 
comfortable living and working conditions for scientists as well as that of the increase of the 
scientists’ social status. In 1935 he complained in a letter of 14-16 February to his wife, that 
‘[t]here is no respect to original scientific thinking here at all. The title of either Professor, 
or Academician is not respected.’797 In his letters to Stalin in 1937 Kapitsa emphasised the 
need for, apart from material conditions, ‘a creative productive element,’ i.e. an ecosystem, 
to be created for scientists and engineers to come from.798 However, ten years later (this 
period included four years of the devastating war), in 1946 Kapitsa thanked Stalin for 
rapidly increasing an average monthly wage for the Soviet professorship. It reached 9,000 
rubles (5,000+4,000) which allowed the scientists to work and live without being ‘being 
distracted for anything but science.’799  
 
Bush was also caring about the material provision for the American scientists. However, in 
the different conditions of the American economic reality, it was expressed in the need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
795 Bush, 74. 
796 Ibid., 12. 
797 Anna Kapitsa. 
798 A Letter to Stalin, December 1936 – January 1937, Kapitsa I, 120-4. 
799 A Letter to Stalin, 10 March 1946, Kapitsa I, 251-3. 
	   248	  
increase the number of scholarships for science undergraduates and graduate fellowships.800 
Bush particularly emphasised that ‘[i]f ability, and not the circumstance of family fortune, is 
made to determine who shall receive higher education in science, then we shall be assured 
of constantly improving quality at every level of scientific activity.’801 
 
Sixthly, it is the reduction of the bureaucratic pressure to zero and the increase of the 
academic freedom as described by Kapitsa to Stalin in the USSR.802 The same universal 
idea important for science was expressed by Bush in the following statement: ‘Scientific 
progress on a broad front results from the free play of free intellects, working on subjects of 
their own choice, in the manner dictated by their curiosity for exploration of the unknown. 
Freedom of inquiry must be preserved under any plan for Government support of 
science.’803 
 
Seventhly, both of the enlighteners in their calls to their national leaders, Stalin and 
Roosevelt, summoned for special attention to education in science and engineering. In 
particular, Kapitsa was known for his contribution to this field in founding one of the 
leading Soviet higher educational institutions, Phystech, or MFTI, The Moscow Institute of 
Physics and Technology,804  in 1951, whose quality of education was emphasised by 
Paltashev in chapter 3.  
 
Meanwhile, its principles were described by Kapitsa in his letter to Stalin in 1946. Quite 
remarkably and due to Kapitsa’s affiliation with Cambridge, they resemble those of this 
university. These distinguishing principles were characterised with the following. The 
teaching process of students by researchers should be performed on the individual basis on 
the latest equipment with the involvement of the students from years 2 and 3 into the 
scientific research activity, which would allow them upon graduation ‘to possess modern 
methods of theoretical and experimental research and to have sufficient engineering 
knowledge to resolve technical tasks.’805 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 Bush, 7-8. 
801 Ibid., 25. 
802 A Letter to Stalin, 10 March 1946, Kapitsa I, 251-3. 
803 Bush, 12. 
804 MFTI. 
805 Kapitsa, Sergey P., ed. Kapitsa, E.L., Balakhovskaya T., 2008, Moi Vospominaniya (My Memoirs), 
ROSSPEN, 145 
	   249	  
In parallel, Bush indicated the importance of the government to concentrate its efforts on 
the formation of education on the purpose of basic research806 and described this philosophy 
in the following way:  
 
Several factors combine to emphasize the appropriateness of universities for 
research. The university as a whole is charged with the responsibility not 
only of maintaining the knowledge of the past and imparting it to students 
but of contributing to new knowledge of all kinds. The scientific worker is 
thus provided with colleagues who, though they may represent widely 
differing fields, all have an understanding and appreciation of the value of 
new knowledge, […] much of which can arouse opposition because of its 
tendency to challenge current beliefs and practices.807 
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Appendix N            Replies to Chokan Laumulin’s Questionnaire for a PhD thesis 
                                 by Gilbert G Lonzarich, Cambridge, 26-05-2017 
 
1. Often these days, in both mass media and conventional economic thought, the role of 
fundamental science is not viewed in connection with economic development. As a scientist, 
do you have an opinion on this? 
 
Reply. There is a large body of evidence supporting the view that fundamental science often 
leads to technological applications. This is especially true for the fields of condensed matter 
physics, materials science and metallurgy, chemistry, biology and, indeed, all of the “higher” 
sciences. Some of the research in more fundamental areas such as particle physics, astronomy 
and cosmology may appear to be more remote from applications. However, the ideas that 
have arisen in such fields have found applications in producing ways of thinking and 
mathematical techniques that can be applied to the higher sciences. There are also spin-off 
developments in these more fundamental areas of research that have changed industry in 
many ways. 
 
The goal of basic research is to develop theoretical frameworks that not only allow us to 
understand or interpret observed phenomena, but, perhaps more importantly, that allow us to 
make reliable predictions. These predictions are not only essential in the design and 
development of our industries, but they are also invaluable in guiding us to new discoveries in 
a never-ending process of scientific evolution. 
 
It is possible that many individuals have failed to recognise the role of fundamental research 
because many years of development are often required to bring a new scientific idea into the 
engineering fields. It is easier to see the links that exist between engineering and our economy 
than the links that exist between fundamental science and industry. 
 
2. In your view, do fundamental science and engineering relate to each other? 
 
Reply. These two areas are deeply interconnected. Fundamental science leads to ideas that are 
eventually taken up in engineering areas and in a similar way engineering developments lead 
to advances taken up in fundamental science. For example, the discovery and understanding 
of superconductivity led to the development of highly powerful magnets that are now being 
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used in medical imagers throughout the world (to name only one of many applications).  
Moreover, this engineering development has led to the construction of the giant supercollider 
such as that at CERN that has changed our understanding of the universe (recently via the 
discovery of how the mass of particles and indeed of every known object in the world has 
arisen). This is an example of the interconnectedness of fundamental science and engineering 
– in short, one feeds off the other and vice versa. 
 
3. In my abstract above I conjecture that science drives the process of industrial 
development. In your opinion, how do discoveries in fundamental science lead to disruptive 
and marketable technologies? 
 
Reply. I have attempted to answer this question under 1 above. However, I can add an 
example out of a vast number for your interest. Fundamental research into the nature of 
electricity led to the discovery in Cambridge and elsewhere of the existence of the electron 
that lies behind many physical, chemical and biological processes. This discovery involved 
the invention of the electronic valve also known as the vacuum tube, which gave us radio, 
television, radar and more. Soon after came the discovery of the quantum nature of matter. 
This in turn led to the invention of the transistor, which replaced the electronic valve and 
brought us the telecommunications and computer age. All of this arose from fundamental 
research discoveries and their theoretical understanding. 
 
It is astonishing to those who are familiar with the history of science and technology that there 
should be a lack of greater awareness of the monumental contributions that fundamental 
research has made to our society. 
 
4. Would you agree or disagree that the main process that leads to the sustainable 
technological development of large developed countries (or companies) is clearly linked to a 
strong fundamental science research base? 
 
Reply. I would unconditionally agree. My reasons have been stated above. 
 
5. Today economic planners and management schools strongly believe in (and teach) the 
notion that science is a product of the Market and discoveries in science are driven by market 
demand (search for practical and profitable solutions). In other words, scientific discoveries 
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result mainly from the pursuit for profit and efficiency. To what degree would agree or 
disagree with this notion? 
 
Reply. It is likely that small-scale invention and development are driven by market demand, 
but that truly major scientific developments arise through a different process. This may not be 
fully understood but it involves the scientists’ natural curiosity to explore and understand the 
natural world. A realistic view might be that the funding bodies are primarily motivated by 
economic or political needs, while scientists are primarily motivated by other factors that may 
be difficult for the funding bodies to understand.  In order to maximize productivity it may be 
crucially important that the planners have a realistic understanding of what actually motivates 
research scientists themselves. 
 
6. Do you think that today’s digital informational revolution has speeded up the process? 
 
Reply. An obvious advantage of the information revolution is that scientists are now able to 
access publications instantly and remain up to date with developments in their field.  Another 
advantage is the ease with which researchers can communicate with each other across the 
world. This has led to the development of something like a collective mind that has no 
parallels in history. This integration of the scientific community might, however, hinder the 
independent development of ideas. This is not unavoidable because researchers have the 
option to turn off the links if they wish to do so to enable them to develop their own thinking 
independently. The main obstacle to this independent development is that academic 
institutions and funding bodies tend to favour individuals who are closely integrated within 
the international community. The age of the lone explorer and inventor may therefore be at an 
end. 
 
7. The following questions are dedicated to the Soviet industrial development, and the first 
one I would like to ask you, if possible, is as follows: to what extent was the Soviet 
technological development different to those of other developed countries, if true? Were there 
any substantial differences to the US, Western European, Japanese or any other approaches in 
dealing with the S&T development? 
 
Reply. I have insufficient information to provide a helpful reply. 
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8. In your opinion, how crucial was technology transfer for the Soviet industrial 
development? 
 
Reply. As above. 
 
9. What is a Soviet science and technology contribution to global technological development? 
 
Reply. Soviet science and technology has brought us the space age. This is a monumental 
contribution not only to the history of civilization, but that of life on earth itself. In general, 
the Soviet Union invested heavily in both fundamental science and technology and has many 
contributions of worldwide importance. I am particularly aware of contributions in metallurgy 
and materials science and in theoretical physics, particularly in the field of superconductivity. 
The theories that we use in practice in the field of superconductivity depend heavily on the 
seminal works of Soviet scientists. I personally use Soviet theoretical inventions on a regular 
basis. 
 
10. In terms of any country’s technological development, what do you think of the idea to rely 
solely on technology transfer without developing its own science and technology base? 
 
Reply. Technology transfer is always desirable unless its effect is to permanently restrict the 
development of the nation’s own science and technology base.  Without such a base, it seems 
likely that a nation would be destined to remain in a subordinate position. This will lead to a 
state of mind that will prevent the nation’s unique genius from flourishing. It is easy to 
understand that the dominant powers would wish smaller nations to remain in a subordinate 
position. 
 
11. Another question is, when talking about technological development about an opinion 
which is getting more widespread, especially in the countries which are not so developed. 
Policy makers often defend the idea of technology transfer – ‘Why would we need to fund 
this development, it requires structural reforms, both educational and social, when it would be 
simpler to achieve economic success through technology transfer?’ What would you say? 
 
Reply. This is the advice that seems likely to be given by some who wish to ensure that 
subordinate status will become permanent. The arguments may seem convincing at first sight, 
but they are likely to lead to the “road to serfdom”. 
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12. In my research the figure of Pyotr Kapitza occupies a central place. What do you think of 
his contribution to global science and technology? 
 
Reply. I had the great pleasure of interacting with Kapitza on his occasional visits to 
Cambridge and I have heard a great deal about him from my mentor David Shoenberg, who 
was one of Kapitza’s first students. Kapitza will be forever known for his fundamental 
discovery of superfluidity in liquid helium, but this was only a part of his overall outstanding 
contributions to science and technology, which has been widely reported and celebrated in the 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  
